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EXPERIMENTS  IN  INTERNATIONAL 
ADMINISTRATION 


EXPERIMENTS  IN 
INTERNATIONAL 
ADMINISTRATION 

By 
FRANCIS  BOWES  SAYRE,  SJ.D. 


Harper    &   Brothers    Publishers 

New  York  and  London 
J  I- 


Experiments  in  Intbrkational  Aomtntstration 


Copyright,  1919,  by  Harper  &  Brothers 

Printed  In  the  United  States  of  America 

Published  January,  1919 


To 

the  dear  mother  of 

Francis  and  Eleanor 

JESSIE  WOODROW  SAYRE 

this  little  hook  is  lovingly  dedicated 


CONTENTS 

CHAP.  FAOB 

Preface xi 

I.  Epoch-making  Treaties  of  the  Past 1 

Treaty  of  Munster 2 

Treaty  of  Utrecht 3 

Treaty  of  Vienna 3 

Reasons  for  failure 6 

II.  Types  of  International  Executive  Organs   .    .  12 

Type  1. — International  Administrative  Organs  with 

little  or  no  real  power  of  control 13 

TyP^  2- — International  Executive  Organs  with  real 
power  of  control  over  some  local  situation  within 

a  particular  state  or  states 14 

Type  3. — International  Executive  Organs  with  real 
power  of  control  over  all  of  the  member  states 

themselves 15 

III.  International  Organs  with  Little  or  No  Power 

— Typel 18 

The  Universal  Postal  Union 19 

Other  Public  Unions       26 

IV.  International  Organs  with  Power  of  Control 

Over  Local  Situations — Ttpe  2 38 

(1)  The  European  Danube  Commission   ....  38 

Its  history 39 

Its  powers 44 

Its  organization 45 


CONTENTS 

PAGE 

(2)  Cape  Spartel  Lighthouse 47 

(3)  International  Sanitary  Councils 48 

(a)  The  Council  at  Constantinople      ....  52 

(6)  The  Council  at  Alexandria 53 

(4)  Albania 56 

Reasons  for  its  failure 59 

Creation   of  the  International   Commission   of 

Control 58 

(5)  Moroccan  International  Police 62 

The  Algeciras  Conference 64 

Organization  of  the  "International  Police"     .     .  65 

(6)  The  Suez  Canal  Commission 68 

The  Paris  Conference  of  1885 70 

The  creation  of  the  Suez  Commission    ....  72 

(7)  The  Congo 79 

(a)  The  Congo  Free  State 79 

(6)  The  International  Congo  River  Commission  84 

(8)  Chinese  River  Commissions 88 

(a)  The  Huangpu  Conservancy  Board     ...  88 

(6)  The  Pei-ho  Conservancy  Board      ....  91 

(9)  Spitzbergen 92 

(10)  The  New  Hebrides 97 

International  Organs  with  Power  of  Control 

Over  the  Member  States — Type  3      ....  117 

(1)  The  International  Sugar  Commission     .     .     .  117 

Its  history 118 

Its  functions 121 

Its  operation 124 

(2)  International  River  Commissions 131 

(a)  The  Rhine  Commission 132 

Treaty  of  1804 132 

Treaty  of  1815 134 

Treaty  of  1831 137 

Treaty  of  1868 139 


CONTENTS 

CHAP.  FAOll 

VI.     Conclusions 147 

(1)  Underlying  reasons  for  success  or  failure  .     .  147 

(2)  The  unanimity  requirement 150 

(3)  Equality  of  votes 158 

(4)  The  chance  for  success 166 

Appendix  A. — Inteknational  Leagues  of  the  Past  173 

(1)  The  Seventeenth  Century 173 

(2)  The  Eighteenth  Century 175 

(3)  The  Nineteenth  Century 178 

Appendix  B. — Danube  Regulations 182 

Appendix   C. — The   International   Sugar   Con- 
vention      189 

(1)  The  Convention  of  March  5,  1902     ....  189 

(2)  The  Additional  Act  of  August  28,  1907     .     .  199 


PREFACE 

The  great  age  of  Nationalism,  which  in  a 
single  century  saw  the  dramatic  unification  of 
two  nations,  and  the  growth  of  a  new  national 
consciousness  on  the  part  of  others,  is  past. 
The  Twentieth  Century  is  witnessing  a  pro- 
found change — a  great  moving  forward  toward 
a  co-operative  Internationalism.  The  surpris- 
ing growth  of  the  facilities  of  international 
transportation  and  communication,  and  the 
consequent  increasing  interdependency  of  na- 
tion upon  nation  for  the  raw  materials  and 
manufactured  products  necessary  for  the  eco- 
nomic existence  of  each,  have  made  such  an 
Internationalism  inevitable,  even  were  the  social 
and  moral  consciousness  of  all  peoples  not 
already  reaching  out  in  that  direction.  The 
incalculable  world  injury  which  has  been  the 
direct  result  of  the  unchecked  national  de- 
velopment of  Prussia  ever  since  the  teachings 
of  Nietzsche  and  Treitschke  and  Bismarck  of 
over  a  generation  ago  has  startled  every  one 
into  a  keen  realization  of  this  interdependency 


PREFACE 

and  of  the  necessity  for  organized  co-operation 
if  future  progress  is  to  be  assured. 

The  growth  of  Internationalism  has  found 
its  most  recent  expression  in  the  increasing 
demand  for  a  League  of  Nations;  but  as  to 
how  this  shall  be  constituted,  with  what  powers 
it  shall  be  clothed,  and  in  what  manner  it  shall 
function,  there  is  the  widest  disagreement. 
Will  it  be  a  scheme  of  mutual  guarantees  alone, 
or  will  it  possess  a  definite  organization?  Will 
it  be  j>ossible  to  endow  it  with  a  practicable 
legislative,  judicial,  or  executive  organ? 

These  are  questions  not  to  be  easily  or  dog- 
matically answered.  The  future  League  of 
Nations  may  gradually  evolve  through  the  play 
and  interplay  of  national  and  world  forces  from 
slender  beginnings  into  a  potent  reality  in 
much  the  same  way  as  has  the  British  Constitu- 
tion. Or,  if  it  is  given  definite  and  permanent 
form  at  the  coming  Congress,  the  nature  of 
its  organization  may  be  shaped  by  practical 
exigencies  arising  at  the  Peace  Table  in  a  way 
no  one  can  predict.  But  in  order  that  a  true 
understanding  may  be  had  of  some  of  the 
fundamental  dangers  and  difficulties  involved 
in  the  formation  of  any  league,  a  survey  has 
been  made  of  the  more  interesting  of  the  recent 
experiments  in  international  administration.  As 
the  title  indicates,  the  field  has  been  restricted 


PREFACE 

to  experiments  in  administration;  no  effort  has 
been  made  to  trace  similar  experiments  of  a 
legislative  or  of  a  judicial  nature. 

It  is  a  pleasure  to  have  this  opportunity 
of  expressing  a  deep  appreciation  for  the  very 
real  help  given  by  Professor  Frank  M.  Anderson, 
of  Dartmouth  College,  who  generously  read  over 
the  proof-sheets  and  made  many  constructive 
suggestions  and  criticisms.  Grateful  acknowl- 
edgment is  also  given  to  Mr.  Joseph  P.  Cham- 
berlain, of  Columbia  University,  who  looked 
over  a  part  of  the  advance  sheets,  and  to  Miss 
Helen  W.  Bones,  whose  assistance  in  correcting 
proof  has  been  invaluable. 

New  York  City, 
Christmas  Eve,  1918. 


EXPERIMENTS  IN  INTERNATIONAL 
ADMINISTRATION 


EXPERIMENTS  IN  INTERNATIONAL 
ADMINISTRATION 

CHAPTER  I 

EPOCH-MAKING   TREATIES   OF  THE   PAST 

SELDOM  has  an  emotion  so  quickly  and 
profoundly  seized  upK)n  the  imagination  of 
the  peoples  of  the  world  as  has  the  great  hope 
that  at  the  Peace  Congress  of  1919  there  will  at 
last  be  created  a  League  of  Nations  to  guarantee 
future  peace.  It  seems  as  though  there  had 
never  been  a  time  when  so  much  earnest  effort 
was  being  devoted  to  the  creation  of  some  world 
organization,  in  order  that  "the  brotherhood 
of  mankind  may  no  longer  be  a  fair  but  empty 
phrase,"  but  "may  be  given  a  structure  of 
force  and  reality."*  Yet,  in  this  high  effort 
to  translate  into  fact  the  hopes  and  desires  of 
all  peoples  for  international  order  and  law,  it 

*  President  Wilson's  message  to  the  Provisional  Government 
of  Russia.  May  26,  1917. 

1 


INTERNATIONAL  ADMINISTRATION 

must  not  be  forgotten  that,  as  a  study  of  past 
experiments  only  too  plainly  shows,  not  every 
kind  of  League  will  insure  peace.  The  Con- 
ference of  Versailles  will  not  be  the  first  one  at 
which  representatives  of  the  nations  have  gath- 
ered at  the  conclusion  of  a  great  war,  sincerely 
animated  by  a  universal  desire  for  peace,  and 
confident  of  devising  some  effective  method  for 
preserving  and  guaranteeing  the  agreements 
and  settlements  reached  at  the  council-table. 

At  the  close  of  the  bloody  Thirty  Years'  War 
in  1648  the  assembled  states  joined  in  recipro- 
cal guarantees  of  peace;  and,  to  make  assur- 
ance doubly  sure,  they  formed  an  interesting 
project  for  combining  the  common  force  of  the 
members  against  any  state^  which  persisted  for 
three  years  in  unjust  aggression,  the  member 
states  "being  first  advertis'd  by  the  injur'd  that 
gentle  Means  and  Justice  prevailed  nothing."* 

Again,  during  the  wars  that  shook  the  world 
in  the  reign  of  Louis  the  Fourteenth,  when 
the  War  of  the  Spanish  Succession  was  draw- 
ing to  its  close,  the  Allied  Powers  of  Great 
Britain  and  the  States  General,  on  December 
22,   1711,  formed  a  new  League  to  keep  the 

1  Numbered  notes  will  be  found  at  the  end  of  each  chapter. 

*  See  the  text  of  this  interesting  project  in  Appendix  A,  p.  173. 
See  also  in  Appendix  A,  p.  174,  the  text  of  an  early  treaty  of 
compulsory  arbitration,  made  between  Spain  and  the  Low 
Countries  on  January  30,  1648. 

2 


TREATIES  OF  THE  PAST 

world's  peace.  By  the  terms  of  this  treaty  they 
agreed  that  in  case  the  peace  to  be  concluded 
at  the  end  of  the  war  should  in  any  way  be  in- 
fringed, if  no  amicable  settlement  could  be  had, 
"the  common  forces  of  the  Confederates  who 
shall  subscribe  this  convention,  shall  be  united 
together,  and  such  a  number  sent  to  act  either 
by  sea  or  land  against  the  disturber,  whosoever 
he  be,  as  the  greatness  of  the  danger  shall  re- 
quire, till  satisfaction  be  made  to  the  party  in- 
jured, and  till  there  be  an  entire  prospect  or 
provision  for  renewing  and  securing  the  publick 
peace  and  tranquility."*  When  the  great  peace 
settlements  of  Utrecht  finally  took  place  in 
1713,  at  the  conclusion  of  the  wars  which  had 
drenched  all  Europe  in  blood,  the  assembled 
plenipotentiaries  believed  that  they  had  at  last 
come  to  a  new  era  of  peace;  and  in  order  to 
make  the  arrangements  then  entered  into  se- 
cure beyond  peradventure,  they  placed  them 
under  the  special  guarantees  of  world-control- 
ling Powers.! 

Again,  in  November,  1815,  at  the  close  of  the 
far-flung  Napoleonic  Wars  a  serious  effort  was 
once  more  made  to  secure  the  peace  of  Europe 
by  forming  a  League  of  Nations.  The  carefully 
drawn  Treaty  of  Paris  of  May,  1814,  which  had 

*  For  the  full  text  of  this  project,  see  Appendix  A,  p.  176. 
t  For  the  text  of  such  guarantees,  see  Appendix  A,  p.  177. 
3 


INTERNATIONAL  ADMINISTRATION 

put  an  end  to  the  rule  of  Napoleon,  had  been 
suddenly  upset  by  his  dramatic  return  to  power 
and  his  " Hundred  Days' "  reign;  the  lesson  was 
clear  that  mere  treaty  terms  were  not  enough, 
and  that  if  future  war  was  to  be  avoided,  the 
great  Powers  must  adopt  some  means  for 
guaranteeing  the  peace.  Accordingly,  when  the 
delegates  assembled  after  the  triumph  of  Water- 
loo, a  League  was  entered  into  by  Great  Britain, 
Austria,  Prussia,  and  Russia,  the  four  great 
world  Powers  of  the  day.  This  was  founded 
upon  mutual  guarantees,  to  see  that  the  stipu- 
lations of  the  peace  treaty  then  concluded  be- 
tween the  Allies  and  France  should  be  "strictly 
and  faithfully  executed  in  their  fullest  extent"; 
but,  as  in  the  preceding  projects,  no  interna- 
tional administrative  organ  was  created,  and 
no  executive  machinery  was  set  up,  to  give  the 
League  a  foundation  more  secure  than  that  of 
mere  promises. 

In  one  respect,  however,  the  scheme  of  1815 
went  a  step  beyond  the  projects  of  1648  and 
1711.  Periodic  meetings  were  provided  for, 
in  order  to  consult  upon  common  interests  and 
to  consider  what  measures  should  be  taken 
"for  the  repose  and  prosperity  of  Nations,  and 
for  the  maintenance  of  the  Peace  of  Europe.*** 

Three  years  later,  when  France  had  regained 

*  See  the  text  of  this  agreement  in  Appendix  A,  p.  178, 


TREATIES  OF  THE  PAST 

her  strength,  the  same  four  Powers,  together 
with  France,  signed  a  protocol,  perfecting  the 
"Union'*  for  the  maintenance  of  peace,  and 
declaring  "that  this  Union,  which  is  the  more 
real  and  durable,  inasmuch  as  it  depends  on  no 
separate  interest  or  temp>orary  combination, 
can  only  have  for  its  object  the  Maintenance  of 
General  Peace,  founded  on  a  religious  resf>ect  for 
the  engagements  contained  in  the  Treaties,  and 
for  the  whole  of  the  rights  resulting  therefrom.'*^ 
On  the  same  day  the  five  Powers  issued  a  formal 
Declaration,  to  be  sent  to  all  the  Courts  of 
Europe,  in  which  the  formation  of  the  League 
was  announced  in  the  following  terms: 

"The  Sovereigns  in  forming  this  august 
Union,  have  regarded  as  its  fundamental  basis 
their  invariable  resolution  never  to  depart, 
either  among  themselves,  or  in  their  Relations 
with  other  States,  from  the  strictest  observation 
of  the  principles  of  the  Right  of  Nations;  prin- 
ciples which,  in  their  application  to  a  state  of 
permanent  Peace,  can  alone  effectually  guaran- 
tee the  Independence  of  each  Government,  and 
the  stability  of  the  general  association."* 

As  one  reads  over  the  story  of  these  great 
efforts  of  1648,  of  1711-13,  of  1815-18,  all  of 
which  have  failed  to  secure  any  permanent 

*  For  the  full  text  of  the  Declaration  of  Aix-la-Chapelle,  see 
Appendix  A,  p.  179, 


INTERNATIONAL  ADMINISTRATION 

peace,  one  wonders  if,  in  the  cold  world  of  his- 
torical fact,  a  League  of  Nations  is  not,  after 
all,  fundamentally  impossible.  Three  times  in 
in  the  last  two  and  a  half  centuries  have  the 
diplomats  assembled  at  the  close  of  a  cataclys- 
mic war,  with  a  desire,  probably,  as  sincere  as 
that  of  the  leaders  of  our  own  day,  to  inaugu- 
rate a  new  era  of  peace,  and  with  the  strong  hope 
that  they  had  at  last  found  the  "formula"  that 
would  guarantee  it;  each  time  their  great  hopes 
ended  in  failure.  In  what  way  will  1919  be 
different  from  1648,  1713,  or  1815.?  Cause  and 
effect  are  changeless  and  eternal;  will  not  the 
same  deep-ly'ng  causes  which  have  turned  to 
failure  every  effort  to  create  a  successful  League 
of  Nations  in  the  seventeenth,  eighteenth,  and 
nineteenth  centuries  continue  to  operate  in  the 
twentieth? 

The  answer  is  that  we  must  change  the  prin- 
ciples upK)n  which  the  League  is  built.  In  two 
ways  can  this  be  done,  the  one  a  matter  of  inner 
substance,  the  other  a  matter  of  structure. 

The  main  reason  for  the  failures  of  the  past 
has  been  that  heretofore  treaties  concluding 
great  world  wars  have  been  founded  essentially 
ujxjn  injustice.  The  treaty  of  1815  was  built 
upon  the  principle  of  dynasty  rather  than 
upon  that  of  nationality;  it  was  written  in  the 
selfish  interest  of  rulers  rather  than  of  peoples. 


TREATIES  OF  THE  PAST 

It  broke  up  the  Italian  people,  whom  Napoleon 
had  brought  together,  and  parceled  them  out, 
chiefly  to  Austrian  princes;  it  forced  together 
the  disparate  peoples  of  Holland  and  Belgium 
under  a  single  monarch;  it  bestowed  upon  Prus- 
sia by  way  of  reward  about  two-fifths  of  the 
kingdom  of  Saxony;  it  forced  artificial  arrange- 
ments upon  unwilling  peoples.*  No  treaty 
founded  on  injustice  can  endure;  no  possible 
effort  to  retard  the  irresistible  progress  and 
triumph  of  justice  and  righteousness  in  the  world 
can  succeed.  Poland  in  its  utter  helplessness  was 
once  calmly  parceled  out  among  three  mighty 
Powers  "in  shining  armor";  Poland  to-day  is 
rising  to  mock  the  fallen  dynasties  of  the  Haps- 
burgs,  the  HohenzoUerns,  and  the  Romanoffs.  A 
century  ago  the  Italian  people  were  split  into 
petty  states  and  forced  by  Metternich  to  bear 
the  yoke  of  hated  Austrian  princes  who  cared 
nothing  for  the  good  of  the  people  they  enslaved ; 
to-day  the  Austrian  army  is  prostrate  before  the 
victorious  soldiers  of  a  redeemed  and  unified 
Italy.  The  p>eace  settlements  of  the  past  have  all 
been  founded  on  purely  selfish  interests,  whether 

*  Self-interest  and  absolute  disregard  of  the  rights  of  peoples 
formed  the  key-note  of  the  whole  treaty.  Norway  was  taken  from 
Denmark  and  connected  with  Sweden;  most  of  the  Grand  Duchy 
of  Warsaw  was  forced  und^r  the  rule  of  the  Russian  Tsar;  and 
Venetia  and  Lombardy  were  actually  incorporated  within  th^ 
Austrian  Empire, 

7 


INTERNATIONAL  ADMINISTRATION 

dynastic  or  national;  and  they  have  had  as 
their  end  in  view  the  guarantee  of  specific 
territorial  arrangements  rather  than  the  guar- 
antee of  international  justice  and  law  as  gen- 
eral principles  to  be  impartially  applied.  If 
the  treaty  of  1919  is  to  succeed  where  others 
have  failed,  it  must  be  founded  upon  the  broad 
interests  of  peoples;  it  must  be  dictated  by  jus- 
tice and  righteousness,  and  not  by  the  narrow 
ambitions  and  selfish  interests  of  triumphant 
governments.  In  this  resp>ect  one  dares  to 
hope  that  the  treaty  of  1919  will  be  different 
from  all  those  that  have  gone  before. 

A  second  cause  of  failure  has  been  the  fact 
that  in  the  arrangements  of  the  past  nations 
have  been  unwilling  to  submit  to  a  sufficient 
amount  of  external  control  to  make  an  effective 
international  executive  organ  possible.  For 
this  reason  the  execution  of  treaties  and  guar- 
antees, as  well  as  the  enforcement  of  the  terms 
of  international  Leagues,  has  depended  upon 
the  mere  promises  of  the  signatory  states; 
words  formed  the  only  sanction  of  these  agree- 
ments; there  had  been  no  international  ma- 
chinery to  enforce  them  against  the  wishes  of 
a  signatory  state  whose  selfish  interests  had 
become  endangered  by  some  new  turn  of  events. 
If  in  1919  the  project  for  a  League  of  Nations 

is  to  succeed  where  earlier  efforts  failed,  it  would 

8 


TREATIES  OF  THE  PAST 

seem  imperative  that  some  guarantee  be  found, 
more  effective  than  mere  words,  to  make  secure 
the  keeping  of  peace.*    Too  rigid  a  machinery 


*  The  system  of  Collective  Guarantees  of  the  nineteenth  cen- 
tury has  not  generally  proved  suflBcient  to  prevent  violation  of 
them  by  any  powerful  nation  which  has  found  it  to  its  interest 
to  do  so.  It  is  interesting  to  study  in  this  connection  a  list  of 
the  more  important  treaties  of  collective  guarantee  of  the  last 
hundred  years: 

Tbeatt 

Found  in 

Hertslet's 

"Map  of 

Europe  bt 

Treatt." 

Vol.  I,  p.  223, 

Art.  17 


Date. 


June  9,  181 ; 


SiQNATORT  States.      Terms  of  Treaty. 


Austria,  France,  Gt. 
Britain,  Portugal, 
Prussia,  Russia, 
Spain,  Sweden. 


Nov.  20, 1815. 


May  7, 1832. 


Austria,  France,  Gt. 
Britain,  Prussia, 
Russia. 


Gt.  Britain,  France, 
Russia,  and  Ba- 
faria. 


Guarantee  of  "the 
possession  of  the 
countries  marked 
out  in  Art.  15  in 
full  property  and 
sovereignty"  (the 
Saxon  cessions). 

Guarantee  of  the 
perpetual  n  e  u  - 
tiality,  and  of 
"the  integrity 
and  inviolabil- 
ity" of  Switzer- 
land. 

Guarantee  that 
"Greece  shall 
form  a  monarchi- 
cal and  independ- 
ent state." 


Vol.  I,  p.  370 


Vol.11,  p.  895, 
Art.  4. 


April  19, 1839.    Austria,  France,  Gt.  Guarantee    of    the    Vol.  II,p.9fl7. 
Britain,    Prussia,  independence  and         Art.  1. 
Russia,    and    Bel-  neutrality  of  Bel- 
gium, gium. 


May  8, 1852. 


Mar.  30, 1856. 


Austria,  France,  Gt. 
Britain,  Prussia, 
Russia,  Sweden 
and  Norway,  and 
Denmark. 

Austria,  France,  Gt. 
Britain,  Prussia, 
Russia,  Sardinia, 
Turkey. 


Guarantee  of  the 
integrity  of  the 
Danish  Mon- 
archy. 


Guarantee  of  the 
independence 
and  territorial  in- 
tegrity of  the 
Turkish  Empire. 


Vol.  II,  p. 
1153,  Pre- 
amble and 
Art.  2. 


Vol.     II,     p. 
1254,     Art. 

7. 


9 


INTERNATIONAL  ADMINISTRATION 

must,  indeed,  be  avoided;  unless  provision  is 
made  for  accommodating  the  international  ar- 
rangements to  the  world  changes  which  are 
constantly  in  progress,  no  project  can  succeed. 
But  whatever  form  it  may  take,  it  seems  clear 
that  the  new  League  can  be  made  infinitely 
more  effective  than  any  projects  of  mere  mutual 
guarantees  or  Leagues  of  the  past  have  been  by 
the  creation  of  some  international  body  to  de- 
cide quickly  and  authoritatively  when  common 
action  is  to  be  initiated,  what  kind  of  action 


April  15, 1856. 


Aug.  19,  1858. 


July  13.  1863. 


May  11, 1867. 


Nov.  2,  1907. 


April  23, 1908. 


Austria,  France,  Gt. 
Britain. 


Austria,  France,  Gt. 
Britain,  Prussia, 
Rtiasia,  Sardinia, 
Turkey. 


France,  Gt.  Britain, 
Russia,  and  Den- 
mark. 


Austria,  Belgium, 
France,  Gt.  Brit- 
ain, Italy,  Nether- 
lands, Prussia, 
Russia. 


Guarantee    of    the 
independence 
and  territorial  in-  . 
tegrity    of    the 
Turkish  Empire. 

Guarantee  of  the 
privileges  and  im- 
munities of  the 
Danubian  princi- 
palities. 


Guarantee    of    the  Vol.     II,     p. 

independence  1547,     Art. 

and  constitutional  3. 
order  of  Greece. 


Vol.  II,  p. 
1280,  Arte. 
1  and  2. 


Vol.  II,  p. 
1333,  Arta. 
2  and  9. 


Guarantee  of  the 
neutrality  of 
Luxemburg. 


Gt.  Britain,  France,  Undertaking  to  re- 
Germany,  Nor-  spect  the  integ- 
way,  Russia.  nty  of  Norway. 


Denmark,   France,  Undertaking  to  pre- 

Gt.   Britain,  Ger-  serve    the    status 

many.    Nether-  quo  of  the  North 

lands,  Sweden.  Sea  states. 

Apri\23, 1908.    Denmark,  Germany,     Undertaking  to  pre- 
Russia,  Sweden.  ,  serve    the   slaitu 

quo  of  the  Baltip 
States. 

19 


Vol.  Ill,  p. 
1803,  Art. 
2. 


Amer.  Jour. 
Int.  Law, 
Vol.II.Sup. 
p.  268,  Art. 
2. 

Amer.  Jour. 
Int.  Law, 
Vol.II,Sup. 
p.  272. 

Ibid,  p.  270. 


TREATIES  OF  THE  PAST 

is  to  be  taken,  and  how  it  is  to  be  brought  into 
play.  Whether  or  not  the  time  is  yet  ripe  for 
the  creation  of  such  an  organ  is  a  question 
which  need  not  here  be  discussed.  But  in  any 
event,  if  the  future  League  is  to  have  an  execu- 
tive organ,  of  whatever  nature  it  may  be,  cer- 
tain grave  and  fundamental  problems  must  be 
faced.  Will  the  ordinary  unanimity  require- 
ment for  voting  be  retained,  so  that  a  single 
discomfited  state  may  block  all  action?  Will 
the  rule  which  obtained  at  both  Hague  Con- 
ferences, that  each  state  is  entitled  to  a  single 
vote  and  all  votes  are  of  equal  weight,  still  be 
allowed  to  hold.'*  In  the  consideration  and 
settlement  of  these  and  other  fundamental 
questions  it  may  prove  serviceable  to  study 
as  a  background  some  of  the  more  interesting 
instances  of  international  administrative  organs 
which  have  been  formed  within  recent  years. 

NOTES 

*  Presumably  this  provision  was  adopted  to  pre' 
serve  peace  among  the  separate  and  frequently  war- 
ring states  of  the  Holy  Roman  Empire.  See  Koch 
et  Schoell,  Histoire  des  Traites  de  Paix,  Vol.  I,  p.  248. 

^  See  Hertslet's  Map  of  Europe,  Vol.  I,  p.  572, 
Art.  2.  Art.  4  provides  for  special  meetings  of  the 
Powers  in  furtherance  of  the  objects  of  the  Union. 


11 


CHAPTER  II 

TYPES  OF  INTERNATIONAL  EXECUTIVE  ORGANS^ 

A  SHARP  distinction  must  be  drawn  be- 
'**^  tween  international  executive  organs  with 
large  j>owers  of  control  and  those  with  little 
or  no  power  of  control.  Failure  to  make  this 
distinction  is  responsible  for  many  loose  state- 
ments as  to  the  success  already  attained  in 
international  organization;  the  large  number 
of  successful  international  Public  Unions  which 
have  been  organized  and  put  into  happy  opera- 
tion within  the  last  fifty  years,  with  their  bu- 
reaux and  administrative  oflficers,  is  used  to 
support  the  declaration  that  in  order  to  create 
a  successful  League  of  Nations  all  that  we  have 
to  do  is  to  widen  the  scoi>e  and  enlarge  the 
form  of  organization  of  these  various  Public 
Unions.  But  an  international  organ  which  has 
proved  immensely  successful  for  the  adminis- 
tration, for  instance,  of  the  Universal  Postal 
Union,  might  be  utterly  impractical  and  in- 
eflficacious  for  a  League  with  real  power  to  keep 

12 


TYPES  OF  ORGANS 

the  world's  peace.  An  international  organ  may 
have  for  its  sole  function  such  harmless  duties 
as  the  collection  of  information,  the  preparing 
of  statistics,  or  the  publication  of  a  specialized 
magazine;  or  it  may  have  power  to  control 
the  actions  of  great  nations  in  matters  of  vital 
concern.  In  order  to  pK)int  out  these  differ- 
ences, the  existing  international  administra- 
tive organs  may  be  roughly  classified  in  three 
groups  according  to  the  nature  of  the  power 
accorded  to  them. 


Type   I. — International  Administrative    Organs 
with  little  or  no  real  power  of  control. 

The  p>ermanent  bureau  of  the  Universal  Post- 
al Union  is  a  good  example  of  this  type.  Al- 
though the  Postal  Union  itself  j)ossesses  con- 
siderable power,  the  only  function  of  the 
permanent  bureau  is  of  an  informational  and 
ministerial  character.  It  cannot  control  in  any 
way  the  free  exercise  of  sovereignty  by  any 
state.  Of  the  same  nature  are  the  Permanent 
Bureau  of  the  Union  for  the  Protection  of  In- 
dustrial Property,  the  International  Office  of 
Public  Health  at  Paris,  the  Permanent  Com- 
mission of  the  International  Institute  of  Agri- 
culture, and  countless  others. 

13 


INTERNATIONAL  ADMINISTRATION 

Type  II. — International  Executive  Organs  with 
real  power  of  control  over  some  local  situation 
within  a  particular  state  or  states. 

Organs  of  this  type  are  not  mere  business 
bureaux  of  administration,  but  are  governing 
bodies  possessing  the  actual  authority  and  os- 
tensible power  to  exert  over  some  local  situ- 
ation an  international  control.  As  might  be 
expected,  such  an  instrument  of  international 
control  is  most  frequently  set  up  in  countries 
with  inefficient  or  backward  governments,  such 
as  Turkey,  Albania,  Morocco  as  it  existed 
under  Moorish  rule,  or  the  Congo  country. 
The  local  sovereign  may  or  may  not  be  given 
representation  upon  the  international  Com- 
mission. The  latter  may  have  full  sovereign 
power  over  the  particular  locality,  or  it  may 
have  only  delegated  and  carefully  defined  pow- 
ers. A  good  example  of  this  type  was  the 
International  Commission  of  Control  created 
to  govern  Albania,  and  composed  of  one  repre- 
sentative each  from  Austria,  France,  Germany, 
Great  Britain,  Italy,  Russia,  and  Albania.  The 
Commission  held  full  sovereign  power  over 
Albania.  Another  excellent  example  is  the 
European  Danube  Commission,  composed  of 
representatives  of  the  larger  European  states, 
with  power  to  control  the  entire  navigation  of 

14 


TYPES  OF  ORGANS 

the  lower  Danube,  free  from  interference  by  the 
local  Roumanian  Government. 

Type  III. — International  Executive  Organs  with 
real  power  of  control  over  all  of  the  member 
states  themselves. 

Sometimes  a  matter  closely  affecting  the 
interests  of  a  number  of  states  is  of  such  a  na- 
ture that  it  cannot  be  satisfactorily  controlled 
by  the  single-handed  action  of  any  one  state, 
or  even  of  a  number  of  states  acting  separately 
and  independently  of  one  another.  Occasion- 
ally matters  of  this  kind  have  assumed  such 
vital  importance  that  states  have  been  con- 
strained to  set  up  some  international  organ 
with  power  to  control  or  restrict  the  action  of 
the  creating  states  themselves.  It  is  not  sur- 
prising that  organs  such  as  this  have  rarely 
been  created;  for  their  very  existence  is  con- 
ditioned uj>on  the  agreement  of  the  member 
states  to  refrain  from  the  exercise  of  their  own 
sovereignty  in  those  spheres  in  which  power  is 
delegated  to  the  international  Commission. 

The  best  example  of  this  type  of  organ  is  the 
permanent  Sugar  Commission,  which  was 
created  in  order  to  rid  Europe  of  the  onerous 
system  of  granting  bounties  for  the  exporta- 
tion of  sugar.     This  Commission,  made  up  of 

2  15 


INTERNATIONAL  ADMINISTRATION 

representatives  from  most  of  the  leading  states 
of  Europe,  possesses  the  unusual  power  of  ad- 
justing the  sugar  tariffs  of  the  member  states, 
even  without  their  consent. 


NOTE 

*  Only  such  commissions  as  are  permanent  in 
their  nature  and  are  composed  of  representatives 
of  more  than  two  states  will  be  considered.  Men- 
tion will  not,  therefore,  be  made  of  such  interesting 
commissions  as  the  American-Canadian  Interna- 
tional Fisheries  Commission,  instituted  according  to 
Art.  1  of  the  Treaty  of  Washington  of  April  11,  1908 
(Treaty  Series,  1908,  No.  17);  the  American-Cana- 
dian International  Joint  Commission  concerning 
boundary  waters,  instituted  by  Arts.  7-12  of  the 
Treaty  of  Washington  of  January  11,  1909  (Treaty 
Series,  1910,  No.  23);  or  the  permanent  Mixed 
Fisheries  Commission  between  the  United  States, 
Canada,  and  Newfoundland,  created  in  accordance 
with  the  arbitral  award  in  the  North  Atlantic 
Fisheries  Case. 

Other  international  commissions  which  can  be  no 
more  than  mentioned  are  the  financial  commissions 
in  the  interest  of  foreign  creditors.  The  most  im- 
portant of  these  are  the  ones  which  have  been  in- 
stituted in  Turkey  since  1878,  in  Egypt  since  1880, 
and  in  Greece  since  1897.  (See  Oppenheim,  Inter- 
national Law,  Vol.  I,  Sect.  461.)  For  the  inter- 
national Commission  instituted  under  Art.  6  of  the 

16 


TYPES  OF  ORGANS 

Treaty  of  London  of  May  30,  1913,  to  regulate  the 
financial  obligations  of  the  Balkans,  see  Bonfils, 
Droit.  Int.  Public  (7th  ed.).  No.  306',  p.  198. 

Since  only  international  commissions  of  an  execu- 
tive nature  will  be  discussed,  no  mention  will  be 
made  of  such  important  judicial  organs  as  the  Hague 
Permanent  Court  of  Arbitration  and  the  proposed 
International  Prize  Court,  nor  of  such  notable  legis- 
lative gatherings  as  the  Hague  Conferences  of  1899 
and  1907. 


CHAPTER  III 

INTERNATIONAL    ORGANS    WITH    LITTLE    OR    NO 
POWER — TYPE   I 

nPHE  International  Public  Unions,  whose 
-*  permanent  bureaux  furnish  excellent  ex- 
amples of  the  first  type  of  executive  organ, 
have  grown  up  within  the  last  fifty  years  in 
response  to  the  ever-growing  necessity  for  uni- 
fied control  of  such  matters  as  international 
trade  and  commerce.  Under  the  stimulus  of 
this  imperative  need  public  and  private  inter- 
national organizations  have  been  formed  re- 
lating to  almost  every  conceivable  subject  of 
international  concern.*  Literally  hundreds  of 
these  associations  composed  of  private  individ- 
uals have  been  formed;  in  the  year  before  the 
war  (1913)  174  such  Congresses  or  Conferences 
were  held;^  and  in  the  years  1901-10  there 
were  held  no  less  than  790.^  So  fruitful  and 
serviceable  have  these  proved  that  states,  as 
well  as  individuals,  have  formed  international 
organizations  for  specific  purposes;  there  are 
to-day  over  thirty  of  these  public  and  oflBcial 
international  unions,^  some  of  them  of  large 

18 


ORGANS  LACKING  POWER 

importance,  such  as  the  Universal  Postal  Union, 
the  International  Sanitary  Union,  the  Union  for 
the  Protection  of  Industrial  Property,  and  the 
Slave  Trade  Convention. 

Because  of  the  importance  and  the  success  of 
its  achievements,  the  Universal  Postal  Union 
is  probably  the  best  known  of  any  of  the  Public 
Unions.  Before  1863  international  postal  com- 
munication was  entirely  dependent  upon  sepa- 
rate treaties  between  various  states;  and  since 
each  country  was  concerned  with  promoting 
its  own  national  profit  and  quite  unconcerned 
about  international  interests,  the  foreign  postal 
rates  were  as  high  as  the  transmitting  states 
dared  to  make  them.  The  rates  were  not  only 
high,  but  were  so  uncertain  and  complicated 
by  reason  of  the  fact  that  they  included  a  pay- 
ment to  the  country  of  despatch,  another  to 
the  country  of  destination,  and  others  to  every 
country  through  which  the  letter  was  carried, 
that  international  business  involving  much 
postal  correspondence  was  rendered  almost  im- 
possible. For  instance,  one  sending  a  letter 
from  the  United  States  to  Australia  was  con- 
fronted by  the  fact  that  the  postage  would 
cost  5  cents,  33  cents,  45  cents,  60  cents,  or 
$1.02  per  half -ounce,  according  to  the  route 
by  which  it  was  sent. 

With  the  growing  necessity  for  international 

19 


INTERNATIONAL  ADMINISTRATION 

exchange  the  postal  conditions  became  so  in- 
tolerable that,  after  a  vain  efifort  to  achieve  an 
international  settlement  in  1863  which  resulted 
in  a  fruitful  exchange  of  ideas  but  in  no  per- 
manent organization,  a  Postal  Congress  at 
which  twenty-two  states  were  represented  met 
at  Berne  in  1874  and  finally  formed  a  General 
Postal  Union.  In  1878  this  became  the  Uni- 
versal Postal  Union.  Since  that  date  various 
modifications  have  been  made,  and  new  states 
have  been  added  to  the  Union;  the  convention 
agreed  to  in  Rome  in  1906,  which  is  at  present 
in  force,  was  signed  by  practically  all  the  civil- 
ized states  of  the  world.* 

*  Some  idea  of  the  magnitude  and  importance  of  international 
postal  communication  may  be  gathered  from  a  glance  at  some 
of  the  statistics  published  in  the  annual  reports  of  the  Postal 
Union.    In  the  report  for  1910  the  statistics  given  were  as  follows: 

Number  of  letters  carried 905,243,677 

Post-cards 277,932,086 

Printed  matter 551,929,168 

Ordinary  packages 55,405,883 

Packages  with  value  declared 5,770,273 

Money  orders 28,839,466 

Value  of  money  orders  (in  francs) 1,614,924..629 

"Whatever  other  significance  they  may  have,  the  above  figures 
express  with  sufficient  eloquence  the  formidable  extension  of 
international  relations  by  postal  methods.  What'  an  enormous 
exchange  of  ideas,  of  impressions,  of  relations  of  all  kinds  among 
peoples  separated  by  ethnic,  linguistic,  and  other  profound  differ- 
ences is  hidden  behind  these  formidable  totals!  Postal  exchange 
constitutes  undeniably  one  of  the  most  powerful  factors  in  con- 
temporaneous international  life."  Translated  from  La  Vie  Inter- 
naiimale.  Vol.  I  (1912),  p.  508. 

20 


ORGANS  LACKING  POWER 

The  Postal  Convention,  as  modified  at  Rome 
in  1906,^  contains  the  following  provisions: 

1.  The  countries  in  the  Union  form  a  single  postal 
territory  for  the  reciprocal  exchange  of  correspond- 
ence. 

2.  The  right  of  transit  is  guaranteed  throughout 
the  entire  territory  of  the  Union. 

3.  Transit  charges  are  definitely  fixed  and  stand- 
ardized, according  to  weight  and  mileage  of  transit. 

4.  The  expenses  of  transit  are  borne  by  the  ad- 
ministration of  the  country  of  origin. 

5.  Uniform  and  fixed  postal  rates  are  established. 

6.  The  responsibility  of  administrations  in  case 
of  loss  is  fixed  and  definitely  regulated. 

7.  Rules  are  laid  down  governing  special  delivery, 
registry,  collectible  trade  charges,  reply  coupons, 
reforwarding,  etc. 

8.  Arbitration  is  provided  for  to  settle  all  dis- 
putes arising  from  the  Convention  between  mem- 
ber states. 

9.  An  International  Bureau  is  created  as  the 
administrative  organ  of  the  Union. 

10.  Provision  is  made  for  the  holding  of  periodic 
Congresses  and  Conferences,  as  the  constituent  and 
legislative  organs  of  the  Union. 

The  following  three  organs  constitute  the 
government  of  the  Union: 

1.  The  Congress. 

This  is  called  upon  a  demand  made  by  two- 

21 


INTERNATIONAL  ADMINISTRATION 

thirds  of  all  the  signatory  states;  it  is  to  meet 
at  least  once  every  five  years.*  Each  state  has 
one  vote.  The  Congress  has  power  to  alter  or 
add  to  the  Convention  itself,  as  well  as  to  make 
or  alter  all  regulations  for  its  execution.  For 
the  exercise  of  both  of  these  powers  a  majority 
vote  is  sufficient.^  The  Convention  as  amended 
by  the  Congress  is  signed  by  each  delegate, 
and,  like  other  diplomatic  agreements,  requires 
ratification  by  the  signatory  states  in  order  to 
become  binding. 

2.  The  Conference. 

This  was  provided  for  in  the  original  Con- 
vention, in  order  to  decide  simple  administra- 
tive questions;  but  as  a  matter  of  fact,  it  has 
proved  a  dead  letter,  never  having  met  since 
1876. 

3.  The  International  Bureau. 

This  is  a  permanent  administrative  body,  and 
furnishes  an  excellent  example  of  an  inter- 
national organ  of  the  First  Type.  It  is  main- 
tained under  the  supervision  of  the  Swiss  postal 
administration  at  Berne.  Its  duties  are  to  col- 
lect, pubHsh,and  distribute  information  concern- 
ing postal  matters  among  all  the  member  states, 
to  circulate  proposals,  and  to  give  notice  of 
alterations  adopted,  to  render  an  advisory  opin- 

*  This  provision  has  not  been  strictly  observed  in  practice. 

22 


ORGANS  LACKING  POWER 

ion  upon  questions  in  dispute,  and  to  act  as  a 
financial  clearing-house.  Its  expenses  are  di- 
vided among  the  signatory  states  by  classifying 
the  latter  into  seven  groups,  each  of  which 
pays  a  different  proportion  of  the  expense.' 
The  work  of  this  bureau  is  performed  by  seven 
permanent  functionaries  under  the  supervision 
of  the  Swiss  Bundesrath.  It  edits  a  monthly, 
U  Union  Postale,  in  French,  German,  and  Eng- 
lish.8 

In  order  to  make  changes  in  the  Convention 
between  Congresses,  provision  is  made  for  vot- 
ing by  mail  through  the  medium  of  the  Inter- 
national Bureau.  Unanimity  is  necessary  for 
the  more  important  changes,  when  this  method 
of  voting  is  followed;  a  majority  is  sufficient 
for  questions  of  interpretation. 

One  of  the  striking  features  of  the  Universal 
Postal  Union  is  the  provision  for  what  virtually 
amounts  to  a  weighting  or  valuing  of  votes. 
The  Convention  early  faced  the  difficulties  in- 
volved in  according  to  Montenegro,  for  instance, 
the  same  voting  power  as  to  the  British  Empire. 
Although  it  proved  impossible  to  get  away  from 
the  customary  form  of  giving  to  each  member 
state  a  single  vote,  and  making  all  votes  of 
equal  value,  yet,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  the  great 
nations  were  given  larger  power  by  according 
votes  to  groups  of  colonies.^   Thus,  one  vote  is 

23 


INTERNATIONAL  ADMINISTRATION 

given  to  France,  another  to  Algeria,  another  to 
French  Indo-China,  and  a  fourth  to  other 
French  colonies.  In  this  way  France  wields 
four  votes.  Great  Britain  and  its  possessions 
have  six,  and  the  United  States  two.  Germany 
had  three  votes  before  the  war  broke  out.  The 
British  possessions  are  the  only  ones  which 
have  not  always  voted  with  the  mother  country. 
In  still  another  way  has  the  Postal  Union  man- 
aged to  escape  the  consequences  of  the  rule  of 
equality  of  voting  power.  In  the  actual  conduct 
of  the  affairs  of  the  Postal  Congresses,  most  of 
the  important  work  is  necessarily  done  in  com- 
mittee; and  the  great  nations  have  generally 
managed  to  secure  such  representation  upon 
the  various  committees  that  they  are  able  to 
exercise  an  influence  quite  out  of  proportion  to 
the  number  of  actual  votes  which  they  possess. 
Although  the  permanent  bureau  is  an  organ 
with  no  real  power,  the  Postal  Union  itself  pos- 
sesses considerable  authority,  and,  on  the 
whole,  it  has  most  successfully  substituted  in- 
ternational for  state  government  in  postal  mat- 
ters.* Although  the  state  governments  have 
carefully  guarded  themselves  on  paper,  and  are 

*  In  answer  to  an  inquiry  as  to  how  successful  the  organiza- 
tion of  the  Postal  Union  had  proved  in  its  actual  operation,  the 
Postmaster-General  of  the  United  States  recently  asserted  that 
"the  organization  of  the  Union  and  the  periodical  Congresses 
have  proved  satisfactory  in  practice." 

24 


ORGANS  LACKING  POWER 

not  bound  without  a  separate  ratification,*  yet, 
in  practice,  such  a  ratification  often  cannot  be 
refused  even  though  the  change  is  unaccept- 
able. In  one  instance  the  French  Govern- 
ment was  strongly  opposed  to  any  change  in  a 
foreign  postage  rate,  and  its  delegate  announced 
that  he  would  refuse  to  accept  it.  The  pro- 
posed change,  however,  was  adopted  by  a  ma- 
jority of  votes;  and  the  French  Government, 
sooner  than  give  up  the  incalculable  advantages 
of  membership  in  the  Postal  Union,  promptly 
ratified  the  change.  "In  fact,  so  far  has  the 
surrender  of  independence  to  International 
Government  gone  in  the  Union,  that  the  theo- 
retical right  of  the  State  to  refuse  ratification 
to  the  Convention  and  Reglement  as  voted  at 
a  Congress,  in  practice  hardly  exists.  The  Ad- 
ministrations adhering  to  the  Union,  never 
wait  for  formal  ratification  before  putting  the 
new  regulations  into  operation,  and  the  de- 
cisions of  a  Postal  Congress  are  acted  upon 
whether  they  are  ratified  or  not."^° 

*  The  procedure  of  the  Postal  Congresses  is  as  follows:  Action 
is  taken  within  the  Congress  by  majority  vote.  If  all  the  signa- 
tory Powers  subsequently  give  their  ratification,  this  majority 
vote  thereupon  becomes  binding  upon  all  member  states.  If  one 
or  more  refuse  to  ratify,  either  the  question  is  referred  back  to  a 
committee  for  further  report  and  recommendation,  or  it  may  be 
agreed  that  the  majority  vote  shall  control,  and  the  subject  mat- 
ter be  dealt  with  in  a  protocol  so  framed  as  to  meet  the  special 
views  of  the  minority. 

25 


INTERNATIONAL  ADMINISTRATION 

Most  of  the  other  Public  Unions  which  are 
endowed  with  permanent  legislative  and  ex- 
ecutive organs,  have  organizations  not  unlike 
that  of  the  Postal  Union,  but  with  many  in- 
dividual differences  of  detail.  The  legislative 
organ  is  the  general  Congress,  or  Conference. 
It  meets  at  regular  or  irregular  periods  and 
is  composed  of  delegates  from  the  member 
states,  each  state  usually  having  one  vote.  For 
action  in  these  Congresses  unanimity  is  the 
general  rule;*  so  far  the  states  have  been  loath 
to  subordinate  national  interests  to  the  larger 
international  issues.  The  Congress  in  some 
cases  has  power  to  change  the  original  conven- 
tion under  which  it  meets  or  to  make  amend- 
ments to  it,  like  a  constituent  assembly,  as 
well  as  to  pass  ordinary  legislation  and  rules 
for  the  governance  of  the  Union.  The  work  of 
the  Congress  is  usually  to  make  regulations 
for  the  government  of  its  internal  affairs,  often 
to  appoint  and  control  the  Administrative 
Bureau  of  the  Union,  to  discuss  and  decide 
matters  of  general  policy,  to  seek  better  methods 
for  attaining  the  objects  of  the  Union,  to  com- 
pare results,  to  make  reports,  and  to  seek 
standardization  and  uniformity  in  the  various 
countries  from  which  the  delegates  come. 

*  As  has  been  seen,  this  is  not  true  of  the  Universal  Postal 
Union. 

26 


ORGANS  LACKING  POWER 

The  routine  administrative  work  of  the  Union 
is  usually  carried  on  by  a  central  bureau.  This 
forms  the  connecting  link  between  the  various 
member  states.  It  acts  as  the  intermediary 
for  communication  back  and  forth  between  the 
governments;  it  carries  out  specific  and  sharply 
defined  administrative  duties  assigned  to  it  by 
the  Congress;  it  gathers  and  disseminates  in- 
formation, statistics,  and  rejwrts;  it  keeps  the 
records  and  papers  of  the  Union.  Occasionally 
it  also  has  power  to  act  in  an  arbitral  capacity. 
It  usually  consists  of  a  president  or  chairman, 
a  secretary,  and  several  other  functionaries; 
these  are  appointed  sometimes  by  the  general 
Congress,  and  sometimes  by  the  government  of 
the  country  in  which  the  permanent  bureau 
is  located.  Since  these  bureaux  possess  no  sub- 
stantial power,  questions  concerning  the  na- 
tionality of  their  officers,  as  well  as  difficulties 
over  their  appointment,  seldom  arise. 

Two  specific  instances  of  administrative 
bureaux  may  be  given  by  way  of  illustration. 
The  Union  for  the  Protection  of  Industrial 
Property,"  the  object  of  which  is  to  extend 
throughout  all  the  countries  of  the  Union 
the  same  protection  to  owners  of  patents  or 
trade-marks  as  is  accorded  to  them  in  their 
home  country,  maintains  a  permanent  bureau 
at  Berne. 

27 


INTERNATIONAL  ADMINISTRATION 

The  duties  of  this  bureau  are  to  collect  "in- 
formation of  every  kind  relating  to  the  protec- 
tion of  industrial  property,"  to  compile  statistics 
therefrom,  to  publish  a  periodical  on  matters 
of  interest  to  the  Union,  to  answer  requests 
for  information,  to  make  annual  reports  upon 
the  management  of  the  Union,  and  to  act  as  an 
intermediary  for  communication  between  the 
member  governments.  It  also  acts  with  regard 
to  certain  countries  as  an  international  registry 
for  trade-marks.  Its  officers  are  appointed  by 
the  Swiss  Government,  and  consist  of  a  secre- 
tary-general and  three  assistants. 

The  Brussels  Conference  of  1890  for  the  re- 
pression of  the  slave  trade,  similarly  set  up  an 
International  Bureau  at  Zanibar.  This  bureau 
is  peculiar  in  that  it  is  composed  of  one  repre- 
sentative of  each  of  the  signatory  Powers; 
herein  it  difiPers  from  the  ordinary  bureau,  which 
usually  consists  of  only  a  few  officers,  quite 
frequently  appointed  irrespective  of  their  na- 
tionality. The  duties  of  the  bureau,  however, 
are  quite  typical.  These  are  to  "draw  up  regu- 
lations fixing  the  manner  of  exercising  its 
functions,"  to  "centralize  all  dociunents  and 
information  of  a  nature  to  facilitate  the  re- 
pression of  the  slave  trade,"  to  collect  for 
this  purpose  information  and  papers  of  every 
kind  that  may  lead  to  the  discovery  of  per- 


ORGANS  LACKING  POWER 

sons  engaged  in  the  slave  trade,  to  furnish 
information  to  those  specially  requesting  it, 
and  to  prepare  a  report  of  its  own  operation 
every  year.^^ 

A  more  recent  development  in  the  evolution 
of  the  international  Union  is  the  Commission — 
a  sort  of  executive  board  to  set  up  and  control 
the  administrative  work  of  the  bureau.  The 
Commission  often  has  the  power  of  making  ad- 
ministrative regulations,  and  is  also  sometimes 
intrusted  with  the  fiscal  control  of  the  Union. 
In  some  instances  it  is  given  arbitral  power. 
In  the  "Sugar  Union"  the  Commission  is  in- 
trusted with  surprisingly  large  p>owers.*  The 
Commission  is  usually  made  up  of  representa- 
tives from  all  of  the  signatory  states,  ^^  but  in 
certain  of  the  Unions  it  is  elected  by  the  Con- 
gress and  contains  fewer  members  than  the 
number  of  member  states. ^^  The  principal 
Unions  which  make  use  of  the  Commission  are 
the  Pan-American  Union,  the  Sugar  Union,  the 
International  Institute  of  Agriculture,  the 
Metrical  Union,  the  Geodetic  Union,  the  Pen- 
itentiary Union,  the  Union  for  the  Explora- 
tion of  the  Sea,  the  Seismological  Union,  and 
the  Association  for  Unifying  the  Formulae  of 
Potent  Drugs.  The  most  striking  thing  about 
these  Commissions  is  that  many  of  them  act 

*  The  Sugar  Commissioa  will  be  described  elsewhere. 
28 


INTERNATIONAL  ADMINISTRATION 

upon  a  majority  vote.  The  overcoming  of  the 
requirement  of  unanimity  in  international  gov- 
erning bodies  is  a  long  step  forward  in  interna- 
tional organization. 

Many  of  the  Unions  have  sought  by  one 
means  or  another  to  escape  from  the  time-hon- 
ored rule  of  equality  of  voting  power.  The 
method  adopted  by  the  Postal  Union  has  al- 
ready been  considered.  Perhaps  the  most  sug- 
gestive of  any  is  that  which  has  been  followed 
by  the  International  Institute  of  Agriculture, 
as  well  as  by  several  other  Public  Unions.  The 
member  states  are  divided  into  five  groups, 
each  of  which  is  assessed  a  different  amount 
for  the  expenses  of  the  Union,  and  is  given  a 
voting  power  roughly  proportioned  to  the 
amount  of  the  assessment — that  is,  the  rela- 
tive power  of  each  state  is  proportioned  to  the 
responsibility  and  financial  burden  which  it  has 
assumed.  Each  member  state  is  then  allowed 
freely  to  choose  the  group  to  which  it  will  be- 
long. In  this  way  the  problem  of  apjx)rtion- 
ing  voting  power  automatically  solves  itself.* 

*  See  Art.  10  of  the  Agricultural  Convention  of  June  7,  1905. 
(The  text  may  be  found  in  Descamps  et  Renault :  Recueil  Inter- 
national des  Traites,  1905,  p.  148.)  This  article,  translated,  reads 
as  follows: 

"  Art.  10.  The  nations  adhering  to  the  institute  shall  be  classed 
in  five  groups,  according  to  the  place  which  each  of  them  thinks 
it  ought  to  occupy. 

"Th«  number  of  votes  which  each  nation  shall  have,  and  the 
30 


ORGANS  LACKING  POWER 

In  the  constitution  and  operation  of  these 
Public  Unions  there  is  much  that  is  suggestive; 
they  show  that  when  the  necessities  of  the  situa- 
tion demand  an  international  control,  it  has  not 
proved  impossible  to  organize  and  to  exercise  it 
successfully.*  In  the  Postal  Union,  for  in- 
stance, as  has  already  been  seen,  the  Congress 
has  power,  by  majority  vote,  to  alter  postal 
rates,  to  make  regulations  concerning  the  regis- 
try and  handling  of  mail,  and  to  determine  rules 
of  responsibility,  all  of  which  are  virtually 
binding  upon  the  signatory  countries. f     This 

number  of  units  of  assessment,  shall  be  established  according  to 
the  following  gradations: 

Groups  of  Numbers  of  Units  of 

Nations.  Votes  Assessment. 

I  5  16 

II  4  8 

III  8  4 

IV  2  2 
VI  1 

"  Colonies  may,  at  the  request  of  the  nations  to  which  they  be- 
long, be  admitted  to  form  part  of  the  institute  on  the  same  con- 
ditions as  the  independent  nations." 

*  This  power  of  control,  heretofore,  has  been  granted  only 
within  very  sharply  restricted  spheres,  as,  for  instance,  within 
the  sphere  of  sugar  tariff  administration,  or  within  the  limits  of 
postal  administration. 

t  Although  it  might  be  argued  that  the  power  on  the  part  of 
any  state  to  refuse  ratification  to  the  work  of  the  Congress  pre- 
vents the  latter  from  having  any  obligatory  authority,  yet  this 
legal  power,  as  a  matter  of  practical  administration,  often  cannot 
be  exercised.  For  an  instance  in  point,  see  L.  S.  Woolf,  Interna- 
tional Government,  p.  123, 
3  31 


INTERNATIONAL  ADMINISTRATION 

has  amounted  to  something  very  like  a  surrender 
of  sovereignty  by  all  of  the  signatory  states  so 
far  as  postal  administration  is  concerned. 

But  it  must  be  pointed  out  that  such  power 
as  the  Unions  possess  is  legislative  rather  than 
executive;  it  usually  lies,  not  in  the  adminis- 
trative organs  of  the  Unions,  but  in  the  legis- 
lative bodies  or  in  the  restricting  provisions  of 
the  treaties  entered  into  between  the  member 
states.  The  functions  of  the  permanent  bureaux 
are  chiefly  of  an  informational  or  ministerial 
character;  apart  from  the  arbitral  power  ac- 
corded to  them  in  a  few  Unions  they  possess 
practically  no  real  power.  If  an  executive  organ 
with  power  is  desired  for  the  League,  these 
permanent  bureaux  will  not  do  as  prototypes. 

Nations  have  been  willing  enough  to  intrust 
purely  ministerial  duties  to  a  group  of  several 
men  unrepresentative  of  all  the  member  states 
and  have  come  to  an  easy  agreement  upon  their 
appointment;  but  once  clothe  the  group  with 
large  and  important  power,  and  the  face  of 
everything  will  be  changed.  Few  nations  will 
be  willing  to  submit  to  control  by  a  body  in 
which  they  are  not  represented,  and  the  ap- 
pointment to  such  positions  of  power  will 
create  a  problem  of  supreme  difficulty.  For 
these  reasons  the  p>ermanent  bureaux  of  the 
Public  Unions  cannot  be  adhered  to  too  strictly 

32 


ORGANS  LACKING  POWER 

as  mcMiels  for  the  creation  of  an  executive  or- 
gan for  the  League  of  Nations. 

If  the  administrative  bureau  of  the  Public 
Union  will  not  serve  as  a  model,  neither  will 
the  legislative  organ.  The  majority  of  the 
legislative  organs  or  congresses  retain  the  una- 
nimity requirement  and  the  rule  of  equality  of 
voting.  But  it  is  open  to  serious  doubt  whether 
these  would  not  have  to  be  very  greatly  modified 
in  any  executive  organ  wielding  vital  power,  if 
the  great  nations  are  to  be  induced  to  partici- 
pate. 

For  these  reasons,  if  for  no  others,  the  Public 
Unions  must  be  regarded  rather  as  hopeful 
examples  of  the  large  possibilities  of  inter- 
national accomplishment  than  as  patterns  of 
organization  to  be  followed  in  setting  up  the 
future  League  of  Nations. 


NOTES 

*  For  a  list  of  116  such  Congresses  or  Conferences 
(admittedly  incomplete)  of  an  official  character 
since  1850,  see  Amer.  Jour,  of  Int.  Law,  Vol.  I,  pp. 
808-817.  For  a  list  of  a  still  greater  number  of 
Congresses  or  Conferences  of  a  private  character, 
see  Ibid.  pp.  818-829. 

^  See  lists  of  these  in  Annuaire  de  la  vie  inter' 
nationale.  Vol.  IV,  1913,  pp.  561-566, 


INTERNATIONAL  ADMINISTRATION 

^  See  lists  in  Annuaire  de  la  vie  internationale, 
1910. 

"*  The  list  and  classification  of  these,  as  given  in 
Woolf,  L.  S.,  International  Government^  pp.  102-103, 
is  as  follows: 

I.  Permanent  Deliberative  or  Legislative  Organs 
working  in  conjunction  with  Administrative  Organs. 

1.  The  Telegraphic  Union. 

2.  The  Radiotelegraphic  Union. 

3.  The  Universal  Postal  Union. 

4.  The  Metric  Union. 

6.  The  International  Institute  of  Agriculture. 

6.  La  Commission  penitentiaire  internationale, 

7.  The   Sanitary  Councils   and   International 

Oflfice  of  Public  Hygiene. 

8.  The  International  Geodetic  Association. 

9.  The  International  Seismological  Union. 

10.  The  Pan-American  Union. 

11.  The  Central  American  Union. 

II.  Periodic  Conferences  in  conjunction  with 
Permanent  International  Bureaux  or  Offices. 

1.  Railway  Freight  Transportation. 

2.  Industrial  Property. 

5.  Literary  and  Artistic  Property. 

4.  Pan-American  Sanitary  Union. 

5.  Slave  Trade  and  Liquor  Traffic  in  Africa. 

III.  Conferences  and  Conventions  with  object  of 
Unifying  National  Laws  or  Administrations. 

1.  Conferences    Internationales    pour    I'unite 

technique  des  chemins  de  fer. 

2.  Automobile  Conference. 

d4 


ORGANS  LACKING  POWER 

3.  Latin  Monetary  Union. 

4.  Scandinavian  Monetary  Union. 

5.  Central  American  Monetary  Union. 

6.  Conference  on  Nomenclature  of  Causes  of 

Death. 

7.  Legal  Protection  of  Workers. 

8.  Submarine  Cables. 

9.  Commercial  Statistics. 
10.  White  Slave  Traffic. 

IV.  Special  International  Organs  of  a  Permanent 
Character. 

1.  Sugar  Commission. 

2.  Opium  Commission. 

3.  Plague  Surveillance  in  China. 

4.  International   Committee  of  the  Map  of 

the  World. 

5.  Hague  Tribunal  and  Bureau. 

6.  Central  American  Court  of  Justice. 

7.  International  Bureau  for  the  Publication  of 

Customs  Tariffs. 
For  the  text  of  the  Convention,  see  Hertslet's 
Commercial  Treaties^  Vol.  XXV,  p.  430. 

®See  Woolf,  L.  S.,  International  Government,  p. 
123. 

^  See  Art.  XXXVIII  of  the  Reglements. 

*  The  functions  of  the  Bureau  are  deJBned  by  Art. 
22  of  the  International  Postal  Convention  of  May 
26,  1906  (Hertslet's  Commercial  Treaties,  Vol.  XXV, 
p.  444).     Art.  22,  translated,  reads  as  follows: 

"  (1)  Under  the  name  of  the  International  Bureau 

of  the  Universal  Postal  Union  a  central  office  is 

M 


INTERNATIONAL  ADMINISTRATION 

maintained  which  is  conducted  under  the  super- 
vision of  the  Swiss  postal  administration,  and  of 
which  the  expenses  are  borne  by  all  the  adminis- 
trations of  the  union. 

"  (2)  This  bureau  is  charged  with  the  duty  of  col- 
lecting, collating,  publishing,  and  distributing  infor- 
mation of  every  kind  which  concerns  the  inter- 
national postal  ser\'ice;  of  giving,  at  the  request  of 
the  parties  concerned,  an  opinion  upon  questions  in 
dispute;  of  making  known  proposals  for  modifying 
the  acts  of  the  Congress;  of  notifying  alterations 
adopted;  and,  in  general,  of  taking  up  such  studies 
and  labors  as  may  be  confided  to  it  in  the  interest 
of  the  Postal  Union." 

®  Art.  27  of  the  Postal  Convention  of  1906. 

*°  Woolf,  L.  S.,  International  Government,  p.  123. 

**  See  the  Convention  for  the  Protection  of  In- 
dustrial Property,  signed  March  20,  1883,  with  the 
Additional  Act  signed  at  Brussels  on  December  14, 
1900.  The  text  may  be  found  in  Martens,  Nouveau 
Recueil  General  (2nd  Series),  Vol.  Ill,  p.  449.  For 
the  constitution  of  the  Administrative  Bureau  see 
Art.  13,  and  also  Art.  6  of  the  Final  Act. 

*^  See  the  Brussels  Act  of  July  2,  1890,  signed  by 
the  leading  nations  of  the  world.  It  may  be  found 
in  Martens,  N.  R.  G.  (2nd  Series),  Vol.  XVII,  p.  345. 
For  the  constitution  and  powers  of  the  International 
Bureau  at  Zanzibar,  see  Arts.  27,  74-80. 

For  another  example  of  a  permanent  bureau,  see 
Art.  57  of  the  Convention  of  October  14,  1890, 
creating  the  International  Union  of  Railway  Freight 

36 


ORGANS  LACKING  POWER 

Transportation.  (See  Martens,  N.  R.  G.  (2nd  Series), 
Vol.  XIX,  p.  289.) 

*^  As,  for  instance,  in  the  Pan-American  Union, 
the  Sugar  Union,  and  the  International  Institute  of 
Agriculture.  (Reinsch,  Paul  S.,  Public  International 
Unions,  p.  154.) 

^^  As,  for  instance,  in  the  Metrical  Union  and  the 
Geodetic  Union.  In  the  former  the  commission  is 
composed  of  fourteen  members,  seven  of  whom  are 
elected  every  six  years.  In  the  latter  it  is  com- 
posed of  two  ex-oflBcio  members  and  nine  others, 
four  or  five  of  whom  are  elected  at  each  meeting 
of  the  triennial  Conferences. 


CHAPTER  IV 

INTERNATIONAL   ORGANS  WITH   POWER   OP   CON- 
TROL OVER   LOCAL  SITUATIONS TYPE  II 

ALTHOUGH  successful  examples  of  inter- 
-^~*  national  organs  of  the  first  type,  where  no 
large  power  of  control  is  exercised,  may  be 
quoted  almost  without  number,  the  successful 
examples  of  the  second  type,  where  substantial 
governing  power  exists,  are  extremely  few.  The 
larger  the  power  conferred  upon  the  commis- 
sion and  the  more  vital  the  nations*  concern 
in  the  questions  placed  under  international  con- 
trol, the  greater  become  the  conflicting  ten- 
sions and  strains.  Under  such  conditions  a 
badly  organized  commission,  or  one  with  a 
weak  personnel,  will  be  sure  to  break  down. 

1. — The  European  Danube  Commission 

Probably  the  best  example  of  this  second 
type  of  international  commission,  and  one  which 
has  met  with  generally  acknowledged  success, 

38 


ORGANS  WITH  LOCAL  POWER 

is  the  European  Danube  Commission.*  From 
1829  up  to  the  time  of  the  Crimean  War,  Russia 
had  held  the  mouths  of  the  Danube;  and  so  in- 
efficient and  incomj)etent  had  been  her  adminis- 
tration that  the  river  mouths  had  been  allowed 
to  fill  up,  and  the  navigation  of  the  lower 
Danube  had  become  as  dangerous  as  it  was  ex- 
pensive. The  matter  was  of  particular  concern  to 
Austria,  situated  at  the  upper  end  of  Danube 
navigation,  and  to  England,  anxious  to  provide 
a  safe  route  for  her  grain  trade  with  the  Rou- 
manian ports.  As  the  Turkish  administration 
which  was  to  succeed  the  Russian  in  1856 
promised  little  improvement,  the  question  of 
the  Danube  became  a  matter  for  special  con- 
sideration at  the  close  of  the  Crimean  War. 
Under  Arts.  16-18  of  the  Treaty  of  Paris  of 

*  Some  writers  have  even  gone  so  far  as  to  call  the  Danube 
Commission  a  "  veritable  state."  This,  of  course,  is  quite  errone- 
ous. See,  for  instance,  L.  Camand,  in  his  book.  Etude  sur  le 
Regime  juridique  du  Canal  de  Suez,  p.  235.  He  calls  the  Danube 
Commission  "wn  veritable  Etat"  "supplying  its  financial  needs 
by  the  collection  of  taxes  and  by  loans;  possessing  legislative 
authority  to  establish  regulations;  and  having  judicial  authority, 
exercised  through  the  medium  of  its  inspectors,  who  render  judg- 
ment on  final  appeal  in  controversies  arising  out  of  the  subject 
of  navigation.  In  addition  to  this,  it  is  independent  of  local 
power  and  is  protected  by  a  complete  neutralization  of  its  works, 
of  its  property,  and  even  of  its  personnel." 

Hershey,  in  his  Essentials  of  International  Public  Law,  says, 
on  p.  207,  note:  "The  Commission  appears  to  form  a  distinct 
International  Person,  having  the  power  of  prescribing  and  en- 
forcing penalties  for  the  violation  of  its  regulations." 

S9 


INTERNATIONAL  ADMINISTRATION 

1856,  the  principles  of  free  navigation  laid  down 
at  the  Congress  of  Vienna  in  1815  with  regard 
to  rivers  which  "separate  or  flow  through  sev- 
eral states"*  were  made  applicable  henceforth 
to  the  Danube.  In  order  to  secure  the  needed 
dredging  and  improvement  of  the  lower  Danube, 
which  could  never  have  been  expected  under 
Turkish  rule,  the  Powers  set  up  a  "European 
Commission,"  composed  of  one  delegate  each 
from  Great  Britain,  France,  Austria,  Prussia, 
Russia,  Sardinia,  and  Turkey,  the  signatory 
powers  to  the  treaty  of  1856,  charged  with  de- 
signing and  constructing  the  necessary  works 
to  deepen  the  channel  and  clear  the  mouths 
of  the  river  for  the  accommodation  of  sea-going 
ships.  The  Commission  was  given  power  to 
levy  such  dues  as  were  necessary  to  pay  its 
expenses,  the  amount  of  the  dues  to  be  deter- 
mined by  a  majority  vote,  on  the  express  con- 
dition "that  in  this  respect,  as  in  every  other, 
the  flags  of  all  nations  shall  be  treated  on  the 
footing  of  perfect  equality."  The  original 
nature  of  this  Commission  was  solely  of  an  en- 

*  Art.  109  of  the  Final  Act  of  the  Congress  of  Vienna  of  June 
9,  1815,  declares  that  "navigation  on  all  rivers  indicated  in  the 
preceding  article,  from  the  point  where  each  of  them  becomes 
navigable  to  its  mouth,  shall  be  entirely  free,  and  shall  not,  in 
respect  to  commerce,  be  prohibited  to  any  one;  it  is  understood, 
however,  that  one  will  conform  to  the  regulations  relative  to 
the  police  of  this  navigation.  These  regiJations  shall  be  uniform 
for  all  and  as  favorable  as  possible  to  the  commerce  of  all  nations." 

40 


ORGANS  WITH  LOCAL  POWER 

gineering  character,  to  improve  the  navigability 
of  the  lower  Danube.  It  was  exj)ected  to  be 
quite  temporary,  and  its  authority  extended  up 
the  river  only  as  far  as  Isaktcha,  beyond  which 
river  improvements  were  not  required.  For 
the  purpose  of  making  regulations  for  the  navi- 
gation of  the  entire  Danube  River,  a  second 
"Riparian  Commission"  was  established,  com- 
posed of  representatives  of  only  the  riparian 
states.*  This  was  looked  upon  as  the  normal 
and  permanent  administrative  and  river-regu- 
lating organ.  But  its  effort  to  establish  the 
right  of  the  riparian  states  to  levy  navigation 
tolls  in  excess  of  its  actual  expenses,  and  even 
to  exclude  altogether  the  ships  of  non-riparian 
states,  aroused  hostility  on  the  part  of  Eng- 
land and  France.  Owing  to  this  hostility 
and  to  its  own  internal  difficulties,  the  Com- 
mission before  long  broke  down;  and  most  of 
its  duties,  so  far  as  the  lower  part  of  the  Danube 
was  concerned,  were  gradually  assumed  by 
the  European  Commission,  whose  life  was  pro- 
longed from  time  to  time  by  special  conven- 
tions. So  effective  did  the  latter  Commission 
prove^  that  by  the  Public  Act  of  November  2, 
1865,2  indorsed  by  the  Protocol  of  March  28, 
1866,^  formal  recognition  and  approval  of  the 

*  These  included  Wiirtemberg,  Bavaria,  Austria,  Turkey,  and 
the  Danubian  principalities. 

41 


INTERNATIONAL  ADMINISTRATION 

work  which  it  had  already  accomplished  was 
given  to  it,  and  definite  authority  was  con- 
ferred upon  it  to  build  works  of  a  more  per- 
manent nature  for  the  improvement  of  the  river 
and  to  establish  henceforth  complete  regula- 
tions for  the  navigation  of  the  lower  Danube. 

For  the  better  protection  of  the  work  of  the 
Commission,  and  in  recognition  of  the  effec- 
tiveness of  its  accomplishments,  "the  works  and 
establishments  of  all  kinds  created  by  the  Euro- 
pean Commission"  were  in  1865  given  the  bene- 
fits of  neutralization;^  and  in  1871  this  neu- 
tralization was  extended  so  as  to  cover  the 
administrative  and  technical  personnel  as  well 
as  the  wcrks  of  the  Commission.^  Furthermore, 
in  1868,  in  order  to  enable  it  to  borrow  the 
funds  necessary  for  the  accomplishment  of  its 
work,  and  in  order  to  place  it  on  a  stable 
financial  footing,  all  the  Powers  concerned  ex- 
cept Russia  agreed  to  guarantee  a  loan  of 
3,375,000  francs  made  in  the  name  of  the  Com- 
mission.* 

The  continued  success  of  the  European  Com- 
mission in  the  administration  and  regulation 
of  the  river  navigation  caused  England  to 
urge  the  further  extension  of  its  territorial 
jurisdiction;  this  was  accomplished  by  the 
Treaty  of  Berlin  of  1878,  Art.  53  of  which  ex- 
tends its  authority  from  the  river  mouth  up 

4ie 


ORGANS  WITH  LOCAL  POWER 

to  Galatz  "in  a  complete  independence  of  ter- 
ritorial authority."  Art.  55  intrusts  it  with 
the  duty  of  formulating,  in  concert  with  dele- 
gates of  the  riparian  states,  police  rules  and 
navigation  regulations  for  the  section  of  the 
river  between  Galatz  and  Hungary.^  In  1883  its 
territorial  jurisdiction  was  extended  to  Braila,^  a 
Roumanian  port  practically  at  the  head  of  the 
river  navigation  for  sea-going  ships.  A  special 
flag  was  accorded  the  Commission  in  1882, 
and  its  employees  were  given  the  right  to  wear  a 
distinctive  armband.  On  November  10,  1911, 
the  Commission  passed  new  river  regulations, 
to  become  effective  on  July  1,  1912.^  Thus 
there  has  grown  up,  through  a  natural  evolu- 
tion, an  international  commission,  composed 
of  representatives  of  the  great  Powers  of  Eu- 
rope, which  is  independent  of  local  sovereignty 
and  which  has  a  jurisdiction  of  its  own  over 
the  most  important  part  of  one  of  the  large 
rivers  of  the  world.  The  importance  of  this 
power  is  best  understood  by  a  glance  at  the 
statistics  of  the  trade  which  annually  passes 
up  and  down  this  great  river.  ^" 

There  can  be  no  question  of  the  success  which 
has  attended  the  efforts  of  the  Commission. 
Before  its  creation  the  navigation  of  the  river 
was  not  only  diflScult  but  dangerous.  The  nu- 
merous shoals  and  sand-bars  necessitated  the 

43 


INTERNATIONAL  ADMINISTRATION 

frequent  lightening  of  ships,  and  the  bar  which 
had  been  allowed  to  form  across  the  mouth  was 
strewn  with  wrecks.^^  As  a  result  of  the  Com- 
mission's work  the  length  of  the  river  course 
between  St.  George's  Chatel  and  the  Soulina 
mouth  has  been  shortened  a  quarter  of  its 
length — i.  e.,  from  45  to  34  miles;  the  mini- 
mum depth  of  the  channel  has  been  increased 
from  9  to  24  feet;  the  number  of  wrecks  has 
been  reduced  from  considerably  over  40  per 
10,000  ships  to  4  per  10,000;  the  navigation 
dues  have  been  reduced  from  3.75  francs  per 
registered  ton  to  the  present  rate  of  1.70  francs.  ^^ 
In  addition  to  this  the  Commission  has  built 
up  the  port  of  Soulina,  where  it  has  established 
lighthouses,  floating  elevators,  eflSicient  pilot 
and  police  service,  and  all  the  facilities  neces- 
sary for  a  modern  port. 

The  general  powers  of  the  Commission  are 
by  no  means  small.  It  fixes  and  collects  all 
tolls  for  the  navigation  of  the  lower  river.  Out 
of  these  it  meets  its  annual  expyenses,  which 
amount  to  some  $400,000.  It  is  thus  entirely 
self-supporting,  except  that  the  salaries  of  the 
several  Commissioners  are  paid  by  their  re- 
spective countries.  Its  loans  have  been  guar- 
anteed by  the  great  Powers  whenever  this  has 
proved  necessary.  It  has  entire  control  of  the 
fiver  navigation  from  Bra'ila  to  the  sea,  without 


ORGANS  WITH  LOCAL  POWER 

any  right  of  the  Roumanian  Government  to 
interfere.  This  includes  the  power  to  make 
regulations  controlling  the  navigation  of  all  the 
lower  Danube,  and  also  to  maintain  and  mark 
the  channel.  By  its  exclusive  power  to  license 
tugs,  lighters,  and  pilots  on  that  part  of  the 
river,  it  exercises  complete  control  over  them, 
since,  upon  conviction  for  dishonesty  or  breach 
of  its  regulations,  it  may  withdraw  its  licenses, 
in  addition  to  imposing  fines.  It  appoints 
and  controls,  by  majority  vote,  a  large  body 
of  employees.  It  has  established  and  main- 
tains at  Soulina  two  hospitals;  it  has  com- 
plete control  of  that  port,  so  far  as  navigation 
interests  are  concerned;  and  has  sui>ervision  of 
the  lighthouses  on  the  Isle  of  Serpents  and  at 
the  mouths  of  the  river.  One  of  its  striking 
features  is  its  judicial  power  to  impose  fines 
and  i>enalties  for  breach  of  its  regulations,^^  al- 
though the  exercise  of  ordinary  criminal  and 
civil  jurisdiction  upon  the  river  is  retained  by 
the  local  Roumanian  courts. 

In  view  of  the  large  powers  accorded  to  the 
Commission  and  the  success  with  which  it  has 
exercised  them,  it  is  interesting  to  glance  at  its 
organization.*  It  is  composed  of  one  member 
from  each  state,  the  countries  represented  being 

*  The  text  of  the  Regulations  of  1879  which  define  the  organi- 
zation of  the  Commission  will  be  found  in  Appendix  B,  p.  182. 

46 


INTERNATIONAL  ADMINISTRATION 

Austria-Hungary,  France,  Germany,  Great  Brit- 
ain, Italy,  Roumania,  Russia,  and  Turkey.*  The 
Commissioners  serve  at  the  will  of  the  appoint- 
ing Powers,  so  that  they  can  be  removed  at 
any  time.  Regular  sessions  are  held  twice  a 
year,  extraordinary  sessions  being  called  by 
special  request.  The  votes  of  all  the  states  are 
of  equal  value.  The  Commission  acts  by  ma- 
jority vote  in  all  ordinary  administrative  ques- 
tions and  also  in  the  important  matter  of  fixing 
the  tolls;"  for  important  questions  of  principle, 
however,  unanimity  is  required,  and  any  mem- 
ber who  disapproves,  even  though  he  were 
absent  from  the  meeting,  may  within  two 
months  overturn  the  vote.  The  executive 
committee,  which  carries  on  the  work  between 
the  regular  sessions,  is  composed  of  all  the 
members  who  happen  to  be  at  Galatz,  which 
is  the  headquarters  of  the  Commission.  De- 
cisions are  taken  in  the  executive  committee 
by  majority  vote.^^ 

As  might  have  been  expected,  the  work  oi 
the  Commission  has  not  been  accomplished 
without  occasional  friction  with  the  local  terri- 
torial government  of  Roumania;  but  since  Rou- 
mania could  not  but  realize  that  the  interna- 


*  Germany  took  the  place  originally  held  by  Prussia,  and  Italy 
has  similarly  superseded  Sardinia.  Roiuuania  was  admitted, 
as  the  local  territorial  state,  in  1878. 

46 


ORGANS  WITH  LOCAL  POWER 

tional  Commission  was  her  best  protection 
against  Austrian  and  Russian  encroachment, 
this  very  natural  friction  has  led  to  no  serious 
trouble.  The  Crown  Prince  of  Roumania,  at 
the  fiftieth  anniversary  of  its  creation,  declared 
that  the  Danube  Commission,  by  the  consid- 
erable services  which  it  had  rendered,  deserved 
"the  admiration  and  the  gratitude  of  the  civil- 
ized world."  Certain  it  is  that  the  interna- 
tional Commission  has  successfully  and  efficient- 
ly performed  a  task  which  would  have  been 
utterly  impossible  under  the  sole  administra- 
tion of  the  local  Roumanian  government. 

It  is  too  early  to  prophesy  how  the  European 
War  will  aflFect  the  Danube  Commission;  but 
it  seems  fairly  certain  that  whatever  changes 
may  come  will  end  neither  its  usefulness  nor  its 
existence. 

2. — Cape  Spartel  Lighthouse 

A  curious,  if  comparatively  unimportant,  in- 
stance of  international  co-operation  is  the 
agreement  signed  at  Tangier  on  May  31,  1865, 
between  Morocco  and  the  leading  European 
states  and  the  United  States,  whereby  an  in- 
ternational lighthouse  was  instituted  at  Cape 
Spartel,  Morocco.  ^^  Under  this  treaty  the  light- 
house and  the  land  upon  which  it  stands  are  to 
remain  under  the  sovereignty  of  the  Sultan, 

4  47 


INTERNATIONAL  ADMINISTRATION 

whose  flag  alone  shall  be  hoisted  on  the  light- 
house tower;  but  its  "superior  direction  and 
administration"  is  turned  over  to  the  repre- 
sentatives of  the  contracting  Powers,  which 
agree  to  share  equally  the  annual  expenses  for 
its  maintenance.  The  lighthouse  is  to  be  pro- 
tected by  a  Moorish  guard,  and  all  the  contract- 
ing states  agree  to  respect  its  neutrality.  There 
is  thus  set  up  an  international  establishment, 
supervised  by  representatives  of  all  the  signa- 
tory states.  These  shall  make  regulations  for 
the  direction  and  management  of  the  light- 
house which  cannot  be  changed  without  the 
consent  of  all. 

Germany  acceded  to  this  convention  on 
March  4,  1878,  and  Russia  on  May  31,  1899.^7 

Although  this  strange  international  light- 
house has  figured  very  little  in  oflScial  reports 
and  documents,  the  fact  that  the  United  States 
continues  to  make  annual  appropriations  for 
its  share  of  the  cost  of  maintenance  shows  that 
the  international  arrangement  still  remains  in 
successful  operation.^* 

3. — International  Sanitary  Councils 

The  necessity  for  taking  international  sani- 
tary measures  to  prevent  the  spread  of  plague 
and  cholera  has  been  responsible  for  another 

48 


ORGANS  WITH  LOCAL  POWER 

inroad  upon  the  current  theory  that  a  com- 
pletely unrestricted  independence  within  its 
own  borders  should  be  enjoyed  by  every  sover- 
eign state.  Cholera  and  plague  epidemics  fol- 
low the  great  trade  and  pilgrimage  routes;  the 
disastrous  cholera  invasions  of  Europe  during 
the  nineteenth  century  have  sometimes  followed 
the  sea  route  to  the  shores  of  the  Red  Sea, 
Egypt,  and  the  Mediterranean,  and  sometimes 
the  overland  route  to  northern  India  and 
Afghanistan,  thence  to  Persia  and  central  Asia, 
and  thus  to  Russia.  In  the  last  century  Eu- 
rope suffered  from  no  less  than  six  cholera  in- 
vasions;* during  each  invasion  even  the  very 
strictest  sanitary  precautions  taken  by  indi- 
vidual states  proved  utterly  unable  to  check 
the  spread  of  the  terrible  disease,  from  Russia 
down  into  France,  Spain,  Italy,  and  England, 
and  even  to  the  United  States  and  Central 
America.  Some  idea  of  the  tragic  character  of 
this  international  scourge  may  be  gained  from 
a  glance  at  the  number  of  deaths  which*  oc- 
curred in  1892.  f    In  the  summer  of  that  year. 


*  Europe  was  invaded  with  cholera  in  1830-32;  1848-51; 
1851-55;  1865-74;  1884-86;  1892-95. 

t  The  number  of  persons  killed  by  cholera  in  1892  in  the  more 
important  countries  was  reckoned  as  follows:  European  Russia, 
151,626;  Caucasus,  69,423;  Central  Asian  Russia,  81,804;  Siberia, 
15,037;  Persia,  63,982;  Somaliland,  10,000;  Afghanistan,  7,000; 
Germany,  9,563;  France,  4,550;  Hungary,  1,255;  Belgium,  961, 

49 


INTERNATIONAL  ADMINISTRATION 

in  the  city  of  Hamburg  cholera  broke  out 
and  was  well  advanced  before  the  authorities 
could  make  up  their  minds  what  the  disease 
was;  in  less  than  a  week  after  the  oflBcial  an- 
nouncement of  cholera  was  made  the  inhabi- 
tants were  being  stricken  at  the  rate  of  1,000 
a  day.  "The  town,  ordinarily  one  of  the 
gayest  places  on  the  continent,  became  a  city 
of  the  dead.  Thousands  of  persons  fled,  carry- 
ing the  disease  into  all  parts  of  Germany;  the 
rest  shut  themselves  indoors;  the  shops  were 
closed,  the  trams  ceased  to  run,  the  hotels  and 
restaurants  were  deserted,  and  few  vehicles  or 
pedestrians  were  seen  in  the  streets.  "^^ 

Little  wonder  that  upon  the  occasion  of  each 
recurring  outbreak  the  nations  of  Euroj>e  sought 
to  devise  international  measures  to  prevent  the 
spread  of  the  disease;  but  always  conflicting 
"national  interests"  made  agreement  impos- 
sible, and  nothing  was  done.  It  was  not  until 
thousands  of  lives  had  been  sacrificed  that  the 
European  states  became  finally  convinced  that 
a  compulsory  surveillance  over  each  country's 
sanitary  measures  and  an  international  stand- 
ard of  sanitary  efficiency  had  become  a  matter 
of  vital  concern  for  the  security  of  each  state; 
and  on  January  30,  1892,  the  first  International 
Sanitary  Convention  was  signed  in  Venice.^" 

This  has  been  modified  by  succeeding  confer- 
so 


ORGANS  WITH  LOCAL  POWER 

ences,  and  by  the  Convention  now  in  force,* 
which  was  signed  at  Paris  by  the  United  States 
and  all  the  leading  European  states  on  De- 
cember 3,  1903.21 

The  Convention  contains  elaborate  regula- 
tions requiring  the  international  notification  of 
the  outbreak  of  epidemic  diseases  and  prescribes 
the  course  of  action  to  be  followed  where  a  dis- 
trict or  a  country  has  become  contaminated, 
the  measures  to  be  adopted  at  ports  in  the  case 
of  infected  ships,  the  quarantine  regulations  to 
be  established,  and  the  special  measures  which 
must  be  taken  in  the  case  of  pilgrimages  and 
pilgrim  ships,  and  provides  for  the  payment 
of  expenses  by  means  of  a  tax  on  shipping.  An 
International  Bureau  is  provided  for  under 
Art.  181,  to  be  set  up  at  Paris,  for  the  pur- 
pose of  gathering  and  disseminating  informa- 
tion, statistics,  and  reports  on  matters  concern- 
ing infectious  diseases.  In  accordance  with 
the  subsequent  Convention  of  December  9, 
1907,22  a  permanent  bureau  of  this  kind  was 
established,  consisting  of  a  director,  a  general 
secretary,  and  a  number  of  clerks.  It  publishes 
a  monthly  bulletin  in  French.  Like  the  in- 
ternational bureaux  of  other  Public  Unions, 
however,  it  has  no  power  of  control  over  the 

*  Owing  to  the  outbreak  of  the  European  War,  the  Conven- 
tion of  1911-12  has  not  been  ratified. 

51 


INTERNATIONAL  ADMINISTRATION 

various  states,  its  functions  being  confined 
to  those  of  a  purely  informational  and  routine 
nature.^^ 

The  special  Sanitary  Councils  provided  for 
by  the  Convention  are  of  more  particular  in- 
terest, because  they  possess  actual  governing 
power  over  particular  localities,  and  therefore 
constitute  international  organs  of  the  second 
type.  They  have  power  to  enforce  the  sani- 
tary provisions  of  the  Convention  in  certain 
places  which  rest  under  the  sovereignty  of  weak 
or  indifferent  governments,  and  which  lie  pe- 
culiarly in  the  path  of  international  trade  or 
pilgrimage  routes.  Three  of  these  international 
commissions  were  provided  for:*  (1)  The  Con- 
seil  Superieur  de  Sant6  at  Constantinople  ;2^ 
(2)  The  Conseil  Sanitaire  maritime  et  quaran- 
tenaire  at  Alexandria  ;2^  and  (3)  The  Conseil 
Sanitaire  at  Tangier.^^ 

The  Conseil  Superieur  de  SantI  of  Con- 
stantinople, as  it  was  organized  under  the  terms 
of  the  Paris  Convention,  and  as  it  existed  before 
the  outbreak  of  the  Great  War  in  1914,  was 


*  International  sanitary  councils  were  established  in  Constanti- 
nople in  1838,  in  Tangier  in  1840,  and  in  Alexandria  in  1881. 
The  International  Sanitary  Convention  gave  formal  recognition 
to  these,  and  intrusted  them  with  substantial  administrative 
duties  and  powers,  as  described  in  the  text. 

An  international  sanitary  council  of  the  same  type  has  been 
instituted  at  Teheran. 

52 


ORGANS  WITH  LOCAL  POWER 

to  decide  "on  the  measures  to  be  adopted  in 
order  to  prevent  the  introduction  of  epidemic 
diseases  into  the  Ottoman  Empire  and  their 
transmission  to  foreign  countries."  ^^  The  coun- 
cil supervised  the  quarantine  service  at  Turkish 
ports,  on  the  Persian  Gulf,  and  on  the  Red  Sea, 
as  well  as ,  along  the  Persian  and  Russian 
boundaries,  and  saw  to  the  fulfilment  within 
the  Turkish  Empire  of  the  latter's  international 
sanitary  obligations.  It  was  composed  of  four 
Turkish  members,  and  one  representative  of 
each  of  the  signatory  Powers;  these  were  re- 
quired to  be  holders  of  medical  diplomas.  The 
president  was  the  Turkish  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs.  The  decisions  of  the  Council  were 
executory  directly;  and  from  them  there  was  no 
appeal.  Still  more  striking  was  the  provision 
that  all  action  should  be  taken  by  a  majority 
vote.2* 

The  Sanitary  Council  of  Alexandria  is  simi- 
larly organized  to  provide  measures  to  prevent 
the  introduction  into  Egypt,  or  the  trans- 
mission abroad,  of  epidemics  and  infectious 
diseases.^*  It  is  composed  of  four  Egyptian 
members  and  fourteen  representatives  of  the 
signatory  states,  all  of  them  to  be  holders  of 
diplomas  of  medicine.  The  presidency  is  ac- 
corded to  the  representative  of  Great  Britain.'" 
It  holds  regular  monthly  meetings  and  suclj 

53 


INTERNATIONAL  ADMINISTRATION 

extraordinary  meetings  as  may  prove  neces- 
sary. It  controls  the  treatment  of  suspected 
ships  and  passengers  coming  from  countries 
subject  to  epidemics;  it  supervises  the  Egyptian 
quarantine  stations  on  the  Red  Sea,  the  Suez 
Canal,  and  the  mouth  of  the  Nile.  It  exercises 
a  permanent  surveillance  over  the  public  health 
of  Egypt,  and  appoints  and  supervises  a  com- 
petent corps  of  inspectors  for  this  purpose.  It 
makes  regulations  and  establishes  preventive 
measures  against  the  spread  of  disease;  it 
supervises  and  controls  the  execution  of  the 
sanitary  regulations  which  it  has  established, 
and  sees  to  the  fulfilment  of  the  international 
sanitary  obligations  of  Egypt  arising  under  the 
Convention  of  1903.^' 

Owing  to  the  unsettled  political  conditions 
and  to  the  violent  and  petty  jealousies  on  the 
part  of  the  representatives  of  certain  states, 
the  Conseil  Sup^rieur  de  Sante  at  Constanti- 
nople has  not  proved  a  success.  Because  of  the 
imtiring  efforts  of  Germany  to  undermine  Eng- 
lish influence  in  Turkey,  the  Sanitary  Council 
developed  into  a  hotbed  of  political  intrigue; 
the  situation  became  so  bad  that  in  1914 
the  Turkish  Government  issued  a  declaration 
denying  the  right  of  the  Council  to  act  at  all 
in  Turkey. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  Council  in  Alexan- 

§4 


ORGANS  WITH  LOCAL  POWER 

dria  has  successfully  maintained  its  work.* 
That  this  is  not  unimportant  is  evidenced  by 
the  fact  that  it  makes  an  annual  expenditure  of 
some  $400,000  and  employs  a  technical  staff  of 
over  eighty  health  officers  and  agents.^'  The 
size  of  the  yearly  expenditure,  however,  is  in- 
significant as  compared  with  the  number  of 
lives  annually  saved  by  the  preventive  measures 
of  the  Commission,  t  It  must  be  recognized, 
however,  that,  owing  to  the  progress  of  events 

*  In  the  Revue  Generale  de  Droit  International  Public  (Vol.  XI, 
p.  205)  this  Council  was  said  to  have  "given  full  satisfaction  in 
Europe." 

t  The  official  Egyptian  Reports  contain  numerous  references  to 
the  beneficial  work  of  the  International  Commission.  "On  the  4th 
of  November  last  the  International  Quarantine  Council  declared 
the  pilgrimage  as  'infected,'  on  account  of  plague,  and  the  usual 
measures  were  adopted  by  the  authorities.  Twenty-six  thousand, 
three  hundred  and  eighty-nine  pilgrims  passed  through  Tor  on 
their  way  home;  716  were  admitted  to  the  hospital  at  this  place,  395 
of  whom  were  Egyptians  and  321  foreigners.  There  were  52  deaths 
among  Egyptian  pilgrims  and  65  among  foreigners.  This  is  the 
lowest  rate  of  mortality  yet  recorded.  There  is  an  improvement 
of  50  per  cent,  in  mortality  figures  during  the  last  ten  years. " 
(Quoted  from  British  Pari.  Accounts  and  Papers,  1914,  Vol.  CI 
(Cd.  7358]  p.  48.) 

"In  October  cholera  broke  out  in  the  Hedjaz,  and  the  pilgrim- 
age was  declared  infected.  On  the  return  of  the  pilgrims  32  cases 
occurred  among  the  pilgrims  at  Tor,  and  accordingly  the  Quar- 
antine Administration  gave  orders  that  no  Egyptian  pilgrim 
should  leave  Tor  without  being  bacteriologically  examined. 
The  result  was  that  69  vibrio-carriers  were  detected.  It  may 
be  noted  that  since  1902,  when  the  last  epidemic  of  cholera  oo^ 
curred  in  Egypt,  the  pilgrimage  has  been  infected  three  times, 
namely,  in  1906,  1911,  and  1912,  and  that,  nevertheless,  cholera 
did  not  on  any  occasion  penetrate  Egypt. "  (From  British  Pari, 
Accounts  and  Papers,  1913,  Vol.  LXXXI  [Cd.  6682]  p.  44.) 

55 


INTERNATIONAL  ADMINISTRATION 

in  Egypt,  the  actual  control  has  come  more  and 
more  under  purely  British  influence.^^ 


^. — Albania 

Perhaps  the  most  striking,  as  well  as  the  most 
recent,  example  of  an  international  executive 
organ  of  the  second  type  was  the  ill-starred 
Albanian  International  Commission  of  Control, 
the  creation  of  which  was  agreed  to  by  the 
London  Ambassadorial  Conference  in  July, 
1913.  Toward  the  close  of  the  first  Balkan 
War  the  fate  of  Albania  presented  a  very  grave 
international  problem;  besides  being  the  storm- 
center  of  European  politics,  it  formed  the 
meeting-place  of  local  Balkan  territorial  am- 
bitions. Albania  had  just  been  cleared  of  the 
Turks,  who  had  misruled  it  for  centuries;  and 
all  Europe  was  filled  with  conflicting  plans  as 
to  who  should  succeed  to  the  sovereignty  of  the 
turbulent  country.  Servia  had  fought  a  suc- 
cessful war  in  order  to  reach  the  Adriatic 
through  Albania;  Austria  and  Italy  were  de- 
termined that  Servia  should  not  reach  the 
Adriatic.  Both  Austria  and  Italy  had  their 
own  designs  upon  the  newly  freed  territory, 
and  each  was  equally  determined  that  the  other 
should  gain  no  foothold  therein.  Russia  stood 
watching,  eying  suspiciously  every  move  on  the 


ORGANS  WITH  LOCAL  POWER 

part  of  Austria.  The  Balkan  States,  themselves, 
long  familiar  with  the  temporizing  policy  and 
divided  councils  of  the  European  concert,  were 
half  persuaded  to  defy  the  great  Powers; 
Montenegro  actually  did  so.  For  a  time  it 
looked  as  though  the  long-predicted  event  were 
at  hand  when  the  Balkan  tinder  would  set  all , 
Europe  on  fire.  But  through  the  able  and  pacifi- 
catory efforts  of  Sir  Edward, Grey,  the  problem 
was  taken  up  and  discussed  at  a  conference  of 
the  Ambassadors  of  the  great  Powers  in  Lon- 
don; and  after  the  diplomats  had  considered  all 
possible  solutions,  they  finally  concluded  that 
the  only  course  which  seemed  likely  to  keep 
the  European  nations  from  flying  at  one  an- 
other's thi'oats  was  the  creation  of  an  inde- 
pendent Albania  organized  under  and  fathered 
by  an  International  Commission  of  Control,  in 
which  each  of  the  five  great  Powers,  as  well  as 
Albania,  should  have  one  representative.* 

*There  seems  to  have  been  no  formal  instrument  signed  creating 
the  independent  state  of  Albania.  See  British  Pari.  65  H.  C. 
Deb.  5th  Ser.,  p.  6.  In  response  to  the  question  whether  the 
London  Conference  had  signed  an  agreement  for  an  autonomous 
state,  Mr.  Acland,  on  July  20,  1914,  said:  "The  creation  of  an 
autonomous  Albanian  state  rests  on  a  resolution  adopted  at  a 
meeting  of  the  Ambassadors'  Conference,  over  which  my  right 
Hon.  Friend  [Grey]  presided.  The  proceedings  of  that  Confer- 
ence were  not  embodied  in  any  formal  document,  and  the  oc- 
casion to  sign  an  agreement  did  not,  therefore,  arise.  To  avoid 
misunderstanding  I  may  add  that  the  ambassadors'  conference 
acted  simply  as  a  means  of  keeping  the  governments  of   the 

57 


INTERNATIONAL  ADMINISTRATION 

This  Commission  of  Control,  instituted  for 
ten  years,  was  made  responsible  for  the  civil 
and  financial  administration  of  the  country; 
its  duties  included  the  drawing  up  of  a  detailed 
plan  of  organization  for  all  the  branches  of  the 
administration  of  Albania.  Under  its  advice 
the  country  was  to  be  governed  by  a  Prince  and 
a  Cabinet.  Prince  William  of  Wied,  a  German 
Protestant  Prince,  was  chosen  as  the  ruler  of  the 
new  country,  and  on  March  7,  1914,  he  arrived 
at  Durazzo.  A  native  Cabinet  was  appointed 
on  March  17,  1914. 

The  Commission*  held  its  first  sitting  on 
October  15,  1913,  and  for  several  months  had 
its  headquarters  at  Valona.^^  In  order  to  avoid 
the  difficulties  of  choosing  a  permanent  presi- 
dent it  was  agreed  that  each  member  should 
hold  the  presidency  for  one  month,  following 
one  another  in  regular  turn.  A  further  pro- 
vision, which  very  clearly  shows  the  unwilling- 
countries  there  represented  in  close  touch  with  one  another,  and 
that  their  resolutions  were  simply  the  records  of  the  points  upon 
which  these  governments  were  in  agreement." 

The  question  was  then  asked :  "  Am  I  to  understand  that  there 
is  no  agreement  as  to  the  status  of  Albania?" 

The  answer  was:  "There  is  a  written  agreement  as  to  the 
boundaries  of  Albania." 

*  The  Commission  of  Control  should  not  be  confused  with  the 
International  Commission  to  lay  out  the  Albanian  boundaries 
in  accordance  with  the  agreement  reached  at  the  London  Ambas- 
sadorial Conference;  the  latter  was  of  little  interest  from  the  view- 
point of  international  administration. 

58 


ORGANS  WITH  LOCAL  POWER 

ness  of  the  European  states  to  vest  their  confi- 
dence in  this  Commission,  required  that,  al- 
though ordinary  administrative  matters  could 
be  settled  by  a  simple  vote,  matters  which 
any  member  claimed  were  possessed  of  political 
importance  could  be  settled  only  after  refer- 
ence to  the  home  governments.^^ 

From  the  very  outset  the  conditions  were 
hopeless.  In  the  view  of  some  the  entire 
absence  of  any  consciousness  of  national  unity 
rendered  it  fundamentally  impossible  to  create 
an  independent  autonomous  Albania.  "No  na- 
tion can  exist  in  modern  times,  when  national 
life  is  in  the  will  of  the  people  rather  than 
in  the  unifying  qualities  of  a  ruler,  if  there  are 
no  common  ideals  and  the  determination  to 
attain  them.  Albania  is  without  a  national 
spirit  and  a  national  past.  It  is,  therefore,  no 
unit  capable  of  being  welded  into  a  state.*'^* 
Even  the  most  optimistic  could  expect  little 
from  a  state  with  no  written  or  unwritten  na- 
tional code  of  law,  with  its  very  boundaries 
still  in  dispute,  governed  by  a  Commission  of 
foreigners  representing  nations  hopelessly  at 
variance  with  one  another,  and  surrounded  by 
countries  waiting  for  the  first  false  move,  to 
set  ufKDn  it  like  a  pack  of  hungry  wolves.* 

*  See  J.  A.  R.  Marriott,  in  The  Eastern  Question,  p.  416.  In 
speaking  of  the  failure  of  Prince  William  of  Wied,  he  says:  "The 

59 


INTERNATIONAL  ADMINISTRATION 

Only  a  Cavour  could  have  mastered  such  a 
situation.  The  great  need  was  for  some  single, 
dominant,  and  masterful  genius,  who,  having 
once  caught  the  vision  of  creating  a  people, 
should  hold  to  his  course  with  singleness  of 
aim  and  should  unite,  partly  by  the  force  of 
his  own  personality,  partly  by  adherence  to  a 
strong,  unified  policy,  a  heterogeneous  mass  of 
warlike  tribes  into  a  united  people  with  com- 
mon ideals,  common  aims,  and  a  common 
faith  in  their  destiny  and  their  government. 
If  ever  there  was  need  for  a  strong,  one-man 
government,  it  was  in  Albania  in  1913.  In- 
stead of  that  there  was  set  up  a  Commission  of 
consuls,  foreigners,  and  outsiders,  all  but  one 
ignorant  even  of  the  Albanian  language,  repre- 
senting sharply  conflicting  j>olicies  and  inter- 
ests. There  could  be  but  one  result,  no  matter 
how  excellent  the  Commission. 

As  the  great  Powers  proved  unwilling  to 
make  themselves  responsible  for  the  keeping 
of  the  peace  in  Albania,*  and  refused  to  send 

ambitious  disloyalty  of  Essad  Pasha  (the  Minister  of  War  and 
of  the  Interior),  the  turbulence  of  the  Albanian  tribesmen,  among 
whom  there  was  entire  lack  of  coherence  or  of  unity,  the  intrigues 
of  more  than  one  interested  Power,  rendered  his  position  from 
the  first  impossible." 

*  On  June  25,  1914,  in  the  English  House  of  Commons,  Sir 
Edward  Grey,  the  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs,  was 
asked  whether,  "in  view  of  the  fact  that  Albanians  are  being 
massacred  and  ill-treated  in  the  south  of  Albania,  he  would  coq- 

60 


ORGANS  WITH  LOCAL  POWER 

international  troops  for  the  preservation  of  or- 
der, chaos  ensued.  In  spite  of  the  earnest 
efforts  of  the  International  Commission  of  Con- 
trol to  reconcile  the  conflicting  claims  and  de- 
mands of  the  warring  native  factions,  insurrec- 
tion broke  out,  and  open  disorder.  Prince 
William  of  Wied  proved  entirely  unable  to  cope 
with  the  situation.  On  May  24,  1914,  he  fled 
incontinently  from  his  palace  at  Durazzo. 
Although  he  returned  a  few  hours  later,  any 
authority  which  he  might  have  retained  was 
gone.  In  the  latter  days  of  July,  after  the 
outbreak  of  the  European  War,  the  Prince  and 
nearly  all  the  members  of  the  Commission  left 
Albania.  An  attempt  was  made  by  Essad  Pasha 
Topdani,  who  had  been  exj>elled  from  the 
country  in  May,  to  establish  a  military  govern- 
ment; but  this  ended  in  failure.  Anarchy  and 
disorder  reigned  in  the  unhappy  country  until 
it  was  eventually  overrun  by  the  Austrians  in 
the  opening  weeks  of  1916. 

The  Albanian  fiasco  was  the  outcome  of  an 

sider  the  advisability  of  sending  Consuls  or  other  qualified 
persons  to  the  areas  in  question  for  the  purpose  of  gaining  accu- 
rate information."  To  this  Sir  Edward  Grey  replied:  "Though 
His  Majesty's  Government  are  responsible  with  the  Governments 
of  other  great  Powers  for  the  creation  of  an  autonomous  Albania, 
I  cannot  admit  responsibility  for  maintaining  order  there,  and 
I  do  not  wish  to  assume  such  responsibility  by  taking  the  measure 
which  the  hon.  member  suggests."  (Parliamentary  Debates, 
House  of  Commons,  Fifth  Series,  Vol.  LXIII,  p.  1962.) 

61 


INTERNATIONAL  ADMINISTRATION 

attempt  to  cure  an  impossible  situation  by  a 
makeshift  ill  adapted  to  the  needs.  It  may 
show  that  an  international  Commission  is  not 
the  happiest  form  of  organization  for  the  fus- 
ing and  unification  of  a  disunited  people;  but 
it  does  not  prove  the  futility  in  general  of 
international  commissions  intrusted  with  real 
power  in  matters  of  vital  concern  to  European 
states.^' 

5. — Moroccan  International  Police 

Another  instance  of  an  international  organi- 
zation whose  success  was  made  impossible  by 
the  conditions  under  which  it  was  created  was 
the  Moroccan  International  Police,  organized 
at  the  Algeciras  Conference  of  1906.  On  April 
8,  1904,  an  Accord^*  had  been  entered  into 
between  Great  Britain  and  France,  whereby, 
in  return  for  France's  allowing  her  a  free  hand 
in  Egypt,  Great  Britain  recognized  the  special 
interests  of  France  in  Morocco,  and  agreed  not 
to  obstruct  any  action  which  might  be  taken 
by  France  for  preserving  order  or  instituting  re- 
forms within  that  country.  Each  of  the  signa- 
tory countries  agreed  to  lend  to  the  other  its 
"diplomatic  support"  in  order  to  obtain  the 
execution  of  the  treaty.'^  The  following  year 
Germany,  apprehensive  lest  this  rapprochement 

62 


ORGANS  WITH  LOCAL  POWER 

of  France  and  England  might  rob  her  of  the 
power  to  dominate  the  affairs  of  Europe  which 
she  had  enjoyed  since  the  Franco-Prussian  War 
of  1870,  and  determined  that  the  time  was 
past  when  colonial  arrangements  could  be  made 
without  her  consent,  executed  a  sudden  and 
theatrical  move.  On  March  31,  1905,  the 
Kaiser  without  warning  appeared  in  his  yacht 
off  the  Moroccan  coast  at  Tangier.  In  a  terse 
speech  that  rang  through  the  chancelleries  of 
the  world,  he  recognized'  the  status  of  Morocco 
as  that  of  a  free  and  independent  country,  and 
sent  a  special  message  of  friendship  to  the 
reigning  Sultan.  The  message  was  intended 
and  accepted  as  a  direct  challenge  to  the  ar- 
rangements of  1904,  as  to  which  the  Kaiser  had 
not  been  consulted.  A  complicated  diplomatic 
battle  followed.  Germany  forced  the  retire- 
ment from  office  of  M.  Delcass^,  the  French 
Foreign  Minister,  and  demanded  the  reference 
of  the  whole  Moroccan  question  to  a  conference 
of  all  the  states  which  had  any  interest  in 
Morocco.*    At  the  time,  France's  ally,  Russia, 

*  Although  the  Kaiser's  sudden  appearance  at  Tangier,  and 
Germany's  subsequent  insistence  upon  the  holding  of  the  Alge- 
ciras  Conference,  have  been  defended  upon  the  ground  that 
Germany's  commercial  interests  in  Morocco  entitled  her  to 
an  equal  voice  with  France  and  England  in  the  settlement  of 
Morocco,  a  glance  at  the  Moroccan  trade  statistics  will  show  how 
unsubstantial  is  this  claim.    The  foreign  commerce  from  Morocco 

5  63 


INTERNATIONAL  ADMINISTRATION 

was  rendered  impotent  by  the  crushing  defeats 
suffered  in  the  Russo-Japanese  War,  and  Eng- 
land had  not  yet  recovered  from  the  mihtary 
failures  of  the  South  African  campaign.  With 
her  own  military  organization  wholly  unpre- 
pared to  push  a  vigorous  war,  France  was 
therefore  forced  to  swallow  her  humiliation 
and  to  agree  to  Germany's  summary  demands. 
An  International  Conference,  in  which  repre- 
sentatives of  the  United  States  and  of  all  the 
principal  countries  of  Europe  took  part,  met  at 
Algeciras,  a  Spanish  port  close  to  Gibraltar, 
in  January,  1906.  In  the  negotiations  which 
followed,  Germany  sought  to  insist  upon  a  gen- 
eral international  Commission  of  reform;  but, 
as  only  Austria  supported  her  demands,  she 

for  the  years  1902  to  1907,  expressed  in  millions  of  francs,  was 
as  follows: 

1902  1903  1904  1905  1906  1907 

France  and  Algiers 32  34  29  30  42  34 

England 43  45  39  23  24  25 

Germany 9  10  10  7  7  9 

Spain 8  7  7  3  3  3 

Expressed  in  tenns  of  percentages,  the  distribution  of  com- 
merce among  these  nations  was  as  follows: 

1902  1903  1904  1905  1906  1907 

France  and  Algiers 31  31  30  46  56  45 

England 41  41  40  29  28  33 

Germany 9  10  11  9  8  12 

Spain 8  7  7  4  4  4 

See  article  by  Andre  Tardieu  in  the  Revue  Politique  et  Parle- 
mentaire.  Vol.  LVIII  (1908),  p.  232. 

64 


ORGANS  WITH  LOCAL  POWER 

was  forced  to  yield,  and  so  finally  acquiesced 
in  intrusting  to  France  and  Spain  the  intro- 
duction of  financial  and  military  reforms  into 
Morocco.  Perhaps  the  most  vital  problem  of 
all  was  the  question  of  policing  Morocco;  and 
this  was  finally,  solved  by  the  creation  of  a  so- 
called  "International  Police." 

This  police  force,  provided  for  by  Chapter 
I  of  the  General  Act  of  the  Algeciras  Con- 
ference, signed  on  April  7,  1906,^°  was  placed 
nominally  under  the  sovereign  authority  of  the 
Sultan  of  Morocco,  and  was  to  be  recruited  by 
the  Maghzen*  from  Moorish  Mohammedans 
and  commanded  by  Moorish  Kaids.  It  was  to 
be  distributed  among  the  eight  ports  open  to 
commerce.  In  order  to  assist  the  Sultan  in 
the  organization  of  this  police,  French  and 
Spanish  commissioned  and  non-commissioned 
oflScers  were  to  be  appointed  as  instructors  of 
the  force,  their  appointment  to  be  submitted 
to  the  Sultan  for  approval.  For  a  period  of 
five  years  these  oflicers  were  to  lend  their  assist- 
ance in  organizing  the  Moroccan  police,  to  in- 
struct and  discipline  the  force,  to  see  that  the 
enrolled  men  possessed  aptitude  for  military 
service,  and,  in  a  general  way,  to  oversee  and 

*  The  Maghzen  (an  Arabic  word  primarily  meaning  store- 
house) is  the  central  Government  of  Morocco;  the  term  is  also 
used  to  mean  the  whole  administrative  body  of  the  Government, 

6i? 


INTERNATIONAL  ADMINISTRATION 

assist  the  whole  police  administration  of  Mo- 
rocco. In  addition  to  the  French  and  Spanish 
instructors  a  superior  officer  of  the  Swiss  army 
was  to  be  appointed  by  the  Swiss  Government, 
with  the  Sultan's  approval,  as  the  Inspector- 
General  of  the  PoHce;  his  permanent  residence 
was  to  be  at  Tangier.  Without  intervening  di- 
rectly in  the  command  or  instruction  of  the 
police,  the  Inspector-General  was  to  make 
reports  of  the  results  obtained  by  the  Moroccan 
police  in  the  maintenance  of  order  and  security, 
and  to  transmit  these  reports  both  to  the 
Maghzen  and  to  the  Diplomatic  Corps  at 
Tangier. 

The  total  effective  of  the  police  troops  was 
to  be  maintained  at  not  more  than  2,500,  nor 
less  than  2,000.  The  police  regulations  were 
to  be  made  by  the  Moroccan  Minister  of  War, 
the  Swiss  Inspector-General,  and  the  French 
and  Spanish  head  instructors,  acting  together, 
and  were  to  be  submitted  to  the  Diplomatic 
Corps  at  Tangier  before  being  put  into  opera- 
tion."! 

It  was  very  clear  from  the  outset  that  no 
one  placed  any  real  confidence  in  the  per- 
manency of  this  anomalous  international  pohce 
organ;  it  was  no  more  than  a  makeshift,  and 
was  understood  by  many  to  be  intended  only 
as  an  artificial  arrangement  to  satisfy  the  in- 

66 


ORGANS  WITH  LOCAL  POWER 

sistent  and  loud  demands  of  Germany.  "The 
Act  of  Algeeiras  was  not  a  solution  of  the 
Moroccan  question,"  says  one  well-known 
writer,  "it  was  the  adjournment  of  the  solution. 
*It  is  not  peace,'  wrote  a  Russian  publicist  the 
day  after  the  Conference;  *it  is  an  armistice 
for  five  years.'"* 

The  subsequent  events  in  Morocco  proved 
the  futility  of  the  Liternational  Police  Force. 
The  Moroccan  Government  showed  itself  less 
and  less  able  to  hold  in  control  the  turbulent 
natives;  one  outrage  after  another  was  com- 
mitted by  the  Mohammedans  against  the  Eu- 
ropeans. "While  the  Diplomatic  Corps  at  Tan- 
gier was  elaborating  regulations  relative  to  the 
police,  to  expropriation,  and  to  the  importation 
of  arms,"  ^^  massacres  were  taking  place  at  Casa 
Blanca  and  at  other  places  within  the  Sultan's 
dominions.     "On  the  confines  of  Chaouia,  and 

*  Augustin  Bernard:  Le  Maroc,  p.  332. 

The  negative  value  of  the  police  arrangement  has  been  ad- 
mirably expressed  by  M.  Andre  Tardieu.  "The  organization 
of  the  police  of  the  ports,"  he  writes,  "which  has  been  intrusted 
to  us  in  common  with  Spain  by  the  Act  of  Algeeiras,  has  a  large 
negative  value,  since  every  other  nation  is  thus  excluded  from  the 
exercise  of  this  power.  But  one  can  see  no  positive  or  particular 
benefits  which  can  flow  from  it."  (Translated  from  the  Revue 
Politique  et  Parlementaire,  Vol.  LVIII  (1908),  p.  252. 

As  M.  Tardieu  further  points  out  {idem,  p.  245),  certain  of 
the  interested  nations  took  good  care  that  the  Swiss  Inspector- 
General  should  be  so  shorn  of  power  that  he  could  not  "become 
a  danger." 

67 


INTERNATIONAL  ADMINISTRATION 

at  the  gates  of  Rabat,  the  natives  were  settling 
their  quarrels  with  their  rifles,  and  were  making 
raids  upon  troops  belonging  to  Europeans, 
while  the  hybrid  and  composite  police,  provided 
for  by  the  Act  of  Algeciras,  was  being  slowly 
organized."^'  These  native  outbreaks  were 
followed  by  civil  war.  The  inevitable  took 
place;  in  one  district  after  another  order  was 
restored  only  by  French  military  occupation. 
Finally,  in  the  spring  of  1911,  in  order  to  re- 
lieve the  Sultan — besieged  in  his  capital  at 
Fez,  by  warring  factions  of  native  troops — and 
to  protect  the  lives  of  Europeans  residing  there, 
the  French  advanced  upon  Fez,  and  occupied 
it  without  difficulty;  and  since  the  Sultan  hence- 
forth owed  his  throne  entirely  to  the  support 
of  French  troops,  the  French  control  of  Morocco 
stood  out  as  an  accomplished  fact.  But  if  the 
so-called  "International  Police'*  "failed,"  it 
was  because  France  succeeded  in  emancipating 
its  colonial  policy  from  German  domination. 
The  Moroccan  episode  presents  rather  a  study 
in  international  politics  than  an  instance  of 
a  serious  attempt  at  international  organization. 

6. — The  Suez  Canal  Commission 

The  Suez  Canal  Commission,  created  by  the 
Treaty  of  Constantinople  of  October  29,  1888, 

68 


ORGANS  WITH  LOCAL  POWER 

furnishes  another  interesting  example  of  an 
international  Commission  formed  as  a  mere 
makeshift  by  way  of  compromise  between  the 
irreconcilable  views  of  opposing  nations.  The 
Suez  Canal,  because  of  its  command  over  the 
most  important  trade  route  in  the  Old  World 
bet  wee  Q  the  East  and  the  West,  has  been,  ever 
since  its  construction,  a  subject  of  singular  in- 
ternational concern.  From  the  time  when  M.  de 
Lesseps,  a  French  engineer,  first  obtained  in  1854 
from  Said  Pasha,  the  viceroy  of  Egypt,  the  con- 
cession to  organize  a  "universal  company*'  for  the 
construction  of  a  ship-canal  across  the  Isthmus 
of  Suez,  Europe  has  consistently  maintained 
that  this  great  world  highway  must  be  kept 
open  by  the  Ifliedive  of  Egypt,  the  local 
sovereign,  wpon  equal  terms  to  the  commerce 
of  all.  In  1866,  a  year  before  the  canal  was 
opened  for  traffic,  the  Sultan  issued  a  decree 
declaring  that  the  canal  would  be  always 
open  to  every  ship  of  commerce  without  dis- 
tinction of  flag;  and  in  1873  an  international 
Commission  assembled  at  Constantinople,  upon 
the  Sultan's  invitation,  and  declared  the  navi- 
gation of  the  canal  open  ui>on  equal  terms 
even  to  warships  and  troopships.  UpKjn  the 
adoption  and  ratification  of  this  declaration 
by  the  Porte  and  by  nearly  all  the  European 

68 


INTERNATIONAL  ADMINISTRATION 

maritime  Powers,  the  Suez  Canal  was  placed 
under  general  European  protection. 

Since,  however,  this  declaration  contained  no 
provision  for  keeping  the  canal  open  in  the  case 
of  a  war  in  which  Turkey,  the  territorial  sov- 
ereign, might  become  engaged,  European  opin- 
ion began  to  demand  the  internationalization 
of  the  control  of  the  canal.  The  purchase  by 
the  British  Government,  in  1875,  of  the  Khe- 
dive's shares  in  the  canal,  thus  giving  England 
a  controlling  interest,  the  Russo-Turkish  War 
of  1877-78,  and  the  British  occupation  of 
Egypt  in  1882,  all  intensified  the  growing  de- 
mand for  internationalization.  In  order  to 
come  to  some  agreement  a  Conference,  at  which 
nine  states,  including  Turkey,  were  represented, 
met  at  Paris  on  March  30,  1885. 

At  this  Conference  the  various  delegates  found 
themselves  in  substantial  agreement  upon  the 
main  purpose  of  the  treaty — i.  e.,  that  the  canal 
should  be  kept  open  to  the  vessels  of  all  nations, 
in  time  of  peace  and  in  time  of  war,  upon  equal 
terms  to  all.  Disagreement  arose,  however, 
upon  the  question  of  how  to  enforce  these  pro- 
visions. Because  it  was  realized  that  neither 
the  Egyptian  nor  the  Ottoman  Government 
might  be  able  to  compel  the  observance  of  the 
treaty,  even  if  desirous  of  doing  so,  most  of  the 
Powers  advocated  the  creation  of  an  intema- 

70 


ORGANS  WITH  LOCAL  POWER 

tional  commission,  with  power  to  enforce  the 
treaty  terms  and  to  take  effective  action  in 
case  they  should  be  infringed.  To  this  proposal 
the  English  delegate,  Sir  Julian  Pauncefote, 
demurred.  "The  interference  of  an  interna- 
tional Commission  in  the  navigation  of  the 
canal  will  be  not  only  useless,  but  injurious 
in  many  respects,"  declared  the  English  dele- 
gate, "and  it  is  remarkable  that  Great  Britain, 
whose  interests  in  this  question  preponderate 
(since  her  trade  represents  about  80  per  cent, 
of  the  canal  traffic),  claims  no  other  guar- 
antees, as  the  present  ones  seem  to  her  to  be 
suflBcient." 

England,  therefore,  desiring  a  free  hand  in 
Egypt  and  wishing  to  be  unhampered  by  inter- 
national control,  took  the  position  that  the 
Khedivial  power  should  not  be  limited  by  the 
imposition  of  any  international  restrictions. 
She  suggested  that  in  case  of  need  the  Khedive 
might  call  upon  the  Porte  and  the  great  Powers 
for  help,  and  they  could  then  come  to  some 
agreement  upon  the  common  measures  to  be 
taken  in  resi>onse  to  the  appeal. 

"France,  throughout  the  discussions  and 
negotiations,  endeavored  to  internationalize  the 
canal.  Great  Britain,  on  the  other  hand,  whilst 
freely  admitting  'that  the  canal  should  be 
free  for  the  passage  of  all  ships  in  any  circum- 

71 


INTERNATIONAL  ADMINISTRATION 

stances,'  sought  safeguards  for  the  independence 
and  territorial  rights  of  Egypt,  of  which  she 
was  and  is  still  the  guardian. "^^ 

After  considerable  disagreement  concerning 
the  international  Commission,  the  Paris  Con- 
ference came  to  an  end  in  June,  1885.  It  was 
able  to  submit,  however,  as  a  result  of  its  la- 
bors a  draft  treaty  for  the  consideration  of  the 
interested  governments.  Lengthy  diplomatic 
negotiations  ensued.  Finally,  on  October  29, 
1888,  a  definitive  treaty  was  signed  at  Con- 
stantinople by  Great  Britain,  France,  Germany, 
Austria,  Italy,  Spain,  the  Netherlands,  Russia, 
and  Turkey.'*^ 

According  to  the  terms  of  the  Treaty  of  Con- 
stantinople the  international  character  of  the 
canal  was  clearly  recognized;  and  it  was  laid 
down  that: 

*'The  Suez  Maritime  Canal  shall  be  always 
free  and  open,  in  time  of  war  as  in  time  of  peace, 
to  every  vessel  of  commerce  or  of  war,  without 
distinction  of  flag. 

"Consequently  the  High  Contracting  Parties 
agree  not  in  any  way  to  interfere  with  the  free 
use  of  the  canal  in  time  of  war  as  in  time  of 
peace. 

"The  canal  shall  never  be  subjected  to  the 
exercise  of  the  right  of  blockade." 

The  international  Commission  which  was  set 

72 


ORGANS  WITH  LOCAL  POWER 

up  to  enforce  the  treaty  provisions  was  a  com- 
promise between  the  views  of  France  and  those 
of  England.  In  order  to  prevent  the  failure 
of  the  treaty  through  England's  refusing  to 
attach  her  signature,  the  teeth  were  duly  ex- 
tracted from  the  effective  international  Com- 
mission which  had  been  proposed  by  France; 
and  in  its  place  was  created  a  nondescript 
Commission,  to  outward  show  supreme,  but 
actually  impotent  and  harmless. 

"The  International  Suez  Commission,  it 
must  be  reluctantly  confessed,"  says  one  French 
writer,  "is  an  abortive  institution."^^  "Eng- 
land, who  wished  no  independent  organ  either 
in  Egypt  or  in  the  vicinity,"  writes  another, 
"refused  to  accept  it,  or  rather  has  so  limited 
its  powers  and  its  role  that  the  guarantees 
which  it  gives  to-day  are  illusory.  "^^ 

Under  Art.  8  of  the  Treaty  of  Constanti- 
nople, "the  agents  in  Egypt  of  the  signatory 
Powers  shall  be  charged  to  watch  over  its  exe- 
cution." They  are  to  meet  once  a  year  "to 
take  note  of  the  due  execution  of  the  treaty," 
and  also  are  to  hold  exceptional  meetings  upon 
the  summons  of  three  of  their  number,  "in 
case  of  any  event  threatening  the  security  or 
the  free  passage  of  the  canal."  The  annual 
meetings  are  to  take  place  under  the  presidency 
of  a  special  Commissioner  nominated  for  that 

73 


INTERNATIONAL  ADMINISTRATION 

purpose  by  the  Ottoman  Government,  and  are 
to  be  composed  of  one  representative  for  each 
signatory  Power  and  a  Commissioner  repre- 
senting the  Khedive.  The  special  meetings 
are  to  be  held  under  the  presidency  of  the 
Doyen.  It  is  in  the  powers  accorded  to  the 
Commission,  or  rather,  in  the  lack  of  them,  that 
one  sees  how  impotent  the  Commission  really 
is.  Its  only  powers  are  to  "inform  the  Khedivial 
Government  of  the  danger  which  they  have  per- 
ceived, in  order  that  that  Government  may  take 
proper  steps  to  insure  the  protection  and  the 
free  use  of  the  canal.  They  shall  especially 
demand  the  suppression  of  any  work  or  the 
dispersion  of  any  assemblage  on  either  bank 
of  the  canal,  the  object  or  effect  of  which  might 
be  to  interfere  with  the  liberty  and  the  entire 
security  of  the  navigation." 

M.  Charles-Roux,  in  his  book  upon  the 
Suez  Canal,  correctly  appraised  the  interna- 
tional Commission  when  he  wrote :^^  "It  re- 
mains to  examine  the  sanction  accorded  by  the 
Convention  to  its  own  stipulations.  I  have 
shown  that  it  was  principally  upon  this  point 
that  France  and  England  disagreed.  So  many 
concessions  had  to  be  made  to  the  English 
Government  in  order  to  induce  it  to  give  its 
signature,  so  many  limitations  were  admitted 
upon  the  principle  of  a  permanent  interna- 

74 


ORGANS  WITH  LOCAL  POWER 

tional  supervision,  so  much  was  whittled  away 
from  the  first  project,  that  the  Commission 
established  by  Art.  8  of  the  treaty  is  nothing 
more  than  a  memory,  an  imperfect  and  timid 
application  of  the  ideas  entertained  by  the 
French  Government.  It  is  no  longer  a  question 
of  a  permanent  Commission  supervising  the 
execution  of  the  terms  of  the  treaty,  co-opera- 
ting with  the  Suez  Company  to  assure  the  ob- 
servance of  its  regulations,  and  controlling  the 
Powers  as  to  the  proper  measures  to  be  taken 
for  respecting  the  engagements  of  the  parties. 
This  essential  organ  upon  which  depends  the 
real  power  of  the  Convention  is  reduced  to 
nothing  but  occasional  meetings  of  the  repre- 
sentatives of  the  Powers  at  Cairo,  whenever 
any  event  may  threaten  the  security  or  the 
free  passage  of  the  canal.  The  r61e  of  this 
Commission,  which  meets  only  upon  the  sum- 
mons of  three  of  its  members,  is  confined  to 
apprising  the  Egyptian  Government  of  the  dan- 
ger which  it  may  have  sensed,  in  order  that 
that  Government  may  take  under  considera- 
tion the  means  of  avoiding  it.  After  the  Com- 
mission's warning,  the  Khedive  acts  as  seems 
best  to  him.  As  to  the  Powers,  the  Com- 
mission has  no  right  to  control  them;  in  this 
respect  the  diplomatic  agents  take  action,  not 
collectively,  but  separately.    In  order  to  avoid 

75 


INTERNATIONAL  ADMINISTRATION 

this  provision  of  the  Convention  from  being 
completely  forgotten,  and  in  order  that  the 
Commission  may  not  in  any  way  lose  its  rights 
by  prescription,  it  meets  in  any  event  once  a 
year,  in  order  to  see  to  the  due  execution  of  the 
treaty/'* 

"For  the  Commission  of  supervision  which  is 
without  usefulness  and  without  power,"  says 
M.  Camand,*^  "there  ought  to  be  substituted 
a  permanent  international  Commission,  com- 
posed of  members  especially  appointed  by  the 
Powers  for  this  purpose,  provided  with  police 
powers  and  with  judicial  powers,  and  able  to 
constitute  itself  into  an  arbitral  tribunal  to 
render  judgment  upon  the  differences  arising 
between  the  company  and  the  various  states 


*See,  to  the  same  efifect,  L.  M.  Rossignol,  Le  Canal  de  Suez 
(1898),  p.  203.    M.  Rossignol  says: 

"  In  the  treaty  as  finally  drawn  the  Commission  itself  meets 
only  exceptionally  in  case  of  danger  threatening  the  security  of 
the  canal.  And  what  does  it  do?  It  remarks  upon  the  danger 
and  gives  warning  of  it  to  the  Khedive,  who  will  act  just  as  he 
sees  fit.  The  Commission  has  not  any  power  of  initiative.  It 
has  no  hold  upon  the  Powers  except  through  the  isolated  action 
of  its  members.  From  the  international  point  of  view,  it  has 
no  existence  except  in  regard  to  the  Egjqptian  Government;  and 
upon  the  latter  it  has  no  means  of  bringing  pressure.  So  that  it 
might  not  fall  into  desuetude,  it  was  decided  that  in  any  event 
it  should  meet  once  a  year.  In  actual  fact,  its  r6le  is  insignifi- 
cant. The  execution  of  the  treaty  then  rests  with  the  territorial 
authorities.  We  have  seen  that  they  are  to  employ  only  their 
own  forces,  and,  if  these  are  insxifficient,  to  make  appeal  to  the 
Turkish  Sultan," 

79 


ORGANS  WITH  LOCAL  POWER 

and  to  furnish  a  means  of  redress  in  ordinary 
suits."* 

The  Suez  Commission  cannot  seriously  be 
regarded,  then,  as  ever  having  constituted  an 
international  governing  body.  Only  in  outward 
appearance  was  the  enforcement  of  the  treaty 
put  under  international  control;  in  substance 
Great  Britain  was  left  with  practically  a  free 
hand,  and  the  Commission  has  amounted  to 
little  more  than  an  empty  form.  In  the  Declar- 
ation respecting  Egypt  and  Morocco,  contained 
in  the  Anglo-French  Accord  of  April  8,  1904, 
Art.  6  states  that  "in  order  to  insure  the 
free  passage  of  the  Suez  Canal,  His  Britannic 
Majesty's  Government  declare  that  they  ad- 
here to  the  stipulations  of  the  Treaty  of  the 
29th  of  October,  1888,  and  that  they  agree  to 
their  being  put  in  force.  The  free  passage  of 
the  Canal  being  thus  guaranteed,  the  execution 
of  the  last  sentence  of  Paragraph  1,  as  well  as 
of  Paragraph  2,  of  Article  8  of  that  Treaty  will 

*  An  interesting  English  estimate  of  the  value  of  the  treaty 
as  a  whole  was  given  by  Mr.  Curzon,  speaking  in  the  English 
House  of  Commons  on  July  12,  1898,  in  answer  to  a  question 
put  to  him  as  to  the  significance  of  the  British  reservations  made 
upon  the  signing  of  the  treaty.  "The  terms  of  this  convention," 
said  Mr.  Curzon,  "have  not  been  brought  into  practical  opera- 
tion."    (See  Hansard,  4th  Series,  LXI,  p.  667.) 

It  may  be  noted  that  England,  before  the  signing  of  the  Treaty 
of  Constantinople  of  1888,  made  certain  reservations,  which  do 
not  directly  concern  the  international  Commission. 

77 


INTERNATIONAL  ADMINISTRATION 

remain  in  abeyance. "^°  This  put  an  end  even 
to  the  perfunctory  annual  meetings  of  the 
Commission.* 

*  During  the  European  War  just  concluded  the  canal  remained 
open  to  the  ships  of  neutral,  as  well  as  of  allied,  countries;  be- 
cause of  England's  domination  of  the  seas,  enemy  ships  were 
not  seeking  passage  through  the  canal.  The  number  and  net 
tonnage  of  commercial  vessels  (excluding  vessels  requisitioned 
by  the  military  authorities)  which  passed  through  the  canal  in 
1917  were  as  follows: 

Nationality  Number  of  Ships       Net  Tonnage 

British 487  2,807,288 

French 131  537,901 

Italian 149  604,147 

Greek 124  347,963 

Dutch 31  124,655 

Japanese 44  123,824 

Norwegian 19  64,711 

Swedish 7  30,091 

Danish 10  29,308 

Spanish 8  20,966 

American 7  15,842 

Other  nationalities 7  28,023 

Total 1^024  4,634,719 

On  December  17,  1914,  the  British  Government  announced  in 
the  following  words  that  Egypt  had  been  made  a  British  Pro- 
tectorate: "His  Britannic  Majesty's  Principal  Secretary  of 
State  for  Foreign  Affairs  gives  notice  that,  in  view  of  the  state  of 
war  arising  out  of  the  action  of  Turkey,  Egypt  is  placed  under 
the  protection  of  His  Majesty  and  will  henceforth  constitute  a 
British  Protectorate.  The  suzerainty  of  Turkey  over  Egypt 
is  thus  terminated,  and  His  Majesty's  Government  will  adopt  all 
measures  necessary  for  the  defense  of  Egypt  and  the  protection 
of  its  inhabitants  and  interests." 

The  outbreak  of  the  war  between  England  and  Germany  found 
several  German  merchant-ships  in  the  ports  of  the  Suez  Canal. 
These  evidently  intended  to  remain  indefinitely,  finding  the 
"neutralized"  waters  of  the  Suez  Canal  a  snug  harbor.  The 
Egyptian  Government  took  steps  in  October,  however,  to  expel 

78 


ORGANS  WITH  LOCAL  POWER 

The  story  of  the  Suez  Commission  is  inter- 
esting chiefly  because  it  affords  stUl  another 
illustration  of  the  fact  that  no  international 
Commission  of  this  type  can  succeed  so  long 
as  the  signatory  states  are  willing  to  accord 
to  it  only  sham  power. 

7.— The  Congo 

During  the  last  quarter  of  the  nineteenth 
century  the  uncivilized  portion  of  Africa  in 
the  Congo  region  furnished  a  fitting  field  for 
international  regulation  and  control.  From  the 
viewpoint  of  international  administration  the 
history  of  the  early  Congo  presents  two  phases 
— first,  the  evolution  of  the  attempt  to  set  up 
a  vaguely  conceived  international  state  in  that 
region;  and,  second,  the  definite  creation,  in 
1885,  of  an  International  Congo  River  Com- 
mission, modeled  upon  the  general  plan  of  the 
European  Danube  Commission. 

(a)    The  Congo  Free  State 

The  beginnings  of  the  Congo  Free  State  date 
back  to  1876.    In  that  year  King  Leopold  II  of 

these  ships,  after  having  oflFcred  them  a  pass  to  proceed  unmo- 
lested to  a  neighhoring  country.  The  ships  were  towed  out  to 
the  high  seas  beyond  Egyptian  waters  and  there  duly  captured  by 
British  cruisers. 

Sec  Coleman  Phillipson,  International  Law  and  the  Great  War, 
p.  286. 

e  79 


INTERNATIONAL  ADMINISTRATION 

Belgium  invited  many  of  the  most  distinguished 
geographers  of  Europe  and  America  to  attend  a 
Conference  at  Brussels  for  the  puipose  of  de- 
vising means  for  the  opening  up  of  the  un- 
civilized regions  of  Africa.  "The  object  which 
unites  us  here  to-day,"  said  King  Leopold,  in 
addressing  this  Conference,  "is  one  of  those 
which  deserve  in  the  highest  degree  to  occupy 
the  friends  of  humanity.  To  open  to  civiliza- 
tion the  only  part  of  our  globe  where  it  has  not 
yet  penetrated,  to  pierce  the  darkness  which 
envelops  entire  populations,  is,  I  venture  to 
say,  a  crusade  worthy  of  this  century  of  prog- 
ress." 

As  a  result  of  this  Conference  an  organization 
was  formed  under  the  name  of  L' Association 
Internationale  Africaine,  with  its  seat  in  Brus- 
sels, but  with  branches  in  the  principal  countries 
of  Europe  and  America.  Each  nation  wishing 
to  co-operate  was  to  assist  in  the  raising  of 
funds  for  the  common  object.  A  central  exec- 
utive committee  of  four  was  formed,  composed 
of  King  Leopold  as  chairman,  and  one  German, 
one  Frenchman,  and  one  American.  The  pur- 
pose of  the  Association  was  scientific  and  philan- 
thropic; it  had  no  political  intentions.  After 
the  discovery  of  the  Upper  Congo  by  Stanley, 
in  1877,  a  separate  committee  of  the  Inter- 
national Association  was  organized  to  study 

80 


ORGANS  WITH  LOCAL  POWER 

particularly  the  Congo  regions.  This  branch  of 
the  Association,  which  took  the  name  of 
Comite  (TEtudes  du  Haul  Congo,  was  organized 
at  Brussels  on  November  25,  1878,  and  for  all 
practical  purposes  superseded  its  progenitor. 
Stanley  became  its  chief  agent.  The  com- 
mittee was  to  pursue  "essentially  philanthropic 
and  scientific  aims,"  and  was  not  intended  as 
a  commercial  undertaking.  But  as  time  passed, 
commercial  enterprises  crept  in.  Representa- 
tives of  this  committee  later  made  treaties  with 
the  native  chiefs,  and  adopted  the  flag  which 
had  been  previously  chosen  by  the  Association 
Internationale.  By  1884  it  had  established 
twenty-four  stations  on  the  Congo  River  and 
its  tributaries.  Its  expenses  were  borne  chiefly 
by  King  Leopold.  Gradually  the  Association 
assumed  more  and  more  power,  until  at  last 
it  was  recognized  by  the  United  States,  on 
April  22,  1884,  as  an  independent,  friendly 
state." 

In  the  meantime,  Portugal  began  to  press 
territorial  claims,  based  upon  the  right  of  prior 
discovery,  covering  much  of  the  Congo  country. 
These  claims  became  the  subject  of  considerable 
discussion  in  European  chancelleries;  there  was 
danger,  too,  that  Africa  might  soon  become  the 
scene  of  a  general  European  scramble.  In  or- 
der to  discuss  and  settle  the  international  status 


INTERNATIONAL  ADMINISTRATION 

of  the  Congo  territory  and  to  apply  to  the 
Congo  and  the  Niger  rivers  the  principle  of  free 
navigation  adopted  at  the  Congress  of  Vienna 
in  1815,  an  international  Conference  gathered 
in  Berlin  upon  the  invitation  of  Prince  Bis- 
marck in  the  autumn  of  1884,  composed  of  rep- 
resentatives of  the  principal  nations  of  the 
world,  including  the  United  States.  The  result 
of  this  great  international  gathering  was  the 
signing  of  the  Berlin  "General  Act"  of  February 
26,  1885,^2  which  defined  and  delimited  the 
basin  of  the  Congo,  provided  for  its  neutraliza- 
tion, and  opened  it  up,  upon  equal  terms,  to  the 
free  trade  of  all  nations. 

Although  the  general  idea  of  an  "interna- 
tional state"  lay  in  the  back  of  the  minds  of 
the  framers  of  the  Berlin  Act,  yet,  inasmuch 
as  the  leadership  in  opening  up  the  Congo  and 
the  financial  support  of  the  undertaking  had 
rested  so  largely  with  the  Belgian  King,  it  was 
only  natural  that  the  infant  state  should  be 
placed  under  the  guardianship  of  King  Leopold, 
the  great  nations  being  well  satisfied  that  the 
guardian  of  the  new  state  should  be  the  king  of 
a  small,  neutralized  nation. 

Accordingly,  when  the  Powers  allowed  the 
Congo  State  to  sign  the  Berlin  Final  Act  as  a 
full-fledged  state.  King  Leopold  of  Belgium  was 
chosen  as  its  head,  and  the  new  state  became 

82 


ORGANS  WITH  LOCAL  POWER 

virtually  an  absolute  monarchy.  Although 
King  Leopold  granted  to  the  Congo  State  a 
constitution  of  an  autocratic  character,  as  time 
passed  he  ruled  it  more  and  more  as  though  it 
were  his  private  jx)ssession. 

Because  the  Berlin  Act  contained  no  inter- 
national machinery  or  other  provisions  for  in- 
suring the  execution  of  its  terms,  its  stipulations 
to  open  up  the  Congo  to  the  free  trade  of  all 
nations  and  its  prohibitions  against  monopolies 
proved  a  dead  letter.  The  Congo,  instead  of 
constituting  an  international  state  under  the 
control  of  the  Powers,  became  the  "personal 
appanage  of  the  King  of  Belgium."  Under  the 
arbitrary  rule  of  Leopold,  who  apparently  ad- 
ministered the  state  "neither  in  the  interest 
of  the  natives  nor  even  of  the  economic  inter- 
ests of  Belgium,  but  with  the  moving  desire  to 
assure  the  maximum  of  pecuniary  benefit  to 
the  sovereign  king,"^^  state  monopolies  were 
established  and  private  monopolies  granted  to 
commercial  companies.  The  natives  were  shame- 
fully maltreated  and  exploited.  So  incensed 
did  the  opinion  of  the  world  finally  become  that 
the  Belgian  Government  was  forced  to  take 
action;  and  in  1908  the  Congo  Free  State  was 
formally  converted  into  a  Belgian  colony,  sub- 
ject, not  to  the  personal  caprice  of  the  King, 
but  to  the  rule  of  the  Belgian  Parliament. 

83 


INTERNATIONAL  ADMINISTRATION 

The  Congo  State,  therefore,  which  is  often 
pointed  to  as  a  striking  example  of  the  failure 
of  an  "international  state,"  has,  as  a  matter 
of  fact,  never  been  administered  by  an  inter- 
national body. 

(b)   The  International  Congo  River  Commission 

A  far  more  clearly  defined  scheme  of  inter- 
national administration  was  the  International 
Congo  Commission  created  to  execute  the  terms 
of  the  Berlin  Act,  already  referred  to,  in  regard 
to  the  Congo  River.  Chapter  III  of  this  Act 
provides  for  the  permanent  neutralization  of 
the  Congo  River,  which  must  be  kept  open  in 
time  of  war,  as  in  time  of  peace;  and  Chapter 
IV  establishes  in  regard  to  the  Congo  River  the 
principles  of  free  navigation,  opening  it  up  to 
the  ships  of  all  nations  upon  equal  terms,  and 
forbidding  the  imix)sition  of  river  tolls  beyond 
the  dues  necessary  for  the  actual  cost  of  ad- 
ministration. 

In  order  to  secure  the  execution  of  the  prin- 
ciples thus  laid  down,  an  international  Com- 
mission was  created,  "charged  to  assure  the  exe- 
cution of  the  dispositions  of  the  present  Navi- 
gation Act."  Under  the  terms  of  the  treaty 
the  Commission  was  to  be  composed  of  one 
delegate  from  each  of  the  fourteen  signatory 

84 


ORGANS  WITH  LOCAL  POWER 

Powers,  and  each  delegate  was  to  have  one 
vote.*  Action  apparently  was  to  be  taken 
by  majority  vote,  except  that  the  negotiation 
of  loans  required  a  two-thirds  vote. 

The  powers  of  the  Commission  were  large. 
It  was  to  designate  "the  works  proper  to  assure 
the  navigability  of  the  Congo  according  to  the 
needs  of  international  commerce";  for  the  exe- 
cution of  these  works  it  was  either  to  take  the 
necessary  measures  itself  or,  in  places  where  the 
river  was  occupied  by  a  sovereign  power,  to 
come  to  an  understanding  with  the  riparian 
state.  It  had  power  to  fix  the  tariff  of  pilotage 
and  navigation  dues,  and  also  to  collect  them. 
It  was  authorized  to  employ  agents  and  em- 
ployees for  the  execution  of  all  its  work  and 
for  the  collection  of  river  dues,  and  to  pay  these 
out  of  the  dues  collected.  It  had  supervision 
over  the  quarantine  station  established  at  the 
mouth  of  the  river.  It  had  power  to  make  reg- 
ulations for  navigation,  for  the  river  jK)lice, 
for  pilotage,  and  for  quarantine;!  and  these 
were  to  be  enforced  by  its  own  agents  or  by  the 
officers  of  the  riparian  states.  Furthermore,  "in 
the  exercise  of  these  p)owers  . . .  the  international 

*  A  delegate  might  represent  more  than  one  Power;  but  even 
in  these  circumstances  he  was  to  be  given  only  one  vote. 

t  These  regulations,  however,  as  well  as  the  tariffs  of  river 
dues,  "before  being  put  into  force  must  be  submitted  to  the 
approbation  of  the  Powers  represented  in  the  Commission." 

85 


INTERNATIONAL  ADMINISTRATION 

Commission  shall  not  depend  upon  the  terri- 
torial authority."  In  the  accomplishment  of 
its  task,  it  was  empowered  to  have  recourse 
"at  need"  to  the  war-vessels  of  the  signatory 
Powers. 

It  is  evident,  therefore,  that  this  Commission, 
independent  as  it  was  of  territorial  authority, 
was  not  to  fail  for  lack  of  power.  The  rocks 
upon  which  this  project  was  wrecked  are  found 
in  Art.  23,  which  provides  for  the  borrowing 
of  money.  After  declaring  that  the  interna- 
tional Commission  "may  negotiate  in  its  own 
name  loans  exclusively  based  upon  the  revenues 
attributed  to  the  said  Commission,"  the  article 
adds:  "It  is  understood  that  the  governments 
represented  in  the  Commission  cannot  in  any 
case  be  considered  as  assuming  any  guarantee 
or  as  contracting  any  engagement  or  respon- 
sibility in  respect  to  said  loans,  unless  by  special 
conventions  concluded  by  them  to  this  effect." 
As  a  French  writer  puts  it:  "In  making  this 
reservation,  the  Conference  has  simply  erased 
all  possibility  of  credit  for  the  Commission, 
since  it  has  made  of  it  a  being,  impersonal, 
intangible,  impalpable,  with  not  even  enough 
capital  at  its  command  to  begin  the  pre- 
liminary studies  for  the  conclusion  of  any 
loan.  .  .  .  The  Conference  has  made  a  liberal 
award  of  all  kinds  of  prerogatives;  it  has  only 

86 


ORGANS  WITH  LOCAL  POWER 

forgotten  to  add  the  means  of  living  and 
acting."^^ 

"By  this  declaration  of  the  Conference," 
says  another  writer/^  "without  the  guarantee 
of  one  or  more  governments,  no  money  could 
be  raised  by  the  international  Commission, 
relying  for  its  revenue  on  merely  the  tariffs 
of  pilotage  and  other  taxes  provided  by  the 
General  Act.  No  money  could  be  borrowed 
without  a  guarantee,  and  with  but  a  hope  of 
extensive  commerce  in  the  future.  The  Con- 
ference was  doubtless  aware  of  the  uselessness 
of  such  a  Commission,  apparently  with  great 
powers,  in  reality  having  none,  but,  as  it  often 
happens  in  such  assemblies,  the  majority  agrees 
on  the  solution  of  a  difficulty,  engaging  each 
one  to  a  minimum  of  responsibility,  while  losing 
sight  of  the  desired  end." 

The  International  Congo  Commission  has 
never  really  come  into  existence.^®  Instead,  the 
work  of  improving  and  regulating  the  naviga- 
tion of  the  Congo  was  undertaken  by  the 
Congo  Free  State. 

The  Congo  Commission,  therefore,  furnishes 
but  another  example  of  an  international  Com- 
mission, apparently  clothed  with  large  power, 
but,  whether  by  carelessness  or  design  on  the 
part  of  those  creating  it,  robbed  of  any  real 
efficacy  by  the  terms  of  its  creation. 

87 


mXERNATIONAL  ADMINISTRATION 

8. — Chinese  River  Commissions 

Another  interesting  project  for  an  inter- 
national organization  was  the  Huangpu  River 
Commission  provided  for  by  the  Final  Protocol 
signed  at  Peking  on  September  7,  1901,^^  be- 
tween China  and  the  great  Powers,  at  the  con- 
clusion of  the  Boxer  troubles.  The  Huangpu  (or 
Whangpoo)  River  connects  the  system  of  in- 
land lagoons  southwest  of  Shanghai  with  the 
Yangtze-kiang  River  and  thus  with  the  sea, 
its  total  drainage  area  being  estimated  at  about 
12,000  square  miles.  Since  the  efforts  to  im- 
prove the  navigation  of  the  river  made  by  the 
Chinese  Government  prior  to  1900  were  insuffi- 
cient to  satisfy  the  foreign  interests  in  Shang- 
hai, the  matter  was  made  the  subject  of  diplo- 
matic agreement  in  the  Peace  Protocol  of  1901. 
Art.  11  provides  that  the  improvement  of  the 
channel  of  the  Huangpu  River  shall  be  put 
under  the  direction  of  an  international  Com- 
mission or  "Conservancy  Board,"  which  shall 
have  power  to  make  regulations  for  river  navi- 
gation as  well  as  to  construct  and  maintain 
river  improvements.  Annex  XVII  to  the  Proto- 
col details  the  powers  and  organization  of  the 
Huangpu  International  Commission.®^  Under 
the  terms  of  this  Annex  the  River  Conservancy 
Board,  to  be  set  up  at  Shanghai,  "will  act  in  a 

88 


ORGANS  WITH  LOCAL  POWER 

double  capacity;  firstly,  as  an  agency  for  the  rec- 
tification and  improvement  of  the  waterway; 
and  secondly,  as  an  agency  for  its  control."  The 
board  is  to  consist  of  the  Taotai,  the  Shanghai 
Commissioner  of  Customs,  two  members  elected 
by  the  Consular  Body,  two  members  of  the 
Shanghai  General  Chamber  of  Commerce,  two 
members  representing  the  shipping  interests  of 
Shanghai,  one  member  of  the  Municipal  Council 
of  the  International  Settlement,  a  member  of 
the  Municipal  Council  of  the  French  Settle- 
ment, and  an  oflBcial  representative  of  each  of 
the  great  Powers  interested  in  Shanghai.  The 
Board  is  to  elect  its  chairman  by  majority  vote, 
and  similarly  by  majority  vote  to  make  all 
resolutions,  ordinances,  and  river  regulations. 

Its  powers  are  extensive.  These  include  the 
entire  control  of  river  and  conservancy  works, 
even  though  this  should  involve  works  beyond 
the  limit  of  its  jurisdiction.  It  is  given  the 
power  to  make  regulations  and  rules  to  control 
all  river  traffic  within  its  jurisdiction;  to  or- 
ganize a  police  and  watch  service  for  insuring 
the  execution  of  its  regulations  and  orders; 
to  organize  and  control  the  lower  Yangtze 
pilot  service;  to  app>oint  a  harbor  master  and 
staff;  to  expropriate  private  moorings;  to  dredge, 
mark,  and  maintain  the  river  channel;  to  ap- 
point, pay,  and  control  all  the  officials  and 

89 


INTERNATIONAL  ADMINISTRATION 

employees  necessary  for  its  work;  to  fix  fines 
for  the  violation  of  its  regulations;  and  to  im- 
pose taxes  and  river  dues  for  the  financing 
of  its  operations.  Its  ordinances  even  are 
given  "the  force  of  law  for  all  foreigners."  Its 
ordinances  and  regulations,  however,  and  the 
fines  fixed  for  violation  thereof,  as  well  as  in- 
creases in  the  river  dues,  must  be  "submitted 
for  the  approval  of  the  Consular  Body"  and 
receive  its  consent  before  coming  into  force. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  beyond  the  appoint- 
ment of  the  foreign  commissioners,  no  serious 
steps  were  taken  to  carry  out  the  terms  of 
this  interesting  agreement.*  Since  China  feared 
the  creation  of  a  foreign  vested  interest  which 
might  lead  to  misunderstanding  at  some  future 
time,  she  signed  another  agreement  with  the 
Powers  on  September  27,  1905,^*  whereby  in 
return  for  her  assuming  the  entire  responsibility 
and  cost  of  the  river  improvement,  the  exe- 
cution of  the  work  on  the  Huangpu  River  was 
intrusted  to  China  alone.  This  agreement, 
however,  was  subject  to  the  proviso^"  that 
if  the  works  were  not  carried  out  satisfactorily 
the  Powers  might  revert  to  the  original  In- 
ternational Board  as  prescribed  by  the  Peace 

*  The  organization  of  the  Commission  was  delayed  owing  to 
the  failure  of  the  Chinese  Government  to  appoint  a  com- 
missioner.    See  U.  S.  Foreign  Relations,  1904,  p.  186,  et  seq. 

SO 


ORGANS  WITH  LOCAL  POWER 

Protocol  of  1901.  The  Chinese  Government 
thereupon  appointed  a  new  Conservancy  Board, 
consisting  of  the  Shanghai  Taotai  and  the  Com- 
missioner of  Customs;  and  since  that  time, 
through  the  employment  of  foreign  engineers, 
and  under  considerable  pressure  from  the  great 
Powers,  she  has  substantially  improved  the 
river  course.^* 

Art.  11  of  the  treaty  of  September  7, 1901, 
also  provided  for  the  improvement  under  an 
international  Commission  of  the  Pei-ho  River, 
which  drains  the  Peking  and  Tientsin  districts; 
but  as  this  Commission  in  1908  delegated  its 
powers  to  an  executive  body  consisting  of  a 
representative  of  the  Consular  Body,  the  Cus- 
toms Taotai,  and  the  Commissioner  of  Customs, 
the  case  is  of  little  interest  from  the  viewpoint 
of  international  organization.* 


*  The  Municipal  Council  of  Shanghai  presents  many  unique 
features,  but  it  is  not  of  very  great  importance  as  an  example 
of  international  organization,  for  the  reason  that  its  members 
are  not  agents  appointed  by  separate  countries  to  govern  an 
international  port,  but  are  elected  quite  irrespective  of  nationality, 
as  far  as  legal  provisions  are  concerned,  by  the  foreign  popula- 
tion of  Shanghai.  The  Council  is  composed  of  nine  members, 
elected  once  a  year  by  the  foreign  landowners  and  taxpayers 
in  the  Foreign  Settlement,  and  has  full  powers  of  municipal 
administration  within  the  settlement.  (See  Wellington  Koo,  The 
Status  of  Aliens  in  China,  p.  232.)  It  usually  contains  an  Amer- 
ican and  a  German,  as  well  as  English  representatives;  the  ma- 
jority of  the  officials  appointed  by  it  are  said  to  be  English.  (See 
Grtiufeld,    Hafenkolonien    und    Icoloniedhnliche   Verhaltnisae   in 

91 


INTERNATIONAL  ADMINISTRATION 

9. — Spitzhergen 

An  exceedingly  interesting  international  prob- 
lem is  presented  by  the  strange  case  of  Spitz- 
bergen.  The  Spitzbergen  Archipelago,  situated 
between  North  Greenland  and  Franz  Joseph 
Land  in  80°  north  latitude,  and  comprising 
some  fifty  thousand  square  miles,  has  for  cen- 
turies existed  as  a  terra  nulliuSy  too  far  north 
for  human  occupation,  and  apparently  too 
valueless  to  be  considered  worth  claiming  by 
any  Government.  Since  1900,  however,  when 
it  was  discovered  that  valuable  coal  deposits 
on  the  islands  could  be  profitably  worked,  the 
situation  has  changed;  and  with  every  suc- 
ceeding year  the  islands  have  increased  in  im- 
portance. Large  companies  have  been  formed 
in  several  countries*  to  work  the  Spitzbergen 
coal-mines;    rich  mineral  ores  have  been  dis- 


China,  Japan,  und  Korea,  p.  190.)    The  Shanghai  International 
Settlement  Land  Regulations,  which  define  the  municipal  govern- 
ment, may  be  found  in  Hertslet's  China  Treaties,  Vol.  II,  pp. 
666  et  aeq.  (See  also  Treaty  Ports  in  China,  by  En-sai  Tai,  Columbia 
Uni.,  1918.)    The  foreign  population  of  the  International  Settle- 
ment in  Shanghai  in  1905  was  as  follows:    British,  4,281;  Japa- 
nese,   2,157;    Portuguese,  1,331;    American,  991;    German,  785 
French,  393;  Russian,  354;  Austro-Hungarian,  158;  Italian  148 
Spanish,    146;    Danish,    121;    other   foreign   nationalities,    692 
total,  11,557.     (See  H.  B.  Morse,  The  Trade  and  Administration 
of  the  Chinese  Empire,  p.  240.) 

*  These  companies  are  chiefly  American,  English,  Swedish, 
^nd  Norwegian. 


ORGANS  WITH  LOCAL  POWER 

covered;*  wireless  stations  have  been  erected; 
and  the  proximity  of  the  islands  to  the  Arch- 
angel trade  route  makes  them  of  importance 
as  a  possible  submarine  base.  During  the  sum- 
mer of  1918  there  were  taken  from  Spitzbergen 
no  less  than  55,000  tons  of  coal. 

After  numerous  efforts  to  reach  some  inter- 
national understanding  upon  the  status  of 
Spitzbergen,  it  was  agreed,  in  reply  to  a  diplo- 
matic note  sent  out  by  Norway  on  May  5, 
1909,  to  all  the  Powers  interested,  that  the 
archipelago  should  be  internationalized,  and 
that  delegates  of  Norway,  Sweden,  and  Russia 
should  prepare  a  draft  Convention  upon  this 
basis.  The  draft  thus  prepared  was  then  to 
be  considered  by  an  international  conference 


*  As  to  the  value  of  the  Spitzbergen  iron  ores,  Mr.  Fraser,  in 
a  letter  printed  in  the  London  Times  on  March  12,  1918,  p.  5, 
says:  "Taking  the  magnetite  alone,  the  deposits  cover  several 
square  miles  of  territory,  being  of  an  extent  far  surpassing  those 
of  Luossavara,  Gellivare,  Kiruna  and  Sydvaranger  combined. 
Sj)ecimens  I  have  myself  brought  back  therefrom  average  over 
60  per  cent,  of  metallic  iron  (equal  to  No.  1  Gellivare  ore),  and 
the  average  of  assays  I  have  seen  in  the  London  offices  of  the 
company  exceed  this  considerably. 

"  There  are  literally  huge  accumulations  of  loose  ore,  broken 
off  the  main  deposits  by  frost  action,  ready  for  collection  and 
shipment,  besides  the  ore  contained  in  the  fast  rock,  which  ex- 
tends for  over  twenty  square  miles.  The  deposits  are  situate 
less  than  one  and  a  half  miles  from  the  sea — deep  water  and  good 
anchorage — and  the  water  is  open  for  from  four  to  five  months 
each  year,  without  mechanical  appliances.  The  work  of  extrac- 
tion can  go  on  all  the  year  round." 

93 


INTERNATIONAL  ADMINISTRATION 

of  all  the  interested  Powers,  and  modified  or 
adopted  by  the  latter  as  they  might  see  fit. 
To  this  end,  upon  the  invitation  of  the  Nor- 
wegian Government,  Swedish,  Russian,  and 
Norwegian  representatives  sat  in  conference 
at  Christiania  from  July  19  to  August  11, 
1910,  and  drew  up  a  very  interesting  draft  con- 
vention. This  proposal  was  then  submitted 
to  the  Cabinets  of  the  interested  states  for 
modification  and  correction;  and  in  January, 
1912,  the  delegates  of  Norway,  Sweden,  and 
Russia  again  met  together  in  Christiania  in 
order  to  incorporate  in  the  agreement  such  sug- 
gestions and  modifications  as  seemed  practi- 
cable. 

The  draft  convention  as  finally  adopted  by 
them  in  19 12^^  creates  a  "neutral"  Spitzbergen, 
open  to  all  nationalities  and  incapable  of  being 
subjected  to  the  sovereignty  of  any  state.^'  It 
sets  up  as  the  governing  organ  an  international 
Commission  with  complete  sovereign  power. 
The  latter  is  to  be  composed  of  three  members, 
Norway,  Sweden,  and  Russia,  each  appointing 
one  representative  for  a  term  of  six  years. 
The  presidency  is  to  be  exercised  in  turn  by 
each  of  the  members  for  a  period  of  one  year, 
in  the  alphabetical  order  of  the  names  of 
the  states  which  they  represent;  and  the  seat 
of  the  Commission  is  to  be  in  the  country  from 

94 


ORGANS  WITH  LOCAL  POWER 

which  the  president  for  the  time  being  comes. 
Unanimity  is  required  for  the  decisions  of  the 
Commission,  except  when  sitting  as  a  final 
Court  of  Appeal  from  the  judgments  of  the 
Police  Commissioner  or  of  the  Justice  of  the 
Peace. 

The  country  is  to  be  controlled  by  a  corps 
of  Liternational  Police  under  the  supervision 
of  a  Police  Commissioner;  the  latter  is  to  be 
appointed  by  the  international  Commission  for 
a  term  of  six  years,*  and  subject  to  its  control. 
The  Police  is  to  be  subject  to  rules  laid  down 
by  the  Commission.  The  Police  Commissioner 
is  also  to  enforce  penalties  for  violation  of  the 
general  regleinents  established  by  the  Commis- 
sion. 

Since  it  was  not  feasible  to  establish  a  civil 
and  criminal  code  of  law  for  Spitzbergen,  the 
Convention  provides  for  national  courts,  which 
are  to  exercise  criminal  jurisdiction  over  the 
subjects  of  their  own  countries,  and  civil  juris- 
diction where  the  affair  concerns  only  their  own 
nationals,  or  where  the  defendant  is  a  national. 
In  addition  to  these  national  courts,  however, 
there  exists  a  Justice  of  the  Peace,  appointed 
by  the  international  Commission,  who  has  juris- 
diction over  special  cases,  such  as  those  con- 

*  His  nationality  is  recommended  to  be  the  same  as  that  of 
the  majority  of  the  inhabitants. 
7  95 


INTERNATIONAL  ADMINISTRATION 

ceming  immovables  situated  in  Spitzbergen.^ 
Final  appeal  may  be  taken  from  the  decisions 
of  the  PoHce  Commissioner  or  of  the  Justice 
of  the  Peace  to  the  international  Commission. 
The  rules  of  law  applied  throughout  are  to  be 
in  accordance  with  the  principles  of  private 
international  law,  the  provisions  of  the  Spitz- 
bergen  Convention,  and  the  general  principles 
of  justice  and  equity.  The  Commission  is  to 
determine  the  rules  of  procedure;  it  is  also  to 
lay  down  penalties  for  violation  of  the  reglements 
which  it  makes  in  accordance  with  the  pro- 
visions of  the  Convention. 

Other  articles  provide  for  the  complete  neu- 
trality of  Spitzbergen  in  time  of  war,  and  for 
the  arbitration  of  all  matters  of  dispute  arising 
from  the  Convention. 

On  June  16, 1914,  an  international  Conference 
composed  of  representatives  from  all  the  inter- 
ested states  met  in  Christiania  and  proceeded 
to  consider  this  draft  convention;®^  but  the 
sudden  outbreak  of  the  European  War  put  an 
end  to  their  deliberations  before  they  had  come 
to  any  conclusion.  The  result  is  that  Spitz- 
bergen remains  to-day  legally  a  country  with- 
out a  government — a  veritable  No  Man's  Land. 

During  the  war,  Spitzbergen  has  come  to  be 
of  such  importance  that  it  figured  in  the  Russo- 
German  Peace  Treaty  signed  at  Brest-Litovsk 

96 


/ 

ORGANS  WITH  LOCAL  POWER 

on  March  3,  1918;*  and  the  whole  question  will 
doubtless  come  up  for  final  determination  at  the 
Peace  Congress  following  the  war.^^ 

10. — The  New  Hebrides 

The  New  Hebrides,  strictly  speaking,  do  not 
present  a  case  of  international  administration, 
but  rather  of  that  peculiar  form  of  government 
called  "Condominium,"  where  two  or  more  na- 
tions share  sovereignty  over  a  single  territory. 

*  The  text  of  Chap.  9,  Art.  33,  of  the  Russo-German  Treaty 
of  March  3,  1918,  reads  as  follows:  "The  contracting  parties 
will  direct  their  efforts  to  the  end  that  the  international  organ- 
ization of  the  Spitzbergen  Archipelago  contemplated  in  the 
Spitzbergen  Conference  of  the  year  1914  will  be  carried  out  on 
a  footing  of  equality  between  the  two  parties. 

"To  this  end,  the  governments  will  request  the  Royal  Nor- 
wegian Government  to  bring  about  the  resumption  of  the  Spitz- 
bergen Conference  as  soon  as  possible  after  the  conclusion  of  the 
general  peace." 

The  London  Times  of  March  11,  1918,  p.  9,  thus  comments 
upon  the  matter: 

"It  now  appears  that  Germany,  who  loses  sight  of  nothing, 
has  not  forgotten  that  Spitzbergen  is  rich  in  mineral  wealth  and 
is  believed  to  contain  gold  as  well  as  coal.  In  some  of  the  nu- 
merous versions  of  the  peace  treaty  recently  signed  at  Brest- 
Litovsk,  which  the  Bolshevists  say  they  accepted  without  ex- 
amination, there  is  a  curious  clause  which  relates  to  the  future 
of  Spitzbergen.  So  far  as  we  can  judge,  the  clause  implies  that 
the  Germans  and  the  Bolshevists  decided  to  share  Spitzbergen 
between  themselves.  .  .  .  The  Bolshevists  may  give  away  Rus- 
sian provinces  if  they  choose,  but  they  cannot  hand  over  to  Ger- 
many a  region  where  the  Russian  flag  has  never  flown.  Herr 
von  KUhlmann  might  as  well  persuade  M.  Trotsky  to  give  him 
the  North  Pole." 

97 


INTERNATIONAL  ADMINISTRATION 

Since,  however,  this  bears  indirectly  upon  the 
subject  of  international  organization,  it  may 
be  of  interest  to  glance  at  this  most  interesting 
of  the  existing  cases  of  Condominium. 

The  idea  of  a  joint  government  by  France 
and  England  over  the  New  Hebrides  was  bom 
of  the  Anglo-French  Accord  of  1904.  This 
notable  agreement,  by  an  exchange  of  terri- 
torial rights  in  various  parts  of  the  world, 
wiped  out  old  scores  and  brought  two  great  na- 
tions from  a  long-standing  attitude  of  mutual 
distrust,  which  had  more  than  once  threatened 
war,  into  a  new-found  friendship,  which  ten 
years  later  helped  to  save  the  world  from  Ger- 
man domination.  By  the  terms  of  the  Accord, 
France  gave  to  England  a  free  hand  in  Egypt, 
and  received  in  return  similar  privileges  for 
herself  in  Morocco.  She  also  surrendered  to 
Great  Britain  certain  rights  upon  the  shores  of 
Newfoundland,  in  return  for  a  pecuniary  com- 
pensation and  territorial  cessions  near  French 
Gambia  and  east  of  the  Niger.  In  Siam,  a 
country  in  which  the  two  nations  jwssessed 
conflicting  claims,  France  agreed  that  British 
influence  should  be  recognized  to  the  west  of 
the  Menam  River  in  return  for  the  British 
recognition  of  her  own  paramount  influence  to 
the  east  of  the  river.  Madagascar  gave  trouble 
because  the  tariff  duties  put  in  force  after  her 

98 


ORGANS  WITH  LOCAL  POWER 

annexation  by  France  were  claimed  to  be  in 
contravention  of  the  previous  treaty  of  free 
trade  made  between  an  independent  Mada- 
gascar and  England;  England  now  formally 
and  definitively  withdrew  her  protest  in  view 
of  certain  compensations  which  she  received 
relating  to  Zanzibar. 

There  was  left  only  the  question  of  the 
Hebrides;  and  this  could  not  be  settled  so 
easily.  The  New  Hebrides  form  a  group  of 
islands  north  of  New  Zealand  in  the  West 
Pacific  Ocean,  of  volcanic  formation,  rugged  in 
outline  and  rich  in  vegetation.  The  bulk  of 
the  population  consists  of  natives,  the  European 
settlers  being  comparatively  few.  A  division 
of  the  islands  seemed  particularly  diflBcult,  be- 
cause the  French  and  English  inhabitants  and 
interests  were  so  commingled  that  no  geo- 
graphical division  would  have  been  satisfactory 
to  the  subjects  of  either  nation.  Accordingly, 
the  two  governments  agreed  "to  draw  up 
in  concert  an  arrangement  which,  without  in- 
volving any  modifications  of  the  pK)litical  status 
quo,  shall  put  an  end  to  the  diflBculties  arising 
from  the  absence  of  jurisdiction  over  the  na- 
tives of  the  New  Hebrides.  "^^ 

The  "arrangement"  provided  for  in  the  Ac- 
cord of  1904  was  definitely  drawn  up  and  signed 
in  London  on  October  20,  1906.«»   This  Conven- 

90 


INTERNATIONAL  ADMINISTRATION 

tion  establishes  the  New  Hebrides  Group  as  a 
"region  of  joint  influence,  in  which  the  sub- 
jects and  citizens  of  the  two  signatory  Powers 
shall  enjoy  equal  rights  of  residence,  personal 
protection,  and  trade,  each  of  the  two  Powers 
retaining  jurisdiction  over  its  subjects  or  citi- 
zens, and  neither  exercising  a  separate  control 
over  the  Group."  Great  Britain  and  France 
are  each  to  be  represented  within  the  Islands 
by  a  High  Commissioner,  and  each  of  these 
is  to  be  independently  appointed  by  his  re- 
si>ective  government.  Each  is  to  have  under  his 
orders  one  half  of  the  island  f>olice  force;  these 
two  forces  are  to  be  united  under  the  joint  direc- 
tion of  the  two  Commissioners  only  when  it  be- 
comes necessary  to  employ  together  some  or  all 
of  both  divisions  of  the  force.  Legislative  jx)wer 
to  issue  regulations,  binding  upon  all  inhabi- 
tants and  enforced  by  penalties  not  exceeding 
five  hundred  francs,  is  vested  in  the  two  High 
Commissioners  acting  jointly.  A  number  of 
public  services  are  to  be  undertaken  in  com- 
mon; these  include  police,  post  and  telegraph, 
public  works,  ports  and  harbors,  buoys  and 
lighthouses,  public  health,  and  finance.  These 
are  to  be  organized  and  directed  by  the  High 
Commissioners  and  their  delegates  jointly. 

Judicial  power  is  divided  between  French 
and  EngHsh  national  courts  and   a  specially 

100 


ORGANS  WITH  LOCAL  POWER 

constituted  Joint  Court.  French  and  English 
citizens  are  subject  to  their  respective  courts; 
foreigners  must  choose  within  six  months  be- 
tween the  French  and  the  Enghsh  legal  systems. 
These  national  tribunals  have  ordinary  criminal 
jurisdiction,  and  civil  jurisdiction  where  no  land 
controversies  are  in  question.  The  Joint  Court 
has  jurisdiction  over  all  suits  respecting  land, 
over  civil  suits  between  natives  of  the  islands 
and  foreigners,  over  criminal  offenses  com- 
mitted by  natives  against  foreigners,  and  over 
violations  of  the  provisions  of  the  Convention 
itself  or  of  the  reglements  made  in  conformity 
to  it.  The  Joint  Court  is  comp>osed  of  three 
judges — one  English,  one  French,  and  one  for- 
eigner to  be  appointed  by  the  King  of  Spain. 
The  foreigner  is  to  act  as  president  of  the  Court. 
The  joint  administration  has  not  worked 
well.  The  expedient  of  Condominium,  in  itself 
a  somewhat  doubtful  experiment,  was  resorted 
to  only  as  a  more  or  less  temporary  makeshift. 
"That  Condominium  ought  to  be  no  more 
than  a  temporary  regime  is  certain,"  says  a 
French  writer  of  recognized  authority.  "Facts 
prove  that,  except  for  three  rare  exceptions, 
which  are  explained  by  special  considerations, 
this  type  of  government  is  necessarily  of  a 
limited  duration.  But  this  arrangement,  which 
was  imposed  for  want  of  a  definitive  solution, 

101 


INTERNATIONAL  ADMINISTRATION 

was  due  to  a  deliberate  desire  on  the  part  of  the 
contracting  Powers;  neither  has  given  up  the 
hope  of  annexation,  or  at  least  of  an  advan- 
tageous division;  they  agreed  to  leave  the 
future  open,  and,  that  there  might  be  no  doubt 
as  to  their  intention,  they  thought  it  proper  to 
stipulate — that  which  goes  without  saying — 
that  the  convention  would  remain  in  force  only 
until  some  new  agreement  might  be  formed 
(Art.  68). "69 

The  arrangements  of  this  Convention  are 
particularly  unfortunate.  The  provisions  seem 
calculated  to  increase,  rather  than  to  dispel, 
discord.  In  the  Joint  Court,  for  instance,  both 
French  and  English  law  are  to  obtain;  and  it  has 
sometimes  happened  that  the  English  judge 
was  ignorant  of  French  law,  the  French  judge 
of  English  law,  the  Spanish  judge  of  both  the 
English  and  French  law  and  languages,  and  all 
three  judges  of  the  native  language  and  cus- 
toms. Owing  to  dissensions  and  misunder- 
standings, to  the  laxity  of  enforcement  of  the 
laws  and  to  race  feeling,  conditions  upon  the 
islands  have  become  so  strained  that  it  seems 
to  be  generally  acknowledged  that  the  present 
arrangement  should  be  terminated.* 

*  "Among  the  most  glaring  defects  of  the  existing  administration 
are  (a)  the  over-insistence  of  the  Joint  Court  on  pure  technicali- 
ties; (6)  the  inabiUty  of  the  Joint  Court  to  see  that  its  sentences 

102 


ORGANS  WITH  LOCAL  POWER 

On  June  10,  1914,  a  Conference  was  held  be- 
tween representatives  of  France  and  England 
to  devise  some  means  for  remedying  the  defects 
of  the  Condominium  government  as  revealed 
by  the  experience  of  the  preceding  eight  years.^'* 
The  breaking  out  of  the  European  War,  how- 


are  carried  out;  (c)  the  leniency  of  the  Joint  Court  in  inflicting 
fines,  and  the  excessive  leniency  of  the  French  resident  officials 
in  remitting  or  neglecting  to  collect  the  fines  inflicted.  To  allege 
these  defects  as  the  main  cause  of  the  situation  which  has  de- 
veloped in  the  islands  is  less  inadequate  than  it  seems,  for  they 
constitute  jointly  a  practical  freedom  from  any  restraint  of  law, 
particularly  in  the  remoter  islands,  which  allow  the  undisciplined 
and  unprincipled  settler  and  trader  full  scope  for  indulging 
the  worst  that  is  in  him.  .  .  . 

"  These  defects  are  not  inherent  in  the  Condominium.  They 
arise  partly  from  the  habit  of  thought  of  certain  judges  and 
officials,  partly  from  weaknesses  in  the  Convention  which  are 
perfectly  remediable  without  destroying  it  or  hurting  any  na- 
tional pride.  To  attack  the  Condominium,  therefore,  because  of 
them  is  extravagant  and  irrelevant.  The  mere  alteration  of 
Art.  12  to  give  the  Joint  Court  jurisdiction  over  crimes  committed 
by  non-natives  against  natives,  and  of  Art.  19B  to  provide  that 
Court  with  its  own  police  capable  of  executing  its  own  sentences, 
would  in  a  short  time  bring  about  imwonted  order  in  many  of 
the  islands.  Provision  should  also  be  made  to  obliterate  the 
Court's  remarkable  distinctions  between  kidnapping  and  illegal 
recruiting,  and  between  employers  and  their  agents.  .  .  . 

"With  the  amendments  mentioned,  the  intention  of  those  who 
framed  the  original  Convention  will  for  the  first  time  stand  some 
chance  of  being  carried  out,  and  the  Condominium  will  be  given 
a  fair  trial,  which  it  has  never  yet  had.  ...  If  the  hands  of  justice 
are  not  strengthened,  as  they  so  easily  can  be,  two  great  and 
friendly  nations  may  find  themselves  embroiled  in  a  mean  squab- 
ble over  the  bodies  of  victimized  and  outraged  natives  at  the 
other  end  of  the  world."  (From  the  Ixmdon  Times  of  February  26, 
1914,  p.  5.    See  also  the  Nineteenth  Century,  Vol.  LXXV,  p.  932.) 

103 


INTERNATIONAL  ADMINISTRATION 

ever,  pre  vented  further  developments  in  the  mod- 
ification of  the  government  of  the  New  Hebrides.'* 
The  only  other  notable  example  of  modem 
Condominium  is  the  case  of  the  Soudan,  placed 
by  the  treaty  of  January  19,  1899,  under  the 
undivided  sovereignty  of  Great  Britain  and  of 
Egypt;*  but  as  the  rights  of  the  latter  were 
purely  nominal  and  theoretical,  this  instance  is 
of  very  minor  importance.'^ 

NOTES 

*  The  words  of  the  preamble  of  the  Act  of  Novem- 
ber 2,  1865,  are  as  follows:  "And  the  said  Commis- 
sion, acting  in  virtue  of  this  mandate,  having  suc- 
ceeded, after  nine  years'  work,  in  realizing  important 
improvements  in  the  system  of  navigation — notably 
by  the  construction  of  two  piers  at  the  mouth  of  the 
Soulina  branch,  which  have  had  the  eflPect  of  admit- 
ting into  this  embouchure  vessels  of  a  large  draught 

*  The  agreement  of  January  19,  1899,  between  Great  Britain 
and  Egypt  provided  that  "the  supreme  military  and  civil  com- 
mand in  the  Soudan  shall  be  vested  in  one  oflBcer,  termed  the 
'Governor-General  of  the  Soudan.'  He  shall  be  appointed  by 
Khedivial  Decree  on  the  recommendation  of  Her  Britannic 
Majesty's  Government,  and  shall  be  removed  only  by  Khedivial 
Decree,  with  the  consent  of  Her  Britannic  Majesty's  Govern- 
ment." Laws,  ordinances,  and  regulations  for  the  Soudan  were 
to  be  made,  altered,  or  abrogated  only  by  Proclamation  of  the 
Governor-General,  without  which  no  Egyptian  law  or  decree 
could  have  effect  within  the  Soudan.  No  consuls  were  to  be 
allowed  in  the  Soudan  without  the  previous  consent  of  the 
British  Government.  (For  the  text  of  this  Agreement,  see  Herts- 
let's  Commercial  Treaties,  Vol.  XXI,  p.  356.) 

104 


ORGANS  WITH  LOCAL  POWER 

of  water — by  the  execution  of  works  of  correction 
and  cleansing  in  the  course  of  the  same  branch — ^by 
raising  wrecks,  and  estabhshing  a  system  of  buoys — 
by  the  erection  of  a  lighthouse  at  the  mouth  of  the 
St.  George — by  the  institution  of  a  regular  lifeboat 
service,  and  by  the  creation  of  a  seaman's  hospital 
at  Soulina — ^lastly,  by  the  provisional  regulation  of 
the  different  services  connected  with  the  naviga- 
tion between  Isaktcha  and  the  sea."  (See  Hertslet'a 
Commercial  Treaties,  Vol.  XII,  p.  884.) 

^  Hertslet's  Commercial  Treaties,  Vol.  XII,  p.  884. 

^  Ihid.,  p.  919. 

*  Art.  21  of  the  Public  Act  of  November  2,  1865. 
Hertslet's  Commercial  Treaties,  Vol.  XII,  p.  891. 

^Art.  7  of  the  Treaty  of  London  of  March  13, 
1871.  Hertslet's  Commercial  Treaties,  Vol.  XIII, 
p.  747. 

^  Hertslet's  Comm£rcial  Treaties,  Vol.  XII,  p.  1206. 

^  Martens,  Nouveau  Recueil  General  (2nd  Series), 
Vol.  Ill,  p.  463. 

*  Art.  1  of  Treaty  of  March  10,  1883.  Hertslet's 
Commercial  Treaties,  Vol.  XV,  p.  1071. 

The  treaty  of  1883  also  provided  for  the  creation 
of  a  new  "Mixed  Commission  of  the  Danube"  for 
the  purpose  of  supervising  the  execution  of  the  regu- 
lations made  for  that  portion  of  the  river  between 
Hungary  and  Braila,  and  with  power  to  act  by  ma- 
jority vote;  this  Commission  was  to  be  composed 
of  representatives  of  Austria-Hungary,  Bulgaria, 
Roumania,  and  Servia,  and  also  a  representative  of 
the  European  Commission.    But  as  Roumania,  the 

105 


INTERNATIONAL  ADMINISTRATION 

local  sovereign  most  interested,  was  not  permitted 
to  take  part  in  the  making  of  the  treaty,  the  pro- 
vision for  the  creation  of  the  "Mixed  Commission" 
has  necessarily  remained  a  dead  letter. 

For  the  text  of  this  provision,  see  Art.  96  of  the 
Annex  to  the  treaty  of  March  10,  1883,  in  Hertslet's 
Commercial  Treaties,  Vol.  XV,  p.  1087. 

®  See  text  of  regulations  in  Hertslet's  Commercial 
Treaties,  Vol.  XXVI,  p.  862.  Some  idea  of  the 
scope  of  the  Commission's  power  may  be  seen  by 
a  glance  at  these  regulations,  covering  194  articles. 
Art.  1  states:  "L'exercise  de  la  navigation  sur  le 
Bas-Danube,  en  aval  de  Galatz,  est  place  sous  I'au- 
torite  de  I'lnspecteur  de  la  navigation  et  du  Capi- 
taine  du  Port  de  Soulina." 

The  Chapter  headings  are  as  follows: 
Dispositions  Generales. 

Titre  I — De  la  Police  de  la  Rade  et  du  Port  de 
Soulina. 
Chap.  1 — De  la  Police  de  la  Rade  de  Soulina. 
"     2 — De  la  PoUce  du  Port  de  Soulina. 
"     3 — Dispositions  communes  a  la  rade  et 
au  Port  de  Soulina. 
Titre  II — De  la  Police  du  fleuve. 

Chap.  1 — Regies  generales  pour  la  navigation 
sur  le  fleuve. 
**     2 — Regies  de  barre  et  de  route. 
"     3 — Regies  pour  le  chemin  de  halage. 
**     4 — ^Regies  pour  la  navigation  pendant 
la  nuit  ou  par  un  temps  de  brouil- 

lard. 

106 


ORGANS  WITH  LOCAL  POWER 

Chap.  5 — Regies  pour  les  Mtiments  au  mouil- 

lage. 

"     6 — Regies  speciales  pour  les  radeaux  et 

trains  de  bois. 

"     7 — Regies  pour  les  cas  d'avarie,  d'^choue- 

ment  et  de  naufrage. 

"     8 — Regies  pour  le  jet  du  lest. 

Titre  III— De  la  Police  du  Port  de  Toultcha. 

Titre  IV — Du  service  du  pilotage. 

Chap.  1 — Dispositions  communes  au  pilotage 

a  I'embouchure  et  dans  le  cours  du 

fleuve. 

"     2 — Pilotage  a  I'embouchure. 

"     3 — Du  pilotage  dans  le  cours  du  fleuve. 

Titre  V — Du  service  des  alleges. 

Chap.  1 — Regies  generales. 

"     2 — Des  operations  d'allege  locales. 

"     3 — Des  operations  d'allege  par  cabotage. 

"     4 — Dispositions  speciales  au  cas  de  force 

majeure. 

**     5 — Dispositions    speciales    au    cas    de 

fraude. 

Titre    VI — Du  remorquage. 

Chap.  1 — Regies  generales. 

"     2 — Du  remorquage  a  rembochure. 

"     3 — Du  remorquage  dans  le  fleuve. 

Titre  VII — Dispositions  speciales  a  observer  dans 

I'int^r^t  des  travaux  d'amelioration 

du  Bas-Danube. 

Titre  VIII — Des  contraventions. 

Chap.  1 — Fixation  des  amendes. 
107 


INTERNATIONAL  ADMINISTRATION 

Chap.  2 — ^Regies  pour  rapplication  des  amendes. 

***  For  a  concise  account  of  the  Danube  Commis- 
sions, see  Bonfils,  No.  528.  For  the  texts  of  most  of 
the  Danube  treaties  between  1856  and  1871,  see  in- 
dexed list  in  Hertslet's  Commercial  Treaties^  Vol. 
XII,  pp.  131,  132  of  Index. 

*^  For  an  interesting  accoimt  of  the  dangers  of 
Danube  navigation  before  1856  and  of  its  robber 
pilots  and  lightermen,  see  British  Pari.  Accounts 
and  Papers  (1907),  Vol.  LXXXVII  [Cd.  3646],  p.  2. 

*^  British  Pari.  Accounts  and  Papers  (1907),  Vol. 
LXXXVII  [Cd.  3646],  p.  7.  Report  concerning  the 
Danube  Commission. 

*^  For  a  list  of  fines  and  penalties,  see  Title  VIII 
of  the  Regulations  of  November  10, 1911.  Hertslet's 
Commercial  Treaties,  Vol.  XXVI,  p.  862. 

"Art.  16  of  the  Treaty  of  Paris  of  March  30, 
1856. 

*^  For  further  information  concerning  the  Danube 
Commission  see  Demorgny,  La  Question  du  Danube 
(1911).  See  also  Maican,  La  Question  du  Danube 
(1904),  p.  222  passim.  For  details  of  organization 
see  the  Regulation  fixing  the  Order  of  Procedure 
of  the  European  Commission  of  the  Danube,  Nov- 
ember 10,  1879.  (Sturdza,  Recueil  des  Documents 
relatifs  a  la  liberie  de  Navigation  du  Danube,  p.  127.) 
For  the  text  of  the  Regulations,  see  Appendix  B, 
p.  180. 

*^  For  text  of  treaty,  see  de  Clercq,  Recueil  des 

Traites,   Vol.   IX,  p.   291;    English  translation  in 

American  Journal  oj  Int.  Law,  Vol.  VI,  Sup.  p.  14. 

108 


ORGANS  WITH  LOCAL  POWER 

For  American  correspondence  relating  thereto, 
see  U.  S.  For.  Rel  (1865)  (part  3),  p.  350. 

*^  For  texts  of  these  accessions  see  Hertslet's  Com.' 
mercial  Treaties,  Vol.  XIV,  p.  375,  and  Vol.  XXI, 
p.  711. 

For  the  exchange  of  notes  between  Great  Britain 
and  France  in  1892,  respecting  the  establishment  of 
a  signal  station  at  Cape  Spartel,  and  the  conditions 
under  which  its  management  would  be  undertaken 
by  Lloyd's  Committee,  see  Brit,  and  Foreign  State 
Papers,  Vol.  LXXXIV,  p.  10. 

**  See  U.  S.  Statutes  at  Large  (64th  Congress), 
Vol.  XXXIX,  pp.  254,  1050. 

^^  Encyclop.  Britannica  (11th  ed.).  Vol.  VI,  p.  265. 

2°  Martens,  N.  R.  G.  (2nd  Series),  Vol.  XIX, 
p.  260. 

"  Martens,  N.  R.  G.  (3rd  Series),  Vol.  I,  p.  78. 

"Martens,  iV.  R.  G.  (3rd  Series),  Vol.  II,  p.  913. 

^^  See  the  Resolutions  of  the  Committee  of  Ways 
and  Means  of  the  Sanitary  Conference  of  Paris 
in  Martens,  N.  R.  G.  (3rd  Series),  Vol.  I,  p.  189. 
The  office  has  suflFered  owing  to  the  refusal  of  Ger- 
many and  Austria  to  take  any  part,  because  the 
office  was  not  established  in  Berlin. 

^'^  Martens,  N.  R.  G.  (3d  Series),  Vol.  I,  p.  156, 
Arts.  165-175. 

"  Ibid.,  p.  155,  Arts,  162-164.  Also,  see  Annex 
III  of  the  Sanitary  Convention  of  January  30,  1892, 
and  the  Khedivial  Decrees  of  1893  and  1894,  Mar- 
tens, N.  R.  G.  (3rd  Series),  Vol.  I,  pp.  169,  177,  and 
the  Ministerial  Order  of  1893,  ibid.,  p.  181. 

109 


INTERNATIONAL  ADMINISTRATION 

^^  Ihid.,  p.  161,  Art.  176. 
^'Art.  165  of  the  Paris  Convention. 
^®Art.  170. 

^^  Art.  1  of  the  Khedivial  Decree  of  June  19,  1893. 
^°  Reinsch,  P.,  Public  Int.  Unions,  p.  59. 
^*  The  Conseil  Sanitaire  at  Tangier  consists  of  all 
the  foreign  envoys  in  Morocco.     See  Oppenheim's 
Int.  Law,  Vol.  I,  p.  515,  note  3;  Liszt,  Das  Volker- 
recht  (10th  ed.).  Book  II,  Sect.  18,  III,  p.  158. 
^^  Woolf ,  Internal.  Government,  pp.  148  el  seq. 
^^  For  the  International  Council  of  Sanitation  for 
the  Danube  River,  instituted  at  Bucharest  in  1881, 
see  Art.  6  of  the  Acte  additionnel  a  I'acte  public  du 
2  novembre,  1865,  pour  la  navigation  des  embou- 
chures du  Danube,  Martens,  N.  R.  G.  (2nd  Series), 
Vol.  VIII,  p.  207. 

^^  The  membership  of  the  Commission  was  as 
follows: 

Austria-Hungary — Herr  Aristoteles  Petrovitch 

(Former  consul  at  Valona). 
France — M.  Krajewski  (Consul  at  Scutari). 
Germany — Dr.  J.  Winckle  (Consul-General  at 

Trieste). 
Great  Britain — Harry  H.  Lamb,  C.M.G.  (Con- 
sul-General at  Salonika). 
Italy  —  Commandatore  A.  Leoni  (Consul-Gen- 
eral at  Bastia). 
Russia — M.  Petraieff  (Consul  at  Monastir). 
Albania — Midhat  Bey  Frachery. 
^^Fortnightly   Review,    Vol.    XCV   (New    Series) 

(1914),  p.  469. 

110 


ORGANS  WITH  LOCAL  POWER 

^*  Gibbons,  The  New  Map  of  Europe,  p.  864. 

^'  See  interesting  articles  on  the  Albanian  ques- 
tion in  the  Fortnightly  Review,  Vol.  XCVI  (New 
Series),  (1914),  p.  1,  Dillon,  E.  J.,  and  the  Contem- 
porary Review,  Vol.  CVI,  p.  277. 

^^  For  the  text  of  the  Anglo-French  Accord  see 
Hertslet's  Commercial  Treaties,  Vol.  XXIV,  p.  400; 
and  for  the  text  of  the  Secret  Articles  signed  at  the 
same  time,  but  not  published  till  considerably  later, 
see  ibid..  Vol.  XXVI,  p.  126. 

^'  Art.  9  of  the  Declaration. 

'*°See  text  of  treaty  in  Martens,  N.  R.  G.  (2nd 
Series),  Vol.  XXXIV,  p.  238.  For  an  English 
translation,  see  American  Journal  of  International 
Law,  Vol.  I,  Sup.  p,  47. 

**  For  the  text  of  the  Reglements,  subsequently 
made,  for  the  government  of  the  Moroccan  Inter- 
national Police,  see  Deloncle,  Leon,  Statut  Inter- 
national du  Maroc,  p.  65.  For  the  text  of  the  agree- 
ment between  the  Inspector-General  of  the  Police 
and  the  Moroccan  Government,  whereby  Col.  Arnim 
Miiller  was  created  Inspector-General,  see  ibid., 
p.  97. 

*^  See  Rapport  de  M.  Pierre  Baudin,  scnateur, 
au  nom  de  la  commission  senatoriale  chargee  d'ex- 
aminer  la  convention  frauco-allemande  du  4 
novembre,  1911,  p.  16. 

'*^  Translated  from  Albin,  Pierre,  Le  Coup  d'Agadir, 
p.  107. 

*"*  White,  A.  Silva,  TJie  Expansion  of  Egypt,  p.  337. 

An  extract  from  the  report  of  the  subcommittee 
8  111 


INTERNATIONAL  ADMINISTRATION 

which  studied  the  question  of  an  international  Com- 
mission, concisely  sums  up  the  views  of  the  diflFerent 
delegates: 

"Le  delegue  de  la  Grande-Bretagne  a  object^ 
que  I'institution  d'une  commission  Internationale  de 
surveillance  serait  incompatible  avec  les  bases  con- 
tenues  dans  la  circulaire  de  lord  Granville,  qui  con- 
f^re  a  la  seule  puissance  territoriale  le  soin  de 
I'execution  du  traite;  que  d'ailleurs  le  besoin  d'un 
organe  de  surveillance  lui  paraissait  tres  contestable 
et  que,  dans  son  opinion,  la  creation  d'un  tel  organe 
entrainerait  beaucoup  plus  d'inconvenients  que 
d'avantages. 

"Les  delegues  d'Allemagne,  d'Autriche-Hongrie, 
de  France  et  de  Russie,  auxquels  se  sont  joints  le 
delegue  de  la  Turquie  et  ulterieurement  le  delegue 
des  Pays-bas,  ont  soutenu,  au  contraire,  que  la  liberte 
du  canal  ne  serait  qu'un  vain  mot  si  la  puissance 
territoriale  ne  participait  pas  aux  servitudes  mu- 
tuelles  qu'on  se  propose  d'etablir  et  qu'une  com- 
mission internationale  etait  non  seulement  utile, 
mais  necessaire.  lis  ont  cite  a  I'appui  de  leurs 
affirmations  les  mesures  prises  d'un  commun  accord 
en  ce  qui  conceme  la  navigation  des  fleuves  inter- 
nationaux  et  particulierement  celle  du  bas  Danube, 
en  insistant  sur  ce  point  que,  s'il  a  ete  juge  utile 
d'etablir  un  organe  collectif  de  surveillance  pour  le 
bas  Danube,  a  plus  forte  raison  il  est  indispensable 
de  prevoir  des  mesures  analogues  pour  une  grande 
voie  de  navigation  internationale  oil  les  inter^ts  du 

monde  entier  sont  en  jeu.'* 
112 


ORGANS  WITH  LOCAL  POWER 

For  an  account  of  the  Paris  conference  see  an 
article  by  M.  Asser  in  the  Revue  de  Droit  Inter- 
national, Vol.  XX  (1888),  p.  529. 

'^^  See  text  of  the  treaty  in  Martens,  N.  R.  G.  (2nd 
Series),  Vol.  XV,  p.  557.  For  English  translation, 
see  Amer.  Jour,  of  Int.  Law,  Vol.  Ill,  Sup.  p.  123. 

***  Translated  from  Camand,  L.,  tltvde  sur  le 
regime  juridique  du  canal  de  Suez  (1899),  p.  235. 

'^'^  Translated  from  Rossignol,  L.  M.,  Le  canal  de 
Suez  (1898),  p.  206. 

**  Translated  from  Charles-Roux,  J.,  Uisthme  et 
le  canal  de  Suez  (1901),  Vol.  II,  p.  113. 

*'  Translated  from  Camand  L.,  Etude  sur  le  regime 
juridique  du  canal  de  Suez,  p.  235. 

^'^  Martens,  N.  R.  G.  (2nd  Series),  Vol.  XXXII, 
p.  17. 

For  an  account  of  the  efiFect  upon  Egypt  of  the 
Anglo-French  Accord  of  1904,  see  an  article  by 
Morel,  A.,  in  the  Revue  Ginerale  de  Droit  International 
Public,  Vol.  XIV  (1907),  p.  405. 

"  Malloy,  Treaties,  Vol.  I,  p.  327. 

For  an  account  of  the  early  history  of  the  Congo, 
see  Reeves,  J.  S.,  Johns  Hopkins  University  Studies 
in  Hist,  and  Polit.  Science,  Vol.  XII,  Papers  11,  12; 
Amer.  Jour.  Int.  Law,  Vol.  Ill,  p.  99;  Rose,  J. 
Holland,  Development  of  the  European  Nations,  Vol. 
II,  Chap.  Vin. 

^^  See  the  text  of  the  General  Act  in  Martens, 
N.  R.  G.  (2nd  Series),  Vol.  X,  p.  414. 

For  an  English  translation,  see  Amer.  Jour,  of 
Int,  Law,  Vol.  Ill,  Sup.  p.  7. 

U3 


INTERNATIONAL  ADMINISTRATION 

Although  the  General  Act  of  Berlin  was  signed 
by  the  delegates  of  the  United  States,  it  was  never 
submitted  by  President  Cleveland  to  the  United 
States  Senate  for  ratification,  since  he  held  that  "an 
engagement  to  share  in  the  obligation  of  enforcing 
neutrality  in  the  remote  valley  of  the  Congo  would 
be  an  alliance  whose  responsibilities  we  are  not  in 
a  position  to  assume."  Message  to  Congress, 
December  8,  1885.     See  U.  S.  For.  Rel.  (1885),  p.  ix. 

*^  Quoted  from  a  summary  by  a  professor  in  the 
University  of  Brussels  of  a  Report  made  by  a  Com- 
mission of  Investigation,  appointed  by  King  I^o- 
pold  himself.  (See  Bliss,  Encyclopedia  of  Social 
Reform,  p.  270.) 

^^  Translated  from  article  by  Rolin-Jaequemyns 
in  Revue  de  Droit  Int.,  Vol.  XXI  (1889),  p.  186. 

*^  Reeves,  J.  S.,  in  the  Johns  Hopkins  University 
Studies  in  Hist,  and  Polit.  Science  (1894),  Vol.  XII, 
Papers  11  and  12,  p.  44. 

^^  Liszt:  Das  Volkerrecht  (10th  ed.).  Sect.  18,  II, 
3,  p.  157. 

See  also  Revue  de  Droit  International,  Vol.  XXI 
(1889),  p.  185. 

*^  For  text  of  treaty  see  Martens,  N.  R.  G.  (2nd 
Series),  Vol.  XXXII,  p.  94. 

^*  For  an  English  translation  of  Annex  XVII  see 
Brit,  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  Vol.  XCV,  p.  621. 

*^  U.  S.  For.  Rel.  (1905),  p.  122;  Reports  of  Chinese 

Imperial  Maritime   Customs,  Misc.  Series  No.  30, 

Vol.  II,  p.  150. 

'"Art.  12. 

114 


ORGANS  WITH  LOCAL  POWER 

"  U.  S.  For.  Rel  (1910),  p.  353  et  seq;  also,  The 
China  Year  Book  (Bell  and  Woodhead),  (1916),  p.  651. 

^^  For  the  text  of  this  draft  Convention  see  Jahr- 
buch  des  Volkerrechts,  Vol.  I,  p.  142;  also  R.  G.  D.  /. 
P.,  Vol.  XX,  p.  277. 

""Art.  1:  Le  Spitzberg  demeurera  terra  nullius. 
II  ne  pourra,  ni  en  tout,  ni  en  partie,  etre  annexe  par 
auciin  Etat,  ni  ^tre  soumis,  sous  quelque  forme  que  ce 
soit,  a  la  souverainete  d'une  puissance  quelconque. 

"Art.  2:  Le  Spitzberg  sera  ouvert  aux  resortis- 
sants  de  tous  les  Etats  conformement  aux  disposi- 
tions de  la  presente  convention." 

^  See  the  list  of  special  cases  in  Art.  21. 

®^  See  the  London  Times,  February  18,  1914,  p.  7, 
for  the  calling  of  the  Conference. 

^  On  the  juridical  status  of  Spitzbergen  see  article 
by  Secretary  Lansing  in  Amer.  Jour,  of  Int.  Law, 
Vol.  XI,  p.  763.  Also  articles  in  R.  G.  D.  I.  P.,  Vol. 
XV,  p.  80;  iUd.,  Vol.  XVI,  p.  117;  iUd.,  Vol.  XX, 
p.  277.  As  to  current  feeling  in  England  regarding 
Spitzbergen,  see  the  letter  from  the  Royal  Geog.  Soc. 
to  the  British  Government,  in  London  Times,  March 
13,  1918,  p.  5,  together  with  Mr.  Balfour's  reply. 

^'  See  Declaration  of  April  8,  1904,  between  Great 
Britain  and  France.  Text  in  Hertslet's  Commercial 
Treaties,  Vol.  XXIV,  p.  391. 

^See  text  of  Convention  in  Martens,  N.  R.  G. 

(3rd  Series),  Vol.  I,  p.  523.     For  an  informing  article 

upon  the  New  Hebrides  see  an  article  by  M.  Politis, 

in  R.  G.  D.  I.  P.,  Vol.  XIV,  p.  689.    See  also  British 

Pari.  Accounts  and  Papers  (1907),  [Cd.  3288],  Vol. 

115 


INTERNATIONAL  ADMINISTRATION 

LVI,  p.  649,  and  ibid.  [Cd.  3525],  Vol.  LVI,  p.  737. 
For  the  Exchange  of  Notes  between  Great  Brit- 
ain and  France  of  Aug.  29, 1907,  containing  the 
Greneral  Instructions  to  the  High  Commissioners 
from  their  respective  governments,  see  Hertslet's 
Commercial  Treaties,  Vol.  XXV.,  pp.  290  et  seq. 

^^  Translated  from  an  article  by  M.  Politis  in 
the  Revue  Genercde  de  Droit  International  Public, 
Vol.  XIV,  p.  756. 

'°  See  names  of  delegates  in  the  London  Times, 
June  11,  1914,  p.  7. 

^^  In  the  London  Times  of  September  2, 1914,  p.  10, 
it  was  announced  that  "Mr.  Glynn,  the  Australian 
Minister  of  External  Affairs,  has  been  informed  that 
the  draft  agreement  between  the  British  and  French 
governments  regarding  amendments  in  the  control 
of  the  New  Hebrides  is  now  on  its  way  to  Australia. 
Mr.  Glynn  says  the  amendments  are  substantial. 
The  Australian  Government  will  be  given  an  oppor- 
tunity to  consider  the  draft  before  its  ratification." 

'^  For  other  cases  of  Condominium  see  Bonfils, 
No.  344^.  For  an  account  of  the  Condominium  of 
Moresnet,  on  the  frontier  between  Belgium  and 
Prussia,  see  article  by  DoUot  in  Annates  des  sciences 
'politiques  (1901),  p.  620;  also  see  Revue  Generale  de 
Droit  International  Public,  Vol.  XVI,  p.  121. 


CHAPTER  V 

INTERNATIONAL  ORGANS   WITH   POWER   OF    CON- 
TROL  OVER   THE  MEMBER   STATES — TYPE   III 

TF  the  instances  are  few  where  sovereign  states 
•■■  have  been  willing  to  create  an  international 
organ  of  the  second  type,  with  substantial 
power  over  some  local  question  in  a  weak  or 
backward  state,  the  instances  where  they  have 
been  willing  to  create  an  international  organ 
with  p>ower  to  control  their  own  actions  are 
still  more  rare.  States  are  so  extravagantly 
tender  of  their  own  sovereignty  that  nothing 
but  compelling  necessity  will  produce  an  organ 
of  the  third  type.  The  most  striking  example 
of  such  an  organ,  and  one  that  has  been  highly 
successful  in  accomplishing  the  object  for  which 
it  was  set  up,  is  the  International  Sugar  Com- 
mission. 

1. — The  International  Sugar  Commission 

During  the  latter  half  of  the  nineteenth  cen- 
tury it  became  the  custom  on  the  part  of  the 

leading  European  States  to  stimulate  the  grow- 
in 


mXERNATIONAL  ADMINISTRATION 

ing  and  exporting  of  sugar  by  granting  large 
state  bounties  to  the  exporters;  the  result  was 
the  flooding  of  the  world's  sugar-markets  with 
artificially  cheapened  sugars  and  the  conse- 
quent drying  up  of  the  natural  sources  of  world 
supply.  To  England,  the  principal  sugar-buying 
nation  of  Europe,  the  question  was  of  particular 
concern.  The  overstocking  of  England  with 
bounty-fed  sugars  threatened  to  kill  the  West 
Indian  sugar  industries,  which  were  dependent 
for  their  markets  mainly  upon  English  con- 
sumption; and  economists  argued  that  the 
severe  injury  to  the  West  Indies  resulting  from 
the  killing  of  their  staple  industry  would  not  be 
offset  by  the  benefit  to  England  of  cheaper 
sugar.  Furthermore,  the  substitution  of  an  ar- 
tificially nourished  for  a  natural  sugar  trade 
promised  to  create  a  monopoly  which  would 
ultimately  spell  higher  prices.  To  the  conti- 
nental nations,  subjected  to  heavy  drains  upon 
their  treasuries  by  the  large  bounties  which 
they  found  it  necessary  to  pay  in  order  to  ex- 
port their  sugars  and  thus  maintain  their  in- 
dustries, the  bounty  system  was  becoming 
unbearable.  Yet  no  sugar-producing  nation, 
acting  separately,  could  possibly  escape  the 
system  which  was  proving  so  burdensome 
to  all. 

As  early  as  1864  Mr.  Gladstone  proposed  to 

118 


POWER  OVER  MEMBER  STATES 

take  international  steps  to  abolish  the  sugar 
bounties;  but  the  Convention  of  1864,  which  was 
secured  through  his  efforts,  failed  in  its  pur- 
pose because  it  contained  no  penal  clause  for 
enforcing  its  provisions;  and  the  matter  was 
of  too  vital  an  interest  financially  for  the  mem- 
ber states  not  to  find  easy  means  of  evasion. 
A  second  conference  was  held  in  1875,  and  a 
Convention  drafted  in  1877,  which  also  proved 
ineffective  for  lack  of  a  penal  provision.  Mean- 
while, the  bounties  were  increasing  by  leaps 
and  bounds.  Efforts  to  reach  a  common  agree- 
ment on  the  matter  of  sugar  bounties  never 
ceased;  but  always  the  unwillingness  of  the 
sovereign  states  to  surrender  the  exercise  of 
any  part  of  their  sovereignty  in  a  matter  of 
such  vital  concern  as  tariff  rates  prevented  the 
successful  conclusion  of  an  adequate  arrange- 
ment. It  was  not  until  the  Brussels  Confer- 
ences of  1901-1902  that  the  European  states 
finally  consented  to  create  an  international 
body  endowed  with  suflBcient  power  to  end 
the  abuse.  In  practice  the  arrangement 
agreed  upon  amounted  to  a  very  consider- 
able limitation  upon  the  exercise  of  their 
sovereignty. 

The  Permanent  Sugar  Commission  presents 
an  excellent  example  of  an  international  execu- 
tive organ  endowed  with  power  to  control  the 

119 


INTERNATIONAL  ADMINISTRATION 

action  of  the  member  states  themselves.*  It  was 
created  by  the  Sugar  Convention  of  March 
5,  1902,^  which  was  supplemented  by  the  Ad- 
ditional Act  of  August  28,  1907,2  ^^jj^j  eventually 
signed  by  fourteen  states,  including  Germany, 
Austria-Hungary,  France,  Great  Britain,  Italy, 
and  Russia.^  AJthough  there  is  considerable 
difference  of  opinion  as  to  whether  English  in- 
terests profited  or  lost  by  the  abolition  of  the 
bounties,  yet  it  is  not  disputed  that  the  Com- 
mission has  been  effective  and  successful  in  the 
attainment  of  its  object. 

By  the  Convention  of  1902  the  signatory 
states  bound  themselves  to  abolish  sugar 
bounties,  both  direct  and  indirect  (Art.  1), 
not  to  impose  import  duties  upon  non-bounty- 
fed  sugars  beyond  a  certain  maximum  (i.  e.,  six 
francs  per  one  hundred  kilos  in  excess  of  the 
excise  tax)f  (Art.  3),  and  to  impose  a  counter- 
vailing duty  upK)n  imported  bounty-fed  sugar 
(Art.  4).     This  last  is  the  penal  clause  which 

*  See  the  text  of  the  Convention  of  March  5,  1902,  in  Appendix 
C,  p.  189. 

For  the  text  of  the  Additional  Act  of  August  28,  1907,  see 
Appendix  C,  p.  199. 

t  The  limitation  of  the  tariff  was  to  put  an  end  to  the  practice 
of  "dumping"  sugar  upon  foreign  markets.  This  dumping 
or  selling  in  foreign  markets  at  less  than  cost  price  by  private 
producers  without  government  assistance  is  made  possible  through 
vast  profits  reaped  from  domestic  sales;  and  this  in  turn  is  made 
possible  on  a  large  scale  through  the  protection  of  a  high  tariff 
which  shuts  out  foreign  competition. 

120 


POWER  OVER  MEMBER  STATES 

has  helped  to  make  the  Convention  effective; 
the  provision  that  bounty-fed  sugars  shall  be 
discriminated  against  by  a  tariff  at  least  as 
high  as  the  bounty  has  given  security  that  the 
contracting  states  will  not  have  to  fear  com- 
petition with  bounty-fed  sugars. 

As  in  most  of  the  Public  Unions,  the  Con- 
vention creates  a  permanent  bureau,  to  be 
located  at  Brussels,  whose  duty  it  is  to  collect, 
arrange,  and  publish  statistics  and  information 
of  every  kind  which  pertain  to  sugar  legislation. 
In  addition  to  this  informational  bureau,  how- 
ever, which  is  of  quite  minor  importance,  the 
Convention  provides  for  a  permanent  inter- 
national Commission,  "charged  with  over- 
seeing the  execution  of  the  dispositions  of  the 
present  convention."  The  Commission  is  com- 
pK)sed  of  one  delegate  from  each  of  the  con- 
tracting states;  it  has  its  seat  at  Brussels.  Its 
functions  are:  (a)  to  determine  whether  in  the 
signatory  states  there  is  accorded  any  direct 
or  indirect  bounty  on  the  production  or  exporta- 
tion of  sugar;  (6)  to  determine  whether  the 
contracting  states  which  are  not  exporters — i.  e., 
Spain,  Italy,  and  Sweden — and  which  were  there- 
fore accorded  certain  exemptions  from  the  gen- 
eral requirements  of  the  Convention,  continue 
to  be  non-exporters.  If  the  Commission  de- 
cides, by  majority  vote,  that  one  of  these  has 

121 


INTERNATIONAL  ADMINISTRATION 

become  an  exporting  state,  the  state  must 
within  one  year  adapt  its  legislation  to  the 
general  provisions  of  the  Convention;  (c)  to 
determine  the  existence  of  bounties  in  non- 
signatory  states  and  the  amount  of  the  com- 
pensatory duties,  which  all  signatory  states 
must  then  put  into  effect  within  two  months; 
(d)  to  give  advisory  decisions  on  questions  in 
controversy;  (e)  to  determine  upon  requests 
for  admission  to  the  Union  on  the  part  of 
states  which  are  not  yet  members,  and,  if  ad- 
mission seems  advisable,  to  give  due  form  to 
such  requests;  (/)  to  authorize  by  a  majority 
vote  the  levy  of  an  increased  surtax  (the  increase 
not  to  exceed  one  franc  per  hundred  kilograms) 
by  any  one  of  the  contracting  states  against  the 
sugar  of  another  by  which  its  markets  are  being 
flooded  to  the  serious  injury  of  its  own  na- 
tional production;  and  (g)  to  determine  the 
method  of  apportioning  among  the  member 
states  its  own  expenses  and  those  of  the  Per- 
manent Bureau.^ 

A  striking  feature  of  the  Commission  is  that 
it  is  given  power  to  act  by  a  majority  vote. 
The  usual  diplomatic  requirement  of  unanimity 
is  thus  brushed  aside  in  the  interest  of  eflBciency ; 
the  result  adds  immeasurably  to  the  power 
and  effectiveness  of  the  Commission.  Thus  it 
may  come  about  that  an  individual  state  may 

122 


POWER  OVER  MEMBER  STATES 

be  compelled  to  alter  or  modify  a  tariflF  quite 
against  its  own  sovereign  wishes.^ 

It  will  be  seen  that  through  the  determina- 
tions of  the  Sugar  Commission,  from  which 
there  is  no  appeal  to  any  higher  body,*  the 
member  states  are  directly  controlled  in  the 
vital  matter  of  the  fixing  of  their  sugar  tariffs, 
and  the  conforming  of  their  legislation  to  the 
dispositions  of  the  Convention.  If,  for  instance, 
the  Commission  votes  that  bounties  are  directly 
or  indirectly  being  given  in  any  country,  all 
the  signatory  states  as  a  result  are  compelled 
to  raise  their  duties  upon  sugar  coming  from 
that  country  to  an  amount  at  least  equal  to 
the  bounties.  As  Reinsch  says:  "The  Sugar 
Commission  is  the  only  international  organ 
which  has  a  right,  through  its  determinations 
and  decisions,  to  cause  a  direct  modification 
of  the  laws  existing  in  the  individual  treaty 
states,  within  the  dispositions  of  the  Conven- 
tion."^ In  view  of  the  sensitiveness  of  states  in 
regard  to  any  compromise  of  their  sovereignty, 
it  is  not  surprising  that  those  who  objected 
to  the  Sugar  Convention  should  have  based 
their  protests  upon  the  ground  that  it  con- 
stituted an  impairment  of  sovereignty.  This 
"police  court,"  said  one  writer,  is  "to  declare 

*  Appeal  for  a  reconsideration  may,  in  certain  cases,  be  made 
to  the  Commission  itself. 

123 


INTERNATIONAL  ADMINISTRATION 

what  duty  Great  Britain  must  impose  to 
*  countervail'  any  sugar  that  may  arrive  from 
those  states.  .  .  .  For  us  it  seems  to  lay  up  a 
store  of  trouble — not  to  enlarge  on  the  indignity 
of  our  new  protective  customs  duties  being 
fixed  for  us  by  foreign  states."' 

So  unusual  are  the  powers  accorded  to  the 
International  Sugar  Commission,  and  so  im- 
portant have  been  its  accomplishments  within 
the  domain  of  sugar  legislation,  that  an  exam- 
ination of  its  operation  and  its  history  will  not 
be  out  of  place. 

Its  first  session  took  place  from  June  2, 
1903,  to  March  14,  1904.  At  this  session  it 
was  voted  that  ordinary  meetings  should  be 
held  twice  every  year.  Action  was  taken  also 
Upon  the  application  for  admission  to  the  Union 
of  Luxemburg,  Peru,  and  Russia;  and  a  careful 
study  was  made  of  the  sugar  legislation  of 
signatory  and  non-signatory  states.  As  a  result 
France,  Austria,  and  Himgary  were  compelled 
to  make  several  modifications  in  their  sugar 
regime.  Bounties  were  declared  to  exist  in 
other  countries,  such  as  the  Argentine,  Costa 
Rica,  the  Dominican  Republic,  etc.,  and  com- 
pensatory duties  were  declared  against  them.^ 

The  second  session  of  the  Conference  lasted 
from  October  10  to  October  22,  1904,  and  de- 
voted itself  to  a  further  study  of  sugar  legisla- 


POWER  OVER  MEMBER  STATES 

tion  and  the  application  of  the  penal  clause.  It 
also  considered  the  request  of  Russia  and  Switz- 
erland for  admission  to  the  Union  under  special 
dispensations,  but  took  no  final  action  thereon. 

Up  to  this  time  the  Sugar  Coivention  had 
worked  smoothly  and  well.  But  its  very  suc- 
cess in  the  attainment  of  the  object  for  which  it 
was  created — i.  e.,  the  abolition  of  the  sugar 
bounties  among  the  signatory  states — aroused 
among  certain  interests  in  England  a  feeling  of 
dissatisfaction.  The  abolition'  of  the  bounties 
meant  a  consequent  elevation  in  the  price  of 
imported  sugars;  and  the  sugar-importing  in- 
terests began  to  bring  pressure  to  bear  upon 
the  Government.  From  February  27,  1905, 
when  a  public  protest  was  voiced  against  the 
Sugar  Commission,  until  England's  final  with- 
drawal from  the  Convention  under  the  pressure 
of  public  opinion,  the  work  of  the  Commission 
was  constantly  hampered  by  English  opposition. 

In  the  session  of  April  6-11, 1905,  the  English 
delegate  complained  that  the  Commission  had 
gone  too  far  in  fixing  a  compensatory  duty 
against  every  country  with  a  surtax  above  that 
allowed  in  the  Union  (under  Aj-t.  3),  since  the 
high  surtax  might  not  necessarily  be  used  for 
"dumping"  purposes,  and  requested  an  apj>eal 
from  some  of  the  former  decisions  of  the  Com- 
mission rendered  upon  that  basis.    The  Com- 

125 


INTERNATIONAL  ADMINISTRATION 

mission  assented;  and  the  reconsideration  oc- 
cupied the  entire  session  of  April  6-11,  1905, 
and  also  the  fall  session  of  October  23-26,  1905, 
and  resulted  in  the  revoking  of  a  certain  num- 
ber of  compensatory  duties. 

From  that  time  on  the  constant  fear  of  Eng- 
land's withdrawal  and  the  consequent  danger 
of  the  dissolution  of  the  Union  tended  to 
weaken  the  action  of  the  Commission.  Brazil, 
Mexico,  Cuba,  and  Venezuela  were  all  able  to 
escape  the  levy  of  compensatory  duties;  only 
Mozambique  was  visited  with  the  penalty.* 

The  question  of  admitting  Switzerland  under 
special  dispensation  was  considered  at  the 
sessions  of  October  23-26,  1905,  and  December 
9-10,  1906.  Switzerland  was  admitted  under 
the  special  terms  of  the  protocol  of  June  26, 
1906,^  whereby  she  was  released  from  the  ob- 
ligations of  Art.  2  and  3  of  the  Sugar  Con- 
vention, as  long  as  she  exported  no  sugar; 
and  her  delegate  was  given  a  seat,  but  no  vote 
in  the  Permanent  Commission. 

At  the  seventh  session  of  the  Permanent  Com- 
mission, which  opened  with  its  forty-ninth  sit- 
ting, on  June  6,  1907,  the  English  delegate 
declared  the  intention  of  his  Government  to 
withdraw  from  the  Union  from  September  1, 
1908,  unless  Great  Britain  should  be  released 

*  In  February,  1910. 

126 


POWER  OVER  MEMBER  STATES 

from  the  obligation  of  Art.  4,^**  which  re- 
quires the  imposition  of  compensatory  duties 
against  sugar  coming  from  countries  granting 
sugar  bounties.  England  was  feeling  the  effect 
of  the  higher  sugar  prices,  and  was  also  smart- 
ing under  the  retaliatory  duties  imposed  upon 
British  Ceylon  and  Indian  teas  by  Russia  in 
return  for  the  English  compensatory  duties 
upyon  Russian  bounty-fed  sugars.  The  session 
was  suspended,  and  a  new  basis  of  agreement 
was  talked  over;  on  the  reconvening  of  the 
session  on  July  25,  26,  and  27,  an  agreement 
was  established  which  took  the  form  of  the 
Additional  Act  of  August  28,  1907.*  Under 
this  act  Great  Britain  was  released  from  the 
obligation  of  applying  the  penal  clause  of  Art. 
4  of  the  1902  Convention;  and  all  sugars  ex- 
ported from  England  were  to  be  accompanied 
by  a  certificate  of  origin  certifying  that  they 
did  not  originate  in  countries  granting  bounties. 
In  the  session  commencing  on  November  18, 
1907,  an  agreement  was  reached  concerning  the 
accession  of  Russia.  By  the  protocol  of  ac- 
cession, signed  on  December  19,  1907,^^  Russia 
was  allowed  to  retain  her  system  of  sugar 
bounties,  but  was  required  to  restrict  within 
definite  limits  the  amount  of  her  sugar  exports, 
which  after  the  first  year  were  not  to  exceed 

*  For  the  text  of  this  Act  see  Appendix  C,  p.  199. 
9  127 


INTERNATIONAL  ADMINISTRATION 

the  annual  amount  of  200,000  tons.  Great 
Britain  was  not  a  signatory  to  this  protocol, 
because,  as  was  pointed  out  by  the  British 
delegate,  since  England  could  now  freely 
admit  Russian  bounty-fed  sugars,  she  was 
not  interested  in  the  restrictions  of  Russian 
exportation. 

At  the  sessions  of  November,  1907,  and  De- 
cember, 1908,  Russia  requested  the  Commis- 
sion without  success  to  allow  it  exceptional 
permission  to  exceed  the  200,000-ton  limit,  in 
the  event  of  serious  European  sugar  shortages. 
Such  sugar  shortages,  owing  to  poor  beet  crops, 
occurred  in  the  following  years  and  consid- 
erably raised  the  price  of  sugar  in  the  European 
markets;  Russia,  on  the  contrary,  had  an  over- 
supply  of  sugar  which  in  1911  amounted  to 
500,000  tons,  and  which  under  the  convention 
she  was  not  allowed  to  export.  Therefore, 
in  the  session  which  opened  on  October  26, 
1911,  Russia  found  the  situation  favorable 
for  demanding  permission  to  increase  her  ex- 
ports. The  English  delegate  gave  hearty  sup- 
port to  the  Russian  demands;  the  continental 
delegates,  on  the  other  hand,  generally  agreed 
that  if  Russia  desired  to  remain  a  member  of 
the  Union  after  the  present  agreement  expired, 
she  must  abolish  her  sugar  bounties  and  con- 
form to  the  general  provisions  of  the  Conven- 

128 


POWER  OVER  MEMBER  STATES 

tion.  The  session  was  suspended  till  December 
8,  1911;  when  it  reconvened  it  again  took  up 
the  question  of  Russia,  debating  various  pro- 
posals. Again  the  meeting  was  suspended  until 
January  27,  1912,  and  then  successively  to 
February  26  and  to  March  15,  1912.  An 
Accord  was  finally  signed  on  March  17,  1912.^^ 
It  renewed  the  Union  for  another  five  years, 
up  to  September  1,  1918,  with  the  same  con- 
ditions as  before.  Russia,  however,  was  author- 
ized to  make  in  1911-12  an  extra  exportation 
of  150,000  tons,  and  during  each  of  the  seasons 
of  1912-13  and  1913-14  to  export  an  extra 
50,000  tons.  Because  of  the  refusal  of  the 
Union  to  allow  Russia  a  larger  increase  of  her 
exports,  Great  Britain,  as  had  long  been  ex- 
pected, withdrew  from  the  Convention  from 
September  1,  1913,  and  Italy  followed  her 
example.  ^^ 

The  British  withdrawal  must  not  be  inter- 
preted as  giving  proof  of  any  inherent  defects 
or  failure  in  the  international  organization  of 
the  Sugar  Union.  The  original  convention  had 
been  entered  into  for  a  period  of  five  years  only, 
and  had  later  been  prolonged  for  another  like 
term.  When  the  question  arose  of  renewing 
it  for  a  third  five-year  period,  it  was  only 
natural  that  Great  Britain  should  hesitate.  The 

Convention  had  been  written  primarily  in  the 
129 


INTERNATIONAL  ADMINISTRATION 

interests  of  the  sugar-producing  nations,  in 
order  to  do  away  with  the  bounty  system  which 
was  proving  so  costly  to  all  exporting  govern- 
ments. England,  however,  as  distinct  from  her 
colonies,  constituted  a  sugar-consuming  nation. 
She  reasoned  that  her  withdrawal  would  not 
cause  the  reappearance  of  the  continental 
sugar  bounties  and  thus  impair  the  usefulness 
of  the  Union;  hence,  in  spite  of  strong  protests 
from  several  of  her  colonies,  she  refused  to  re- 
new the  Convention,  which,  in  the  opinion  of 
many  of  her  leaders,  was  disadvantageous  to 
her  own  financial  interests. 

The  obvious  difference  which  lies  between 
membership  in  the  Sugar  Union  and  member- 
ship in  any  League  of  Nations  which  is  effective 
and  powerful  need  hardly  be  pointed  out.  The 
former  is  of  immediate  concern  only  to  sugar- 
exporting  states,  whereas  the  latter  would  be 
of  such  supreme  imp>ortance  to  every  state,  re- 
gardless of  political  conditions  or  local  interests, 
that  it  could  not  be  lightly  discarded  by  any. 
The  experience  of  the  last  few  years  has  dra- 
matically shown  that  no  single  nation  can  hope 
to  stand  out  against  the  ordered  progress  and 
opinion  of  the  world. 

That  an  international  commission,  with 
power  to  control  so  difficult  and  complicated 
a  matter  as  sugar  legislation,  could  exist  at  all 

130 


POWER  OVER  MEMBER  STATES 

is  not  without  significance,*  and  that  it  has 
proved  so  effective  is  a  matter  of  the  keenest 
interest  to  students  of  international  organiza- 
tion. The  work  of  the  Commission  has  proved 
that  where  sufficient  power  is  granted,  an  effec- 
tive international  organization  is  by  no  means 
chimerical. 

2, — International  River  Commissions 

Other  examples  of  international  organizations 
of  the  third  type,  having  power  in  regard  to  the 
member  states  themselves,  are  the  International 
River  Commissions.  These  are  usually  em- 
powered to  make  regulations  for  the  navigation 
of  rivers  separating  or  flowing  through  several 
states,  and  are  composed  of  representatives  of 
all  the  riparian  states.f    The  navigation  legu- 

*  It  is  interesting  to  note  that  in  spite  of  the  opposing  interests 
of  the  countries  represented,  the  delegates,  in  the  performance 
of  their  diflBcult  tasks,  showed  a  marked  consideration  for  one 
another's  feelings  and  interests.  ..."  The  delegates  have  always 
given  proof  of  their  sound  judgment  and  prudence,  and  of  the 
greatest  solicitude  for  the  economic  interests  of  all  the  states,  both 
signatory  and  non-signatory.  .  .  .  The  Commission,  then,  consti- 
tutes a  happy  experiment,  from  which  it  will  be  possible  in  the 
future  to  draw  inspiration  which  may  prove  useful  in  other  fields  of 
international  law."  (Translated  from  Andre,  in  Revue  Generate 
de  Droit  Int.  Public,  Vol.  XIX,  p.  688.) 

t  It  will  be  seen  that  these  are  closely  related  to  River  Com- 
missions of  the  second  type.  The  Danube  European  Commis- 
sion is  an  example  of  the  second,  rather  than  the  third,  type  be- 
cause it  is  composed  of  representatives,  not  of  the  riparian  states, 
but  of  the  leading  Powers  of  Europe.  The  short-lived  Danube 
Riparian  Commission  of  1856  was  an  example  of  this  third  type. 

131 


INTERNATIONAL  ADMINISTRATION 

lations  thus  made,  however,  are  usually  valid 
only  after  having  been  rep)orted  back  to  the 
member  states  and  approved  by  all.  Although, 
in  comparison  with  the  Sugar  Commission, 
their  executive  and  legislative  powers  are  not 
very  extensive,  they  have  nevertheless  proved 
extremely  serviceable  within  the  restricted  scope 
allowed  to  them.  A  series  of  very  successful 
commissions  of  this  type  has  exercised  super- 
vision over  the  Rhine  ever  since  1804. 

Prior  to  that  time  navigation  upon  the  Rhine, 
which  then  formed  the  boundary  between 
France  and  a  number  of  German  states,  had 
become  so  precarious  and  costly,  owing  to  the 
extortionate  demands  and  tolls  of  the  Rhine 
cities  and  provinces,  that  an  international  treaty 
to  put  an  end  to  the  abuse  became  almost  a 
necessity.  Accordingly,  a  treaty  was  entered 
into  on  August  15,  1804,^^  between  France  and 
the  Holy  Roman  Empire;*  this  substituted  uni- 
form and  fixed  Rhine  tolls  and  regulations  for 
the  diversified  and  harassing  local  levies  and 
regulations  which  had  existed  up  to  that  time, 
and  provided  that  the  new  tolls  should  be  paid 
into  a  central  treasury.    From  the  money  thus 


*  The  Holy  Roman  Empire  was  the  only  political  bond  which 
at  that  time  existed  between  the  separate  German  states;  this 
was  a  federation  of  the  loosest  kind,  each  German  state  retain- 
ing its  full  sovereignty  except  in  a  few  sharply  defined  matters. 

132 


POWER  OVER  MEMBER  STATES 

collected  were  to  be  deducted  the  expenses  of 
the  River  Commission  and  of  the  upkeep  of  the 
towpaths;  of  the  balance  half  was  to  be  paid 
to  France,  and  the  remainder  to  certain  German 
princes.  In  order  to  secure  the  due  carrying  out 
of  the  terms  of  the  treaty,  Art.  43  provided 
for  an  administrative  officer  called  the  Director- 
General  of  the  tolls;  he  was  charged  with  di- 
recting and  overseeing  the  imposition  and  col- 
lection of  the  tolls,  maintaining  uniformity, 
and  executing  generally  the  treaty  provisions. 
He  was  appointed  by  agreement  between  the 
contracting  parties,  and  took  his  oath  of  office 
to  both  the  French  Government  and  the  Arch- 
Chancellor  of  the  Roman  Empire.  He  was 
assisted  by  four  inspectors,  two  appointed  by 
the  French  Government  and  two  by  the  Ger- 
man Arch-Chancellor.  These  were  to  watch 
over  the  navigability  of  the  Rhine,  to  see  that 
the  towpaths  were  kept  in  repair,  to  see  that 
the  stipulations  of  the  Convention  were  ob- 
served in  the  fixing  and  collection  of  duties,  and 
to  report  on  all  offenses  against  the  navigation 
police  and  the  collection  of  tolls.  An  inter- 
national Commission  was  created,  to  meet  once 
a  year  at  Mayence,  composed  of  the  local 
prefect  as  commissioner  of  the  French  Gov- 
ernment,   a   commissioner   appointed    by    the 

German  Arch-Chancellor,   and  a  jurist   who 
133 


INTERNATIONAL  ADMINISTRATION 

lived  on  the  Rhine,  chosen  by  the  other  two 
commissioners.  The  president  was  to  be  alter- 
nately the  French  and  the  German  commis- 
sioner. Appeals  from  the  toll  officials  in  matters 
of  tolls  collection  or  river  police  were  to  be 
brought  before  this  Commission,  which  was 
empowered  to  render  definitive  judgment. 

This  treaty  of  1804  was  superseded  by  the 
provisions  of  Annex  XVI  of  the  Final  Act  of 
the  Congress  of  Vienna  of  June  9,  1815.^^ 
Art.  10  of  the  Regulations  for  the  Navigation 
of  the  Rhine,  attached  to  this  Annex,  provided 
that  "in  order  to  establish  a  perfect  control 
over  the  observance  of  the  general  regulation, 
and  to  constitute  an  authority  which  may  serve 
as  a  means  of  communication  between  the 
states  of  the  Rhine,  upon  all  subjects  relating 
to  navigation,  a  central  Commission  shall  be 
appointed.'*  This  Commission,  composed  of  one 
representative  from  each  state  bordering  on 
the  Rhine,  was  to  meet  yearly  at  Mayence  on 
the  first  of  November,  and  also  in  the  spring, 
if  necessary.  The  president  was  to  be  chosen 
by  ballot,  and  replaced  each  month  in  case 
the  session  should  be  prolonged.  The  Commis- 
sion was  to  keep  watch  over  the  navigability  of 
the  river,  to  supervise  the  work  of  the  river 
inspectors,  and  to  "attend  to  all  matters  that 
may  contribute  to  the  general  interests  of  navi- 

134 


POWER  OVER  MEMBER  STATES 

gation  and  commerce."  It  was  also  to  hear 
appeals  carried  up  from  the  Rhine  courts,  con- 
cerning navigation  or  river  police.  It  acted 
upon  a  majority  of  votes;  and  each  state  was 
entitled  to  one  vote  except  when  appointing 
or  removing  river  inspectors.  The  votes  of 
the  Commission,  however,  were  not  to  bind 
the  states  of  the  Rhine  until  the  consent  of 
the  latter  should  have  been  given  to  the  com- 
missioners. A  chief  inspector  and  three  depu- 
ties were  created  "in  order  that  a  permanent 
authority  may  exist,  which,  in  the  absence  of 
the  Central  Commission,  may  superintend  the 
observance  of  the  regulation,  and  to  which  the 
merchants  and  boatmen  may  at  all  times  refer." 
An  exceedingly  interesting  arrangement  was 
devised  for  the  election  of  these  river  inspectors. 
Prussia  with  considerable  reason  advanced  the 
view  that,  whereas  in  the  judicial  and  legislative 
work  of  the  Commission  each  riparian  state 
should  be  accorded  an  equal  right  to  represen- 
tation and  a  single  vote,  yet,  in  administrative 
matters,  since  some  states  possessed  far  more 
of  the  river-bank  than  others,  it  would  be  only 
fair  to  weight,  or  value,  the  votes.  Accordingly, 
while  each  state  was  given  a  single  vote  of  equal 
value  in  all  legislative  and  judicial  matters,  in 
the  appointment  of  the  chief  and  deputy  river 
inspectors,  who  constituted  the  main  admin- 

135 


INTERNATIONAL  ADMINISTRATION 

istrative  functionaries  of  the  river,  it  was  pro- 
vided that  voting  power  should  be  roughly 
proportioned  to  "the  extent  of  their  respective 
possessions  on  the  bank."^^  Thus  it  came  about 
that  in  the  choice  of  the  chief  inspector  the 
commissioners  were  entitled  to  the  following 
proportion  of  votes:  Prussia,  one-third;  France, 
one-sixth;  the  Netherlands,  one-sixth;  and  the 
Geiman  states,  except  Prussia,  one-third.  The 
deputy  inspectors  were  to  be  chosen,  one  by 
Prussia,  one  by  the  other  German  states,  and 
one  alternately  by  France  and  the  Netherlands. 
The  duties  of  these  inspectors  were  to  super- 
intend the  river  regulations  and  the  police  work 
along  the  river,  to  have  supervision  over  the 
local  oflBcers.  and  to  report  to  the  Central  Com- 
mission. 

Another  interesting  provision  in  the  treaty  of 
1815  was  the  creation  of  the  "Rhine  Courts,'* 
one  of  which  was  "attached  to  each  office 
where  duties  are  collected,  for  the  purpose  of 
investigating  and  determining  agreeably  to  the 
regulation,  in  the  first  instance,  all  disputes" 
relating  to  river  navigation.  These  included  all 
such  matters  as  disputes  arising  from  the  col- 
lection of  tolls,  breaches  of  river  regulations, 
contests  between  boatmen,  suits  for  damages 
from  collisions,  etc.  The  judges  of  these  special 
courts  of  restricted  jurisdiction  were  appointed 

136 


POWER  OVER  MEMBER  STATES 

by  the  local  sovereigns  and  made  directly  re- 
sponsible to  them;  but  the  individual  judges 
took  oath  strictly  to  observe  the  Rhine  regu- 
lations, and  it  was  specially  provided  that  they 
could  not  be  displaced  "unless  by  a  regular 
and  formal  process  and  by  a  judgment  given 
against  them.'*  Those  wishing  to  appeal  from 
the  decisions  of  these  Rhine  Courts  were  given 
the  option  of  applying  either  to  superior  tribu- 
nals situated  in  the  same  districts  and  similarly 
sworn  to  observe  the  Rhine  regulations,  or  to 
the  Central  Commission,  previously  described. 
This  power  of  appeal  to  the  Central  Commis- 
sion was  a  very  substantial  right;  it  put  an 
effectual  check  upon  attempts  by  local  oflBcials 
to  treat  outsiders  and  foreigners  oppressively 
or  unjustly;  and  the  local  influence  of  the  pro- 
vision was  thus  of  large  importance. 

A  dispute  having  arisen  between  the  Ger- 
man states  and  the  Netherlands,  a  new  treaty 
was  signed  at  Mayence  on  March  31,  1831,  be- 
tween France,  the  Netherlands,  and  the  Ger- 
man states  bordering  upon  the  Rhine."  This 
treaty  again  retained  the  "Central  Com- 
mission" of  the  Rhine.^^  This  was  to  be 
formed  of  one  commissioner  from  each  riparian 
state,  and  was  to  meet  on  July  1st  each  year  at 
Mayence,  and  again  in  the  autumn,  if  necessary. 
It  was  to  choose  its  president  by  lot.    It  was  to 

137 


INTERNATIONAL  ADMINISTRATION 

appoint  and  have  supervision  over  the  chief 
inspector  of  the  river.  Its  functions  were  to 
see  that  the  regulations  of  the  convention  were 
put  into  execution,  to  propose  new  regulations 
to  the  member  states,  to  push  the  execution 
of  the  works  for  improving  the  navigability  of 
the  river,  to  turn  in  reports,  and  to  act  as  a 
court  of  last  resort  on  the  appeals  carried  before 
it.  It  was  to  act  by  a  majority  of  votes,  which 
were  of  equal  value;  but  its  decisions  did  not  be- 
come binding  until  ratified  by  the  signatory 
states.  The  chief  inspector  was  appointed  for 
life  by  the  River  Commission  in  the  same  manner 
as  previously.^^  He  was  to  hear  and  endeavor 
to  settle  complaints  from  all  parties  relative 
to  river  navigation,  which  could  be  carried  in 
the  first  instance  either  to  the  local  courts  or 
to  the  river  inspectors.  If  the  complaint 
seemed  well  founded,  he  was  to  bring  the  mat- 
ter to  the  attention  of  the  provincial  authori- 
ties; failing  justice  there,  he  was  to  take  the 
case  before  the  Central  Commission.  These 
provisions  show  how  effective  an  influence  over 
local  functionaries  was  conferred  upon  the 
chief  inspector,  although  it  is  to  be  noted  that 
final  control  over  local  authorities  in  river 
matters  was  vested,  not  in  the  insi>ector,  but 
in  the  Central  Commission.  The  inspector 
was  also  to  keep  the  Commission  informed  at 

138 


POWER  OVER  MEMBER  STATES 

each  session  as  to  the  needs  and  defects  of 
river  navigation.  The  existence  of  the  special 
Rhine  tribunals  was  continued  under  this  treaty. 

The  results  of  the  Austro-Prussian  War  of 
1866  necessitated  the  making  of  still  another 
treaty;  this  was  signed  on  October  17,  1868,  by 
France,  the  Netherlands,  Prussia,  Bavaria, 
Baden,  and  Hesse,^°  and  is  still  in  force  to-day.^^ 
The  new  treaty  again  preserved  the  Central 
Rhine  Commission,  composed  of  one  delegate 
from  each  riparian  state.  Under  the  new  treaty 
the  Commission  is  to  meet  in  August  annually, 
and  to  have  extra  sessions  upon  the  request  of 
one  state.  The  president  is  to  be  designated 
by  lot  for  each  meeting,  and  in  case  of  judg- 
ment on  appeal,  he  is  to  have  a  casting  vote. 
The  Commission  examines  all  complaints  aris- 
ing from  the  application  of  the  convention;  it 
takes  cou  sel  on  the  propositions  of  the  govern- 
ments to  improve  navigation;  it  makes  an 
annual  report  up>on  the  state  of  navigation;  it 
executes  the  common  river  regulations;  and 
it  decides  appeals  carried  to  it  from  the  Rhine 
Courts.  It  acts  by  a  majority  of  votes,  which  are 
of  equal  value,  but,  as  in  the  case  of  the  previous 
treaties,  its  resolutions  are  not  obligatory  until 
after  approval  by  the  signatory  governments. 

The  principal  change  effected  by  this  treaty 
was  the  abolition  of  the  Rhine  River  tolls,  due 

139 


INTERNATIONAL  ADMINISTRATION 

to  Prussia's  desire  to  consolidate  and  unify  the 
German  states.  The  chief  river  inspector, 
who  had  largely  outlived  his  usefulness,  was 
dropped  from  this  treaty.  This  appreciably 
diminished  the  executive  power  of  the  Com- 
mission; for  although  the  former  inspection 
districts  were  continued  and  the  local  inspect- 
ors still  required  to  report  to  the  Central  Com- 
mission, yet,  since  they  were  appointed  and 
paid  by  the  governments  in  whose  territory 
they  acted,  they  were  not  likely  to  prove  in- 
dependent. The  Rhine  Courts,  however,  were 
continued,  and  the  jxjwer  of  optional  api>eal 
from  these  courts,  either  to  the  local  courts  or 
to  the  Central  Commission,  was  maintained. 
The  number  of  appeals  actually  carried  before 
the  Central  Commission  is  comparatively  small, 
but  the  mere  existence  of  this  power  has  a  large 
influence  upon  local  administration. 

Although  France  has,  of  course,  appointed 
no  delegate  since  1871,  the  treaty  of  1868  was 
still  in  effective  op>eration  up  to  the  outbreak 
of  the  European  War.^^ 

In  all  these  Rhine  treaties  of  1804,  1815, 
1831,  and  1868  the  principle  of  an  interna- 
tional Commission  to  supervise  the  improve- 
ment of  navigation,  to  administer  common  river 
regulations,  and  to  hear  appeals  in  complaints 
regarding  navigation  or  river  police  has  been 

140 


POWER  OVER  MEMBER  STATES 

constantly  and  successfully  maintained.  Al- 
though changing  national  boundaries  and  polit- 
ical conditions  necessitated  alterations  in  the 
method  of  appK)intment  of  the  commissioners 
and  in  the  details  of  the  river  arrangements, 
the  principle  of  the  international  commission 
was  found  to  work  so  well  that  it  was  retained 
in  each  succeeding  treaty,  and  still  obtains  to- 
day. No  better  proof  of  its  success  could  be 
had.  The  general  functions  of  the  Central 
Commission,  it  is  true,  are  executive  and  judi- 
cial rather  than  legislative.  The  river  regula- 
tions are  for  the  most  part  made  by  common 
agreement  between  the  riparian  states;  the 
Commission  administers  them  and  hears  ap- 
peals arising  from  their  execution.  Neverthe- 
less, it  has  been  extremely  influential  even  in 
a  legislative  way,  in  suggesting  measures  for 
river  regulation;  and,  quite  apart  from  its 
large  judicial  and  executive  functions,  has 
proved  itself  invaluable  as  a  meeting-ground 
to  settle  by  intimate  discussion  questions  aris- 
ing from  the  navigation  of  the  Rhine.  The 
International  Rhine  Commission  may  be  re- 
garded, therefore,  as  one  of  the  examples  of  an 
international  executive  organ  with  power,  which 
has  been  attended  with  real  success.* 

*  The  txeaty  of  May  18,  1815,  between  Prussia  and  Saxony 
provided  (Art.  17)  for  the  creation  of  a  Commission  to  regulate 

141 


INTERNATIONAL  ADMINISTRATION 

NOTES 

*  Martens,  N.  R.  G.  (2nd  Series),  Vol.  XXXI, 
p.  272. 

^  Hertslet's  Commercial  Treaties, \o\.  XXV,  p.  547. 

^Acceded  December  19,  1907.  Hertslet's  Com- 
mercial Treaties,  Vol.  XXV,  p.  1050. 

''Politis,  in  his  article  upon  "L'Organisation  de 
L'Union  Internationale  des  Sucres"  in  the  Revue  de 
Science  et  de  Legislation  financieres"  for  January- 

the  navigation  of  the  Elbe,  in  accordance  with  the  general  prin- 
ciples adopted  at  the  Congress  of  Vienna.  By  the  treaty  of  June 
23,  1821  (Martens,  Nouveau  Recueil,  Vol.  V,  p.  714)  between 
Austria,  Denmark,  Great  Britain,  Prussia,  Saxony,  Hanover, 
Mecklenburg-Schwerin,  and  other  German  states,  the  naviga- 
tion of  the  Elbe  was  declared  to  be  entirely  free  with  respect  to 
commerce;  and  to  secure  this  end  a  Commission  was  provided  for 
(Art.  30),  whose  members  should  be  appointed  by  the  riparian 
states,  and  whose  president  should  be  elected  by  a  majority  of 
votes.  The  objects  and  powers  of  this  Commission  were  "to 
watch  over  the  present  convention;  to  form  itself  into  a  com- 
mittee for  the  settlement  of  any  dififerences  which  may  arise  be- 
tween the  states  bordering  on  the  river,  and  to  determine  upon 
the  measures  which  by  experience  may  be  found  to  be  necessary 
to  the  improvement  of  commerce  and  navigation." 

See  also  the  treaty  between  Austria,  Modena,  and  Parma  of 
July  3,  1849,  conunitting  the  regulation  of  the  navigation  of 
the  Po  to  an  international  Commission. 

Also,  the  treaty  of  Bucharest  of  December  3/l5,  1866  (Recueil 
des  Traites  d'Autriche-Hongrie,  Vol.  XX,  N.  S.,  p.  452),  be- 
tween Austria,  Russia,  and  the  Danubian  principalities,  setting 
up  a  permanent  international  Commission  for  the  navigation  of 
the  Pnith,  a  tributary  of  the  Danube.  The  Commission  (Art.  7), 
composed  of  representatives  of  the  signatory  powers,  draws  up 
rules  of  navigation  which  form  the  law  for  civil  as  well  as  police 
cases,  fixes  the  tolls,  designs  and  carries  out  the  works  of  improve- 
ment in  the  channel  of  the  river,  and  supervises  the  maintenance 
of  navigability  and  the  application  of  the  regulations.  By  com- 
mon agreement  it  appoints  an  inspector,  who  supervises  the  col- 

142 


POWER  OVER  MEMBER  STATES 

March,  1904,  classifies  the  power  of  the  Sugar  Cora- 
mission,  roughly,  as  follows: 

I.  "Consultative  Attributes.'* 

(a)  Makes  a  report  on  all  questions  sub- 
mitted to  it  to  the  interested  Powers 
(Art.  7). 

(b)  Proposes  necessary  measures  to  prevent 
bounty-fed  sugars  which  have  been  car- 
ried through  a  member  state  from  enjoy- 
ing the  advantages  of  the  Convention  in 
the  ultimate  market  (Art.  8). 

(c)  Furnishes  its  advice  on  controversial 
questions  (Art.  7). 

(d)  Determines  whether  or  not  bounties, 
direct  or  indirect,  are  being  given  in  mem- 
ber states  (Art.  7). 

II.  "Executory  Decisions." 

(a)  Determines  whether  or  not  Italy  and 
Sweden  (both  being  signatories)  are  ex- 
porting sugar,  and,  therefore,  subject  to 
certain  restrictions  (Art.  7). 


lection  of  the  tolls,  and  who  has  an  international  character.  The 
governments  keep  close  control  of  the  Commission,  and  its  regu- 
lations and  plan  of  river  improvement  must  be  approved  by  them. 

See  also  the  treaty  of  August  31,  1835,  between  Spain  and 
Portugal,  regulating  the  navigation  of  the  river  Douro,  and  pro- 
viding for  a  Mixed  Commission  to  regulate  navigation  dues  and 
the  policing  of  the  river.  (See  Coleccidn  de  los  Tratados  [of  Spain] 
■por  el  Marques  de  Olevart,  Vol.  I,  p.  70.)  The  Commission  is  to 
be  composed  of  four  members,  two  to  be  named  by  each  Govern- 
ment (Art.  4).  It  has  power  to  fix  the  river  tariflF;  and  this 
cannot  be  altered  by  either  state  except  through  common  agree- 
ment (Art.  6). 

10  1*8 


INTERNATIONAL  ADMINISTRATION 

(b)  Determines  whether  or  not  bounties  exist 
in  non-signatory  states,  and,  if  so,  how 
great  (Art.  7). 

(c)  Passes  on  requests  for  admission  to  the 
Union  by  non-signatory  states  (Arts.  7  and 
9). 

(d)  Nominates  the  permanent  Bureau. 

(e)  Fixes  the  amount  of  expenses  of  itself 
and  the  permanent  Bureau,  and  decides  on 
the  method  of  apportionment  of  these  ex- 
penses among  the  signatory  states  (Art.  7). 

(f)  Has  power  to  authorize  the  increase  of 
the  sugar  tariff  in  exceptional  cases  by 
certain  states.     (Final  protocol.) 

^  For  British  Act  of  Parliament  of  August  11, 1903, 
for  putting  the  Sugar  Convention  into  effect,  see 
British  and  For.  State  Papers,  Vol.  XCVI,  p.  108. 
For  French  legislation  to  the  same  effect,  see  ibid., 
p.  313. 

For  a  good  account  of  the  Sugar  Commission  see 
R.  G.  D.  I.  P.,  Vol.  XIX,  p.  665. 

^Reinsch,  Public  International  Unions,  p.  51. 

^^Quoted  from  an  article  by  Lough,  Thos.,  in  The 
Contemporary  Review,  Vol.  LXXXIII,  p.  82. 

*  See  British  and  For.  State  Papers,  Vol.  XCVI,  p. 
234,  for  British  Order  in  Council,  prohibiting  the 
importation  into  England  of  bounty-fed  sugars  from 
Denmark,  Russia,  and  the  Argentine,  in  accordance 
with  the  vote  of  the  Permanent  Commission.  "And 
whereas  it  appears  from  the  findings  of  the  Perma- 
nent Commission,  as  contained  in  Command  Paper 

144 


POWER  OVER  MEMBER  STATES 

1632,  presented  to  Parliament,  that  the  said  Per- 
manent Commission  has  reported  that  a  bounty 
on  the  exportation  of  sugars  is  granted  in  Denmark, 
Russia,  and  the  Argentine  RepubHc,  Now,  there- 
fore," etc. 

^Hertslet's  Commercial  Treaties,  Vol.  XXIV, 
p.  1043. 

*°Art.  4  reads  in  part  as  follows:  "Les  Hautes 
Parties  Contractantes  s'engagent  a  f rapper  d'un  droit 
special,  a  I'importation  sur  leur  territoire,  les  sucres 
originaires  de  pays  qui  accorderaient  des  primes  a 
la  production  ou  a  i'exportation. 

"Ce  droit  ne  pourra  etre  inferieur  au  montant  des 
primes,  directes  ou  indirectes,  accordees  dans  le 
pays  d'origine.  Les  Hautes  Parties  se  reservent  la 
faculte,  chacune  en  ce  qui  la  conceme,  de  prohiber 
I'importation  des  sucres  primes." 

^^  Hertslet's  Commercial  Treaties,  Vol.  XXV, 
p.  1050. 

^2  Martens,  N.  R.  G.  (3rd  Series),  Vol.  VI,  p.  7. 

For  an  account  of  the  sugar  situation  in  Russia 
prior  to  1912,  see  Viallate  et  Caudel,  La  Vie  Poli- 
tique, Vol.  VI  (1911-12),  p.  402. 

^^  See  the  British  notice  of  withdrawal  and  state- 
ment of  the  British  position  in  Hertslet's  Commercial 
Treaties,  Vol.  XXVI,  p.  356.  For  the  Italian  notice 
of  withdrawal  see  ibid.,  p.  729. 

The  proceedings  of  the  International  Sugar  Com- 
mission may  be  found  in  the  Reports  of  the  British 
delegate,  published  from  year  to  year  in  the  British 
Parliamentary  Accounts  and  Papers, 

145 


INTERNATIONAL  ADMINISTRATION 

For  the  Reports  and  correspondence  relating  to 
the  British  withdrawal,  see  British  Parliamentary 
Accounts  and  Papers  (1912-13),  Vol.  XCIII,  pp.  857, 
869,  and  957;  (1912-13),  Vol.  CXXI,  p.  83;  (1912- 
13),  Vol.  LX,  p.  279;  (1913),  Vol.  LXXXI,  p.  159. 

"  Martens,  Recueil  de  Traites,  Vol.  VIII,  p.  261. 

*^  Martens,  Nouveau  Recueil^  Vol.  II,  p.  414. 

*®  See  Art.  13. 

"  de  Clercq,  Recueil,  Vol.  IV,  p.  24. 

"  See  Title  IX. 

"  See  Art.  13  of  Annex  XVI  of  the  Treaty  of 
Vienna. 

2°  Martens,  N.  R.  (?.,  Vol.  XX,  p.  355. 

^*  Liszt,  Das  Volkerrecht  (10th  ed.),  p.  156. 

^*  See  the  Grerman  law  of  December  24,  1911, 
R.  G.  B.  (1911),  p.  1137,  concerning  the  improve- 
ment of  navigation  and  the  collection  of  tolls  for 
this  purpose  in  regard  to  the  Rhine,  the  Elbe,  and 
the  Weser. 

Because  of  Holland's  having  refused  her  consent, 
however,  Germany  has  been  unable  to  put  this  law 
into  effect. 


CHAPTER  VI 

CONCLUSIONS 

1. — Underlying  Reasons  for  Success  or  Failure 

TT  must  be  frankly  recognized  that  up  to  this 
■*  time  very  few  international  executive  organs 
with  p>ower  have  proved  successful.  The  reason, 
however,  is  not  to  be  sought  in  any  fundamental 
imp>ossibilities  in  international  government.  The 
true  explanation  lies  in  the  fact  that  hitherto 
nations,  loath  to  restrict  the  exercise  of  their 
own  sovereign  powers,  have  been  unwilling  to 
accord  any  real  p>ower  of  control  to  an  interna- 
tional body.  The  striking  fact  is  not  that  suc- 
cesses have  been  so  few,  but  rather  that  in  the 
very  few  cases  where  international  government 
has  been  sincerely  and  honestly  tried,  and  where 
necessity  has  forced  the  nations  to  accord  to 
the  international  organ  sufficient  j>ower,  the 
results  have  been  on  the  whole  successful. 

An  examination  of  the  few  instances  in 
which  states  have  been  willing  to  set  up  an  in- 
ternational organ  of  the  second  or  third  type, 

147 


INTERNATIONAL  ADMINISTRATION 

shows  that  the  failures  have  been  due  primarily 
to  one  or  more  of  the  following  three  reasons: 

1.  Virtual  impotence  of  the  executive  organ. 

2.  Unimportance  of  object  and  consequent 

indifference  of  member  states. 

3.  Impossibility  of  conditions  at  the  outset. 
Virtual  impotence  of  the  executive  organ  is 

due  generally  to  an  unwillingness  on  the  part 
of  sovereign  states  to  restrict  their  own  sover- 
eign independence,  or  to  place  their  trust  in 
any  international  organization.  In  the  Congo 
River  Commission  the  nations  refused  to  back 
the  loans,  upon  the  successful  negotiation  of 
which  depended  the  whole  accomplishment  of 
its  task;  without  the  power  to  raise  money,  the 
Commission  might  as  well  never  have  been 
created.  In  the  Suez  Canal  Commission  the 
only  powers  intrusted  to  it  were  to  "inform  the 
Khedivial  Government  of  the  danger  which 
they  may  have  perceived,"  and  to  make  de- 
mands if  the  liberty  of  navigation  should  be  in- 
terfered with.  A  Commission  with  power  only 
to  inform  and  to  make  demands  will  never  prove 
very  effective. 

In  some  instances  it  has  been  the  comparative 
unimportance  of  the  object  of  the  Commission 
which  has  prevented  success.  Where  sovereign 
states  are  indifferent  to,  or  only  slightly 
concerned  in  the  success  of  the  international 

148 


CONCLUSIONS 

project,  they  are  not  likely  to  subject  their  in- 
dependence to  a  really  effective  control  by  any 
international  body,  nor,  after  its  creation,  to 
iron  out  diflSculties  nor  to  overcome  the  petty 
differences  which  are  sure  to  arise.  Such  was 
the  case  in  the  Huangpu  River  Commission  in 
China.  It  has  been  the  cause  of  failure  in 
innumerable  other  instances  too  unimportant 
to  mention. 

The  imjx)ssibility  of  success  owing  to  local 
conditions  faced  at  the  very  outset  has  been 
at  the  root  of  at  least  two  failures.  The  In- 
ternational Commission  has  sometimes  been  re- 
sorted to  merely  as  a  means  to  tide  over  an 
impossible  situation  and  prevent  war;  it  has 
been  created,  not  in  the  faith  that  any  inter- 
national organization  can  resolve  the  peculiar 
diflSculties  of  the  situation,  but  simply  as  a 
device  to  avoid  the  dividing  up  of  some  inter- 
national plum  and  the  regrettable  consequences 
which  might  ensue.  This  was  the  reason  for 
the  failure  of  the  Moroccan  International  Police 
venture,  when  all  of  the  parties  concerned  knew 
in  their  hearts  that  the  loudly  proclaimed  inter- 
nationalization was  only  a  makeshift,  and  the 
facts  of  the  case  made  a  real  internationalization 
out  of  the  question.  In  the  same  way  the  Al- 
banian International  Commission  was  given 
the  impossible  task  of  creating  in  a  moment  a 

149 


INTERNATIONAL  ADMINISTRATION 

unified  nation  out  of  warring  and  unsettled 
tribes,  beset  by  the  jealousies  of  most  of  the 
nations  of  Europe. 

The  encouraging  thing  to  remember  is  that 
in  all  the  failures  of  the  past  there  is  no  evidence 
that  international  government  is  impossible. 
Where  the  nations  have  been  earnest  in  their 
purpose  to  set  up  an  organ  of  international 
control,  and  where  the  object  to  be  attained 
has  been  of  sufficient  imix)rtance  to  cause  the 
creating  states  to  accord  to  it  adequate  power, 
the  organ  has  generally  been  successful.  The 
Danube  Commission,  the  Rhine  Commission, 
and  particularly  the  Sugar  Commission,  all  bear 
evidence  of  this  fact. 

2. — The  Unanimity  Requirement 

Perhaps  one  of  the  oldest  and  most  securely 
established  principles  of  diplomatic  procedure 
is  the  time-honored  rule  that  in  all  diplomatic 
gatherings  and  congresses  the  majority  has 
no  power  to  bind  the  minority.  As  the  presi- 
dent of  the  Hague  Conference  of  1907  remarked: 
"The  first  principle  of  every  Conference  is  that 
of  unanimity;  it  is  not  a  vain  form,  but  the 
basis  of  every  political  understanding."*     This 

*The  unanimity  requirement  was  one  of  the  great  obstacles 
faced  at  both  of  the  Hague  Conferences. 
At  the  memorable  Congress  of  Berlin,  in  1878,  Prince  Bismarck, 
160 


CONCLUSIONS 

rule  of  unanimity  springs  directly  from  the 
conception  of  sovereignty  which  underlies  the 
present  form  of  international  law,  that  each 
state  is  the  unrestricted  arbiter  of  its  own  fate, 
and  that  no  state  therefore  can  be  bound  against 
its  will. 

At  a  time  when  every  state  was  well-nigh  a 
self-suflBcing  unit  such  a  theory  of  a  perfect 
indep>endence  of  any  external  restriction  ac- 
commodated itself  well  enough  to  the  actual 
situation;  states  were,  in  fact,  almost  as  separate 
as  water-tight  compartments,  and  the  affairs  of 
one  had  little  real  effect  upon  the  internal  order 
of  another.  But  to-day  the  situation  is  quite 
different.  Overseas  transportation  and  com- 
munication and,  with  them,  international  trade 
and  finance,  have  developed  as  though  by  the 
magic  of  some  old  romance;  an  international 
"division  of  labor'*  has  been  evolved;  almost 
no  state  is  economically  self-suflBcient,  but  is 
hopelessly  dependent  ujxjn  international  ex- 
change, either  for  its  raw  materials  or  for  its 
manufactured  products.  As  so  often  happens, 
the  facts  of  international  life  have  outstripped 
the   law.     Nations   are   no  longer   financially 


in  the  course  of  his  remarks  at  the  first  session,  considered  it  "in- 
contestable that  the  minority  in  the  Congress  shall  not  be  bound 
to  acquiesce  in  a  vote  of  the  majority."     (See  Berlin  ProtocoU, 

p.  14) 

161 


INTERNATIONAL  ADMINISTRATION 

and  commercially  and  socially  independent; 
they  are  in  a  very  real  sense  interdependent, 
and  subject,  in  point  of  fact,  whether  they  will 
or  no,  to  innumerable  economic,  social,  and 
even  p>olitical  restrictions  from  without.  The 
existence  of  some  thirty  Public  International 
Unions,  which  have  developed  within  the  past 
half-century,  each  tending  to  substitute  in- 
ternational for  state  control  within  its  own 
field,  bears  striking  evidence  of  the  fact  that 
the  tremendous  development  of  international 
activity  is  fast  making  state  separateness  im- 
possible, even  were  it  desirable.  The  further 
progress  of  the  world  is  coming  to  depend  more 
and  more  upon  concerted  international  ar- 
rangement and  co-operative  action;  and  con- 
certed international  action  presupposes  of  ne- 
cessity a  certain  restraint  upon  the  exercise  of 
individual  sovereignty  by  each  state.  National 
sovereignty  must  thus  yield  to  international 
demands;  the  right  of  the  individual  state  to 
stand  out  against  the  ordered  progress  of  the 
world  is  open  to  serious  question. 

So  far  as  the  unanimity  requirement  is  con- 
cerned, a  distinction  must  be  pointed  out  be- 
tween special  diplomatic  congresses  and  ordi- 
nary, functioning  organs  of  government.  It  is 
one  thing  to  require  unanimity  in  a  diplomatic 
gathering  representing  an  unrelated  group  of 

152 


CONCLUSIONS 

nations,  called  together  to  ascertain  whether 
or  no  all  are  willing  to  agree  to  some  treaty  or 
to  enter  into  some  common  arrangement;  it  is 
quite  another  to  require  unanimous  consent  in  a 
regularly  constituted  governmental  organ,  exer- 
cising carefully  defined  and  specially  delegated 
powers.  It  needs  little  argument  to  prove  that  a 
functioning  organ  will  cease  to  operate  effec- 
tively if  it  must  constantly  labor  under  the 
burden  of  the  unanimity  requirement.  In  their 
national  and  commercial  life  states  have  long 
ago  learned  this  lesson.  In  the  conduct  of 
public  affairs  the  majority  vote  is  the  comer- 
stone  of  the  whole  political  structure.  It  is  the 
unquestioned  principle  of  industrial  organiza- 
tions. It  is  taken  for  granted  wherever  com- 
binations of  interests  or  of  separate  units  act 
through  a  single  organ.  The  reason  is  obvious. 
No  two  human  beings  think  alike  in  all  respects; 
and  as  long  as  a  single  discordant  voice  can 
block  all  action,  no  action  of  large  importance 
will  be  pK)ssible.  The  member  states  of  any 
League  of  Nations  will  always  have  widely 
differing  ideas  and  interests;  if  the  League  can- 
not act  until  all  agree,  it  will  never  be  capable 
of  any  but  petty  action. 

No  better  evidence  could  be  had  upon  this 
point  than  that  afforded  by  actual  experience. 
Probably  the  most  instructive  and  important 

153 


INTERNATIONAL  ADMINISTRATION 

international  gathering  of  recent  years  was  the 
notable  Hague  Conference  of  1907.  One  of  the 
lessons  which  the  Conference  strikingly  taught 
was  the  difficulty  of  great  international  ac- 
complishment under  the  incubus  of  the  una- 
nimity requirement.  As  Sir  Edward  Fry,  the 
ranking  representative  of  the  British  Empire, 
pointed  out  in  his  official  report  upon  the  Con- 
ference to  the  British  Secretary  of  State  for 
Foreign  Affairs,  "the  rights  of  the  majority 
over  the  minority"  must  be  settled  "before 
another  meeting  of  the  Conference  can  prove 
satisfactory."* 

In  order  to  prove  that  unanimity  does  not 
make  for  effective  action,  it  is  hardly  necessary 
to  enter  into  a  detailed  examination  of  isolated 
instances  in  diplomatic  history  where  this  re- 
quirement has  perforce  been  dispensed  with 
in  the  interests  of  efficiency;!  but  a  glance  at 

*  "The  machinery  of  this  Conference  has  proved  in  a  high 
degree  dilatory  and  confusing;  the  rights  of  individual  delegates 
to  take  up  the  time  of  the  Conference,  the  rights  of  the  majority 
over  a  minority  in  the  absence  of  unanimity,  the  power  of  a 
chairman  to  confine  the  discussion  within  due  limits — these  and 
many  other  questions  demand  solution  before  another  meeting 
of  the  Conference  can  prove  satisfactory." 

The  Report  referred  to  may  be  found  in  British  Pari.  Accounts 
and  Papers  (1908),  Vol.  CXXIV  [Cd.  3857],  p.  20. 

t  A  striking  case  in  point  occurred  in  regard  to  the  diluted 
Grecian  boundary  in  1881.  In  order  to  prevent  Greece  and 
Turkey  from  coming  to  blows,  the  great  Powers  of  Europe 
created  an  international  Commission  to  lay  out  the  boundary. 

154 


CONCLUSIONS 

the  instances  of  international  administration 
already  referred  to  may  be  suggestive  in  this 
connection. 

There  is  particular  significance  in  the  fact 
that  the  international  organ  which  wields  prob- 
ably larger  p>owers  than  any  other  in  existence, 
has,  doubtless  because  of  the  pressing  neces- 
sity for  effective  co-operative  action  under  which 
it  developed,  disj>ensed  with  the  unanimity  re- 
quirement. The  International  Sugar  Conven- 
tion of  March  5,  1902,  provides  that  decisions 
of  the  Permanent  Convention  shall  be  taken 
by  a  majority  vote.  As  has  already  been 
pointed  out,  this  Commission  exercises  very 
substantial  pK)wer,  since  it  controls,  through  its 
determinations  of  fact,  matters  of  such  vital 
national   interest  as  the  sugar  tariffs  of  the 

Prompt  action  was  so  imperative  that  it  was  provided  that  all 
resolutions  of  the  Commission  should  be  passed  by  a  majority 
of  votes  (treaty  of  May  24,  1881,  between  the  great  Powers 
and  Turkey).  Art.  1  of  the  treaty  provides  that  "this  de- 
limitation will  be  fixed  on  the  spot  by  a  Commission  composed 
of  the  Delegates  of  the  Six  Powers  and  of  the  two  parties  in- 
terested. The  Delimitation  Commission  will  pass  their  Resolu- 
tions by  a  majority  of  votes,  each  Power  having  but  one  vote." 

In  accordance  with  the  decisions  of  the  Commission,  the  new 
line  was  handed  over,  mile  by  mile,  to  the  Greek  nation. 

Compare,  also,  such  special  provisions  as  that  contained  in 
the  General  Act  of  the  Algeciras  Conference  of  1906  (Art.  76), 
which  provides  that  "in  every  case  covered  by  the  present 
Declaration  where  the  Diplomatic  Corps  [at  Tangier]  may  be 
called  to  intervene,  except  in  matters  covered  by  Arts.  64,  70, 
and  75,  the  decisions  will  be  taken  by  majority  vote." 

155 


INTERNATIONAL  ADMINISTRATION 

member  states;  its  determinations  become  bind- 
ing upon  member  states  without  their  consent 
and  without  ratification  by  them.  It  seems 
hardly  open  to  question  that  unless  the  great 
Powers  which  signed  this  Convention  had  been 
convinced  that  effective  action  was  impossible 
so  long  as  the  unanimity  requirement  was  main- 
tained, they  would  never  have  been  willing  to 
permit  an  organ  wielding  such  extraordinary 
power  to  act  by  a  majority  vote. 

The  International  Sanitary  Commissions  af- 
ford similar  examples.  The  unchecked  spread 
of  cholera  and  plague,  as  has  already  been 
suggested,  is  so  extraordinarily  rapid  and  tragic 
in  its  consequences  that  preventive  action,  if 
it  is  to  be  efficacious  at  all,  must  be  unhesi- 
tating, efficient,  and  often  even  drastic.  It 
is  noteworthy  that  the  International  Sanitary 
Councils  are  accorded  power  to  act  by  a  ma- 
jority vote.  "The  decisions  of  the  Superior 
Board  of  Health*'  [of  Constantinople],  reads 
Art.  170  of  the  International  Sanitary  Conven- 
tion of  1905,  "reached  by  a  majority  of  the 
members  who  compose  it,  are  directly  execu- 
tory and  without  appeal." 

In  the  Danube  Commission,  which  stands 

among  the  most  successful  of  the  International 

Commissions,   decisions  are  also  taken  by  a 

majority  of  votes  upon  the  important  questioo 
1^9 


CONCLUSIONS 

of  modifying  the  tolls^  or  upon  matters  of  in- 
ternal concern.  Under  the  regulations  of  1879, 
however,  unanimity  is  still  necessary  for  ques- 
tions of  principle  (questions  de  fond).^  The 
Rhine  River  Commission,  which  has  proved 
so  successful  that  it  has  been  maintained  for 
over  a  century  through  the  vicissitudes  of 
changing  treaties  and  altered  political  condi- 
tions, likewise  acts  by  a  majority  vote,^  al- 
though its  votes  do  not  become  binding  until 
they  have  been  approved  by  the  signatory 
governments.* 

So,  too,  action  is  taken  by  majority  vote  in 
the  governing  body  of  the  Universal  Postal 
Union,  the  most  successful  and  imj>ortant  of 
the  larger  Public  Unions.  It  is  true  that  the 
Postal  Convention  is  silent  upon  the  question 
of  how  voting  is  to  be  conducted  at  the  periodic 
meetings  of  the  Postal  Congress;  but  under  the 
exigencies  of  actual  practice  the  question  has 
been  resolved  in  favor  of  the  majority  rule.^ 

To  make  the  assertion  that  the  unanimity 
requirement  has,  in  one  way  or  another,  been 
dispensed  with  whenever  prompt  and  effective 
action  has  seemed  imperative,  would  be  too 
sweeping  a  statement  of  the  case;  for  in  a 
number  of  instances,  where  the  organ  is  com- 
paratively small,  or  where  single  blocking  states 
can  be  coerced  into  line  through  moral  or  social 

157 


INTERNATIONAL  ADMINISTRATION 

pressure,  the  unanimity  requirement  still  re- 
mains. Nevertheless,  the  fact  that  in  those  in- 
ternational organizations  which  have  proved 
most  successful  the  unanimity  requirement  has 
in  most  instances  been  displaced  by  the  rule 
of  the  majority  vote,  is  of  suflBcient  significance 
to  be  worthy  of  serious  consideration  by  those 
who  would  give  to  the  League  of  Nations  an 
executive  organ  of  real  eflBciency.* 

■3. — Equality  of  Votes 

Another  question  of  fundamental  importance, 
so  far  as  international  organization  is  con- 
cerned, is  the  problem  of  the  weighting  or  valu- 
ing of  votes.  Perhaps  in  all  the  lengthy  philo- 
sophical discussions  of  the  fundamental  prin- 
ciples of  international  law,  there  is  no  term 
more  abused  than  that  of  the  Equality  of 
States.  Volumes  have  been  written  to  prove 
that  all  states,  like  men,  are  created  equal; 
and  there  are  still  many  modern  and  gifted 
writers  who  adhere  to  this  theory,  a  product 
of  the  outlived  philosophy  of  the  Law  of  Nature. 

*  If  the  unanimity  requirement  is  dispensed  with,  the  question 
whether  action  should  be  taken  upon  a  mere  plurality  vote,  or 
whether  a  two-thirds  or  three-quarters  majority  should  be  re- 
quired, is  one  which  must  depend  largely  upon  other  details  of 
organization,  and  which  it  is  not,  therefore,  possible  in  thb  study 
to  discuss. 

158 


CONCLUSIONS 

The  faxit  is  that  the  dogma  of  the  Equality 
of  States,  like  so  many  other  dogmas  over 
which  bitter  controversies  have  raged,  is  so 
ambiguous  that  it  is  capable  of  more  than  one 
interpretation;  and  unfortunately  much  con- 
fusion has  been  produced  by  a  failure  to  make 
the  necessary  distinctions.  In  one  sense  it 
embodies  a  noble  principle  which  few  people 
outside  of  Germany  and  the  Central  Powers 
are  inclined  to  deny;  in  another,  it  embodies 
a  principle  which  is  believed  by  many  to  be 
very  far  removed  from  justice  or  truth.  In 
the  sense  that  all  states,  great  and  small,  should 
be  treated  alike  before  the  law,  that  legal 
privileges  should  not  be  granted  to  the  strong 
and  withheld  from  the  weak,  that  interna- 
tional protection  and  law  should  be  accorded 
to  all  equally,  the  dogma  of  the  Equality  of 
States  asserts  a  lofty  truth,  the  integrity  of 
which  we  have  just  been  seeking  to  establish 
by  one  of  the  greatest  wars  in  history.  But 
in  the  other  sense  in  which  the  dogma  is  some- 
times used,  that  all  states  are  equal  in  fact, 
and  that  therefore,  great  or  small,  each  is  en- 
titled to  precisely  the  same  influence  in  mold- 
ing and  shaping  the  pK)litical  affairs  and  future 
destinies  of  the  world,  the  assertion  of  equality 
can  hardly  be  substantiated  by  the  facts. 
Luxemburg,  for  instance,  with  its  268,000  in- 

11  159 


INTERNATIONAL  ADMINISTRATION 

habitants  and  an  area  of  perhaps  1,000  square 
miles,  is  not  entitled  to  the  same  voice  in 
shaping  the  destinies  of  the  world  as  is  the 
British  Empire,  with  a  population  of  some 
442,000,000  and  an  area  of  12,784,755  square 
miles.  No  amount  of  brilliant  philosophy  can 
disprove  the  fact  that  no  two  states  are  equal 
in  their  resources,  in  their  possessions,  particu- 
larly in  their  capacities.  As  some  writers  have 
put  it,  equality  of  rights  must  be  very  carefully 
distinguished  from  equality  of  capacities.  Na- 
tions have  equal  rights  before  the  law,  but  not 
equal  capacities.  Power  to  influence  the  future 
course  of  nations  springs  rather  from  inherent 
native  capacities  than  from  rights;  and  if  an 
international  organ  is  to  accord  truly  to  the 
world  of  facts,  the  member  states  which  com- 
pose it  will  be  given  voting  power  more  or  less 
according  to  their  actual  world  influence.  To 
give  to  states  which  are  unequal  in  wealth, 
in  area,  in  population,  in  native  capabilities, 
in  influence,  and  in  military  power,  exactly  the 
same  voting  power  in  a  duly  constituted  execu- 
tive organ  would  be  to  depart  far  from  justice; 
and  no  institution  founded  on  injustice  can 
permanently  endure. 

It  is  quite  true,  as  was  suggested  in  the  con- 
sideration of  the  unanimity  requirement,  that 
in  a  Conference  or  Congress  of  unrelated  states, 

160 


CONCLUSIONS 

called  together  to  consider  the  making  of  some 
treaty  or  the  formulation  of  some  new  arrange- 
ment, every  state,  powerful  or  weak,  should 
have  an  equal  voice  and  an  equal  right  to  de- 
clare whether  it  will  or  will  not  enter  into  the 
proposed  treaty  or  arrangement;  this  is  a  right 
which,  under  the  conception  of  the  Equality  of 
States  in  its  first  and  truer  sense,  should  be 
carefully  secured.  But  the  matter  is  very  dif- 
ferent as  to  voting  in  an  executive  organ  with 
powers  specifically  delegated  and  carefully  de- 
limited; to  invoke  the  dogma  of  the  Equality 
of  States  in  such  a  case  is  to  use  the  phrase  in 
its  second  and  very  questionable  sense.  The  in- 
sistence upon  equality  of  voting  power  under 
the  cover  of  this  dogma  has  wrecked  more  than 
one  international  project;  this  was  directly,  if 
not  solely,  responsible  for  the  failure  of  the 
earnest  efforts  made  at  the  Hague  Conference 
of  1907  to  create  an  international  Court  of 
Arbitral  Justice. 

No  proof  is  necessary  to  make  it  clear  that 
if,  in  the  executive  organ  of  a  League  of  Na- 
tions, each  of  the  great  Powers  is  allowed  a 
voice  of  influence  no  greater  than  that  of  the 
smallest  principality,  the  great  Powers  will 
never  consent  to  intrust  their  destinies  to  such 
control.  The  organ  might  be  created;  but  the 
great  nations  would  see  to  it  that  its  powers 

161 


INTERNATIONAL  ADMINISTRATION 

were  so  shadowy  and  unsubstantial  that  it 
would  prove  a  mere  mockery.  It  would  be 
only  a  repetition  on  a  larger  scale  of  the  Inter- 
national Suez  Commission  of  1888.  Even  if 
an  organ  with  equal  votes  were  endowed  with 
actual  power,  it  would  be  only  a  question  of 
time  before  some  vote,  passed  by  a  group  of 
smaller  states,  whose  interests  naturally  tend 
to  draw  them  together,  would  prove  intolerable 
to  the  great  Powers;  and  the  result  would  be 
the  sudden  overturning  of  the  League  by  the 
nations  which  in  the  world  of  fact  wield  the 
actual  power. 

An  examination  of  the  various  international 
organizations  already  considered  reveals  a  num- 
ber of  different  methods  for  weighting  votes, 
some  of  them  of  a  quite  ingenious  turn.  Most 
of  the  important  international  organizations, 
however,  have  been  unable  to  overcome  the 
orthodox  "one  state,  one  vote"  rule.  In  some 
cases  this  is  due  to  the  fact  that  the  Commis- 
sion is  composed  of  representatives  of  states 
more  or  less  equal  in  influence;  in  other  cases 
it  is  because  the  difficulties  to  be  overcome 
at  the  outset  in  creating  the  international 
organ  were  so  great  that  it  seemed  impossible 
to  weight  the  votes  without  endangering  the 
whole  project. 

Perhaps  the  most  natural  scheme  for  what 

162 


CONCLUSIONS 

amounts  to  an  actual  weighting  of  votes  is 
that  already  described  as  adopted  by  the  tJni- 
versal  Postal  Union.^  Under  this  provision, 
although  nominally  each  state  is  given  a  single 
vote,  large  colonies  are  given  separate  ones; 
therefore,  if  the  votes  of  the  colonies  are  counted 
with  those  of  the  mother  countries,  the  great 
Powers  wield  the  following  number  of  votes: 
Great  Britain,  six;  France,  four;  Germany, 
three;   United   States,  two;    and  Italy,  two.* 

The  Postal  Union  is  not  the  only  one  which 
has  adopted  this  method  of  weighting  votes. 
In  the  Telegraphic  Union  the  Convention  of 
1906,  although  it  definitely  declares  that  "in 
the  deliberations  each  country  shall  have  one 
vote,"  makes  provision,  nevertheless,  that  "if 
a  Government  adheres  to  the  Convention  for 
its  colonies,  possessions,  or  protectorates,  sub- 
sequent conferences  may  decide  that  such  col- 
onies, possessions,  or  protectorates,  or  a  part 
thereof,  shall  be  considered  as  forming  a  coun- 
try as  regards  the  application  of  the  preceding 
paragraph  [i.  e.,  the  voting  j>ower].  But  the 
number  of  votes  at  the  disposal  of  one  Govern- 
ment, including  its  colonies,  f>ossessions,  or 
protectorates,  shall  in  no  case  exceed  six."^ 

A  second  and  very  indirect  method  of  ap- 
IK)rtioning  power  or  influence  among  the  mem- 

*  A  few  smaller  powers  likewise  were  given  more  than  one  vote. 
163 


INTERNATIONAL  ADMINISTRATION 

ber  states  is  that  also  described  before  in  con- 
nection with  the  Postal  Union.  This  consists 
in  giving  large  representation  to  the  great 
Powers  on  the  important  committees,  which 
usually  wield  the  actual  jK)wer  in  assemblies 
of  any  size.  For  obvious  reasons  this  does  not 
seem  the  happiest  method  of  accomplishing 
the  desired  object. 

A  third  and  more  open  method  is  that  of 
classifying  all  the  member  states  in  several 
different  groups,  and  giving  to  each  group  a 
different  voting  power.  Thus,  the  International 
Sanitary  Convention  of  1907,  creating  a  Bureau 
of  Public  Hygiene,  divides  the  signatory  states 
into  six  different  groups,  the  first  group  pay- 
ing as  high  as  twenty-five  units  of  the  expense 
of  the  Bureau,  and  the  sixth  paying  only  three.  ^ 
Each  state  is  given  a  number  of  votes  inversely 
proportioned  to  the  number  of  the  group  to 
which  it  belongs.* 

Several  other  Public  Unions  have  adopted 
this  same  method.  In  the  International  In- 
stitute of  Agriculture,  the  signatory  states  are 
divided  into  five  groups;  and  the  members  of 
each  group  are  given  a  voting  power  roughly 
proportioned  to  the  amount  of  financial  as- 
sistance which  they  agree  to  render.^"  The  most 
interesting  feature  of  the  arrangement  is  that 
each  state  is  allowed  freely  to  choose  the  group 

164 


CONCLUSIONS 

to  which  it  is  to  belong.  In  this  way  the  diflficul- 
ties  of  apportioning  voting  power  completely 
disappear.  If  membership  in  the  League  of 
Nations  should  be  made  to  entail  very  definite 
responsibilities  in  the  amount  of  financial  con- 
tributions required,  in  the  number  of  soldiers 
and  supplies  which  might  have  to  be  furnished 
for  police  work,  in  the  economic  and  other 
burdens  to  be  assumed,  this  idea  of  apportion- 
ing votes  according  to  responsibilities  assumed 
might  prove  extremely  suggestive.* 

In  seeking  to  gain  an  understanding  and  aj)- 
preciation  of  the  principles  involved  in  the 
creation  of  an  executive  organ  for  a  League  of 
Nations,  no  attempt  has  been  made  to  describe 
the  League  as  it  should  be  set  up  in  1919,  or 
to  outline  in  even  the  most  general  terms  its 
powers.  Because  of  political  and  other  prac- 
tical considerations,  it  may  prove  necessary  to 


*  DiflBcult  as  it  may  be  to  secure  any  scheme  for  the  weighting 
of  votes  which  will  receive  the  consent  of  sufficient  nations  to 
put  it  into  operation,  it  is  not  impossible.  At  the  last  Hague 
Conference,  when  the  delegates  were  trying  to  devise  a  scheme 
for  the  selection  of  judges  for  the  International  Prize  Court, 
agreement  seemed  for  a  time  impossible,  since  the  small  nations 
tenaciously  insisted  upon  the  same  representation  upon  the  Court 
as  that  possessed  by  the  great  Powers.  But  in  the  end  an  in- 
genious scheme  was  hit  upon  which  accorded  a  different  measure 
of  representation  to  the  various  states  in  a  manner  acceptable  to 
those  present;  and  the  Convention  for  the  creation  of  an  Interna- 
tional Prize  Court  was  thereupon  duly  signed.  Owing  to  other 
causes,  however,  the  Court  has  never  been  put  into  operation. 

165 


INTERNATIONAL  ADMINISTRATION 

begin  with  only  a  rudimentary  League,  in  the 
hope  that  it  will  evolve  into  an  organ  of  more 
and  more  power  as  it  proves  practicable  and 
serviceable.  The  critical  danger  of  such  a 
course,  as  need  hardly  be  pointed  out,  is  that 
any  League  without  adequate  power  at  the 
outset,  may,  like  the  Egyptian  Suez  Commis- 
sion, prove  a  dismal  failure.  It  is  therefore 
of  especial  importance  to  discover  in  the  be- 
ginning the  eternally  just  and  true  principles 
to  which  it  should  adhere;  if  these  can  be  dis- 
covered, the  sooner  the  League  conforms  to 
them  the  better  for  all  concerned. 

i. — The  Chance  for  Success 

So  far  as  the  League  of  Nations  is  concerned, 
one  must  recognize  that  if  it  is  to  have  a  really 
effective  executive  organ,  the  latter  must  be  of 
the  third  and  most  difficult  type.  Although 
many  highly  successful  organs  of  the  first  type 
have  been  created,  very  few  of  the  second,  and 
still  fewer  of  the  third  have  come  into  existence 
and  survived.  In  direct  proportion  to  the 
amount  of  power  vested  in  the  international 
organ  and  to  the  scope  of  the  functions  accorded 
to  it,  are  magnified  the  international  jealousies 
and  animosities  and  all  the  divergencies  of  in- 
terests that  make  community  of  action  difficult. 

166 


CONCLUSIONS 

It  must  be  recognized  that  the  power  to  be 
invested  in  the  proposed  executive  organ  may 
grow  in  the  course  of  time  into  the  largest  ever 
concentrated  within  the  hands  of  a  small  group, 
even  though  controlled  through  the  democracy 
of  the  political  systems  represented. 

On  the  other  hand,  factors  of  supreme  im- 
portance would  come  into  play,  making  for 
success.  So  huge  are  the  issues  involved,  and 
so  vital  to  the  very  existence  of  the  smaller 
nations  and  to  the  security  of  the  larger  ones 
will  be  the  success  of  this  great  international 
venture,  that  the  member  states  cannot  afford 
to  allow  smaller  selfish  interests  to  overthrow 
the  League.  Its  existence  will  furnish  the 
only  guarantee  for  international  order;  for  the 
events  of  the  past  have  shown  beyond  perad- 
venture  that  no  small  nation  is  safe  under 
guarantees  not  backed  with  organized  world 
force.  This  necessity  for  its  existence  will  prove 
the  surest  pledge  of  its  success.  Necessity  can 
reconcile  almost  any  differences.  It  was  this 
factor  which  enabled  the  early  American  states, 
on  the  adoption  of  the  Federal  Constitution,  to 
overcome  their  differences,  which  had  seemed 
quite  irreconcilable  and  had  well  nigh  placed 
them  at  the  mercy  of  Europe.  Where  inter- 
national co-operation  becomes  a  thing  of  neces- 
sity, defects  of  organization  will  be  ironed  out, 

167 


INTERNATIONAL  ADMINISTRATION 

competent  and  able  administration  will  be  in- 
sisted upon,  and  indifference  will  not  be  toler- 
ated. It  was  the  necessity  of  the  occasion 
which  compelled  the  nations  of  the  world, 
whose  representatives  had  met  to  consider  the 
urgent  necessities  of  international  jwstal  com- 
munication, to  make  larger  restrictions  upon 
the  exercise  of  their  sovereignty  than  they  had 
ever  previously  made,  and  to  sign  the  Postal 
Convention;  it  was  necessity  which  later  over- 
came all  difficulties  of  administration  and  made 
of  the  International  Postal  Union  a  success.  It 
was  necessity  which  caused  the  evolution  of  the 
European  Danube  River  Commission,  and  made 
of  it  a  success.  It  was  necessity  again  which 
caused  the  nations  to  go  to  such  lengths  in  the 
creation  of  the  Sugar  Commission,  and  which 
made  it  successful  in  the  accomplishment  of  its 
object.  It  will  be  necessity  again,  now  revealed 
as  it  has  never  been  before,  which  will  evolve 
a  successful  and  triumphant  League  of  Nations. 

NOTES 

*  See  Art.  16  of  the  Treaty  of  Paris  of  March  30, 
1856. 

2  See  Art.  12. 

^Art.  17  of  the  Treaty  of  Vienna,  Annex  XVI 

(Martens,  Nouveau  Recueil,  Vol.  II,  p.  421) ;  Art.  94 

of  the  treaty  of  March  31,  1831  (de  Clercq,  Recueil 

168 


CONCLUSIONS 

des  TraUeSy  Vol.  IV,  p.  53);  Art.  46  of  the  treaty  of 
October  17,  1868  (Martens,  N,  R.  G.,  Vol.  XX, 
p.  369). 

*The  Agricultural  Institute,  one  of  the  Public 
Unions  to  which  most  of  the  countries  of  the  world 
belong,  has  also  apparently  dispensed  with  the 
unanimity  requirement,  since  by  Art.  5  of  the  Con- 
vention of  June  7,  1905,  two-thirds  of  all  votes 
constitute  a  quorum  and  can  therefore  take  action. 

^Woolf,  International  Governmenif  p.  123.  See 
also  supra,  p.  25. 

^See  Art.  27  of  the  Postal  Convention  of  1906. 

^  Art.  12  of  the  Telegraphic  Convention  of  Novem- 
ber 3,  1906.  {Brit,  and  For.  State  Papers,  Vol. 
XCIX,  p.  323).  The  number  of  colonies  and  de- 
pendencies to  which  representation  and  votes  were 
accorded  was  finally  decided  in  the  Convention  of 
1912. 

®  See  Art.  11  of  the  Annex  to  the  Convention  of 
December  9,  1907  (Hertslet's  Commercial  Treaties , 
Vol.  XXV,  p.  685). 

^Art.  6. 

*°  Art.  10  of  the  Agricultural  Convention  of  June 
7,  1905.    See  supra,  p.  30,  note. 


APPENDICES 


APPENDIX  A 

INTERNATIONAL  LEAGUES  OF  THE  PAST 

I.— THE  SEVENTEENTH  CENTURY 

(a)  a  league  op  nations 

Treaty  of  Peace  between  the  French  King,  the  Emperor, 
and  the  several  Princes  and  States  of  the  Roman 
Empire.    Signed  at  Munster,  October  £^,  1648. 

Article  123.  That  nevertheless  the  concluded 
Peace  shall  remain  in  force,  and  all  Partys  in  this 
Transaction  shall  be  oblig'd  to  defend  and  protect 
all  and  every  Article  of  this  Peace  against  any  one, 
without  distinction  of  Religion;  and  if  it  happens 
any  point  shall  be  violated,  the  Offended  shall  be- 
fore all  things  exhort  the  Offender  not  to  come  to 
any  Hostility,  submitting  the  Cause  to  a  friendly 
Composition,  or  the  ordinary  Proceedings  of  Justice. 

Article  124,  Nevertheless  if  for  the  space  of  three 

years  the  Difference  cannot  be  terminated,  by  any 

of  those  means,  all  and  every  one  of  those  concern'd 

in  this  Transaction  shall  be  oblig'd  to  join  the  in- 

jur'd  Party,  and  assist  him  with  Counsel  and  Force 

to  repel  the  injury,  being  first  advertis'd  by  the 

injur'd   that   gentle   Means   and   Justice   prevail'd 

nothing;    but  without  prejudice,   nevertheless,   to 

every  one's  Jurisdiction,  and  the  Administration  of 

173 


INTERNATIONAL  ADMINISTRATION 

Justice  conformable  to  the  Laws  of  each  Prince  and 
State;  and  it  shall  not  be  permitted  to  any  State 
of  the  Empire  to  pursue  his  Right  by  Force  and 
Arms;  but  if  any  difference  has  happen'd  or  hap- 
pens for  the  future,  every  one  shall  try  the  means 
of  ordinary  Justice,  and  the  Contravener  shall  be 
regarded  as  an  Infringer  of  the  Peace.  That  which 
has  been  determin'd  by  Sentence  of  the  Judge,  shall 
be  put  in  execution,  without  distinction  of  Condi- 
tion, as  the  Laws  of  the  Empire  enjoin  touching  the 
Execution  of  arrests  and  Sentences. 

(b)  ahbitration 

Treaty  of  Peace  between  Philip  ZF,  King  of  Spain, 
and  the  United  Provinces  of  the  Low  Countries. 
Signed  at  Munster^  January  30,  1648. 

Article  21.  Certain  Judges  shall  be  appointed  on 
both  sides  in  an  equal  Number,  in  form  of  the 
Chambre  Mipartie,who  shall  sit  in  the  Low-Countries, 
and  in  such  other  Places  as  shall  be  found  convenient 
and  proper,  and  that  everywhere,  sometimes  under 
the  Obedience  of  the  one,  and  sometimes  of  the 
other,  according  as  shall  be  agreed  by  mutual  Con- 
sent; which  Judges  appointed  on  both  sides,  shall 
(conformably  to  the  Commission  and  Instruction 
that  shall  be  given  them,  and  upon  which  they 
shall  make  Oath  according  to  a  certain  Form  to  be 
settled  on  both  sides  for  that  eflFect)  have  regard  to 
the  Negotiations  of  the  Inhabitants  of  the  said 
Provinces  of  the  Low-Countries,  and  to  the  Burdens 

and  Duties  which  of  both  sides  shall  be  laid  upon 

174 


APPENDIX  A 

Merchandizes:  And  if  the  said  Judges  perceive  that 
any  Excesses  are  committed  on  either  side,  or  of 
both  sides,  they  shall  regulate  and  moderate  the 
said  Excesses. 

Moreover,  the  said  Judges  shall  examine  into 
Disputes  touching  a  Failure  in  the  Execution  of 
the  Treaty,  and  the  Contraventions  thereof,  which 
from  time  to  time  may  happen  in  the  Countries  on 
this  side,  as  also  in  the  distant  Kingdoms,  Countries, 
Provinces  and  Islands  of  Europe;  and  shall  sum- 
marily and  fully  determine  therein,  and  decide  as 
they  see  agreeable  and  conformable  to  the  Treaty: 
the  Sentences  and  Determinations  of  which  Judges 
shall  be  executed  by  the  ordinary  Judges  of  the 
Place  where  Contravention  shall  have  been  com- 
mitted, upon  the  Persons  of  the  Contraveners,  ac- 
cording as  Occasion  and  Circumstance  shall  require; 
nor  must  the  said  ordinary  Judges  neglect  to  do  the 
said  Execution,  or  suffer  it  to  be  neglected,  but 
repair  the  Contraventions  within  the  space  of  six 
Months,  after  they  the  said  ordinary  Judges  shall 
have  been  thereto  requir'd. 

n.— THE  EIGHTEENTH  CENTURY 

(a)   an  ante  peace-treaty  league  of  nations 

Confirmation  of  tlie  Treaties  made  between  Hie  Queen 
of  Great  Britain  and  tlie  Staies-Generaly  Decem- 
ber 22,  1711* 

[After  intimating  that  they  are  very  earnest  **to  join 
all  their  endeavours  for  maintaining"  the  treaty  of  peace 

*  The  Complete  History  of  the  Treaty  of  Utrecht,  Vol.  I,  p.  128. 
12  175 


INTERNATIONAL  ADMINISTRATION 

(then  entered  upon)  "against  all  persons  whatsoever" 
the  contracting  powers  confirm  previous  engagements 
looking  towards  the  "prosecuting  the  present  war  with 
good  success,  according  to  treaty  .  .  .  till  the  enemy  con- 
sent to  the  conditions  of  a  just  and  safe  peace,  and  a 
general  peace  be  obtained  and  established."  Then  is 
stipulated  the  following]: 

On  the  other  hand,  if  a  peace,  by  God's  bless- 
ing, be  had.  Her  Royal  Majesty  and  the  Lords  the 
States-General  do  sincerely  and  solemnly  engage, 
and  mutually  promise,  that  they  will  faithfully, 
diligently,  and  with  the  utmost  industry,  direct  the 
course  of  their  councils,  and  mutually  employ  their 
care  and  pains,  (even  with  an  arm'd  force,  if  neces- 
sary) to  the  end  that  the  said  peace  may  be  truly 
observ'd;  that  the  right  which  any  of  the  Con- 
federates shall  by  common  consent  acquire  thereby 
may  remain  safe  and  entire  to  them;  and  that  all 
infractions  of  the  said  peace  may  be  timely  avoided 
and  prevented;  and  that  all  controversies  which 
may  arise  about  its  genuine  sense  be  amicably  de- 
cided, or  if  amicable  means  should  not  succeed, 
then  before  the  end  of  two  months,  or  even  sooner, 
in  a  case  where  the  exigency  of  the  danger  will  not 
suffer  delay,  the  common  forces  of  the  Confederates 
who  shall  subscribe  this  convention,  shall  be  united 
together,  and  such  a  number  sent  to  act  either  by 
sea  or  land  against  the  disturber,  whosoever  he  be, 
as  the  greatness  of  the  danger  shall  require,  till 
satisfaction  be  made  to  the  party  injured,  and  till 
there  be  an  entire  prospect  or  provision  for  renewing 

and  securing  the  publick  peace  and  tranquility. 

176 


APPENDIX  A 

For  which  end,  viz.,  for  procuring  in  a  more  full 
and  perfect  manner  a  firm  and  solid  tranquility, 
and  to  maintain  the  same,  all  and  singular  the 
Christian  princes  and  states,  who  are  lovers  of  peace, 
and  especially  His  Imperial  Majesty  and  the  other 
Confederates,  shall  be  invited,  that  they  may  enter 
into  this  convention,  and  give  their  consent  and 
application  for  enlarging  and  acconmiodating  it  to 
its  pacifick  and  wholesome  scope,  which  is  the  only 
end  the  above-mention'd  parties  propose  to  them- 
selves by  this  convention. 

(b)  guaeantees  of  peace  terms 

Treaty  of  Utrecht  entered  into  between  Great  Britain 
and  France,  March  3U  1713. 

Article  24.  It  is  mutually  agreed  that  all  and 
singular  the  Conditions  of  the  Peace  made  this  Day 
between  his  Sacred  Royal  most  Christian  Majesty, 
and  his  Sacred  Royal  Majesty  of  Portugal  be  con- 
firmed by  this  Treaty;  and  her  Sacred  Royal  Maj- 
esty of  Great  Britain  takes  upon  herself  the 
Guaranty  of  the  same,  to  the  end  that  it  may  be 
more  firmly  and  inviolably  observed. 

British  guaranty  of  May  3,  1715,  of  the  Treaty  of 
Peace  of  Utrecht  between  Spain  and  Portugal* 

We,  following  the  steps  of  our  royal  ancestors, 
and  being  unwilling  to  decline  any  offices,  by  which 

*  Martens,  Recueil  des  Traitis,  Vol.  I,  Sup.  p.  106, 
177 


INTERNATIONAL  ADMINISTRATION 

the  peace  between  the  said  Kings  may  be  promoted, 
do  therefore  most  readily  engage  for  the  preserva- 
tion of  the  treaty  now  estabhshed;  gladly  taking 
the  occasion  to  satisfy  his  Royal  Majesty  of  Portu- 
gal of  our  friendship  and  sincere  regard  to  his  per- 
son and  interests,  agreeable  to  the  most  strict  con- 
cord which  has  always  been  between  the  British 
and  Portuguese  crowns.  We  therefore  have  made 
ourselves  guarantees  and  sureties  of  the  said  treaty 
of  peace,  as  by  these  presents,  in  the  most  due  and 
ample  form  we  do  make  ourselves  guarantees  and 
sureties  thereof;  engaging  and  promising  on  our 
Royal  word,  to  take  care  (as  far  as  in  us  lies)  that 
the  said  treaty,  with  all  and  every  the  articles  and 
clauses  in  it,  shall  be  sacredly  and  inviolably  ob- 
served according  to  their  genuine  sense,  and  that 
nothing  shall  be  done  in  any  wise  contrary  there- 
unto; and  that  we  will  be  always  ready  to  enter 
into  all  such  reasonable  measures  as  shall  appear 
most  necessary  and  efiFectual  for  preserving  the  same 
from  all  violation.    In  witness  whereof,  etc. 

in.— THE  NINETEENTH  CENTURY 

(a)  mutual  guarantees 

Treaty  of  Alliance  between  Great  Britain,  Austria^ 
Prussia,  and  Russia.  Signed  at  Paris,  November 
20, 1816* 

Article  1.  The  High  Contracting  Parties  recipro- 
cally promise  to  maintain,  in  its  force  and  vigour,  the 

*  Hertslet's  Map  of  Europe  by  Treaty,  Vol.  I,  p.  372. 
178 


APPENDIX  A 

Treaty  signed  this  day  with  His  Most  Christian 
Majesty,  [i.  e.  the  Kjng  of  France]  and  to  see  that 
the  stipulations  of  the  said  Treaty,  as  well  as  those 
of  the  Particular  Conventions  which  have  reference 
thereto,  shall  be  strictly  and  faithfully  executed  in 
their  fullest  extent. 

Article  6.  To  facilitate  and  to  secure  the  execu- 
tion of  the  present  Treaty,  and  to  consolidate  the 
connections  which  at  the  present  moment  so  closely 
unite  the  Four  Sovereigns  for  the  happiness  of  the 
world,  the  High  Contracting  Parties  have  agreed 
to  renew  their  Meetings  at  fixed  periods,  either  under 
the  immediate  auspices  of  the  Sovereigns  themselves, 
or  by  their  respective  Ministers,  for  the  purpose  of 
consulting  upon  their  common  interests,  and  for 
the  consideration  of  the  measures  which  at  each  of 
those  periods  shall  be  considered  the  most  salutary 
for  the  repose  and  prosperity  of  Nations,  and  for 
the  maintenance  of  the  Peace  of  Europe. 

(b)  a  league  of  nations 

Declaration  of  Great  Britain,  Austria,  France,  Prussia, 
and  Russia.  Signed  at  Aix-la-ChapeUe,  Novem- 
ber 15,  1818* 

The  Convention  of  the  9th  October,  1818,  which 
definitively  regulated  the  execution  of  the  engage- 
ments agreed  to  in  the  Treaty  of  Peace  of  20th 
November,  1815,  is  considered  by  the  Sovereigns 

*  Hertslet's  Map  of  Europe  by  Treaty,  Vol.  I,  p.  573. 
179 


INTERNATIONAL  ADMINISTRATION 

who  concurred  therein,  as  the  accompUshment  of 
the  work  of  Peace,  and  as  the  completion  of  the 
poUtical  System  destined  to  insure  its  solidity. 

The  intimate  Union  established  among  the  Mon- 
archs,  who  are  joint  parties  to  this  System,  by  their 
own  principles,  no  less  than  by  the  interests  of  their 
people,  offers  to  Europe  the  most  sacred  pledge  of 
its  future  tranquillity. 

The  object  of  this  Union  is  as  simple  as  it  is  great 
and  salutary.  It  does  not  tend  to  any  new  politi- 
cal combination — to  any  change  in  the  Relations 
sanctioned  by  existing  Treaties.  Calm  and  con- 
sistent in  its  proceedings,  it  has  no  other  object 
than  the  maintenance  of  Peace,  and  the  guarantee 
of  those  transactions  on  which  the  Peace  was 
founded  and  consolidated. 

The  Sovereigns,  in  forming  this  august  Union, 
have  regarded  as  its  fundamental  basis  their  in- 
variable resolution  never  to  depart,  either  among 
themselves,  or  in  their  Relations  with  other  States, 
from  the  strictest  observation  of  the  principles  of 
the  Right  of  Nations;  principles,  which,  in  their 
application  to  a  state  of  permanent  Peace,  can  alone 
effectually  guarantee  the  Independence  of  each 
Government,  and  the  stability  of  the  general 
association. 

Faithful  to  these  principles,  the  Sovereigns  will 

maintain  them  equally  in  those  meetings  at  which 

they  may  be  personally  present,  or  in  those  which 

shall  take  place  among  their  Ministers;    whether 

they  be  for  purpose  of  discussing  in  common  their 

180 


APPENDIX  A 

own  interests,  or  whether  they  shall  relate  to  ques- 
tions in  which  other  Governments  shall  formally 
claim  their  interference.  The  same  spirit  which 
will  direct  their  comicils,  and  reign  in  their  diplo- 
matic communications,  will  preside  also  at  these 
meetings;  and  the  repose  of  the  world  will  be  con- 
stantly their  motive  and  their  end. 

It  is  with  these  sentiments  that  the  Sovereigns 
have  consummated  the  work  to  which  they  were 
called.  They  will  not  cease  to  labour  for  its  con- 
firmation and  perfection.  They  solemnly  acknowl- 
edge that  their  duties  towards  God  and  the  people 
whom  they  govern  make  it  peremptory  on  them  to 
give  to  the  world,  as  far  as  it  is  in  their  power,  an 
example  of  justice,  of  concord,  and  of  moderation; 
happy  in  the  power  of  consecrating,  from  henceforth, 
all  their  eflForts  to  protect  the  arts  of  peace,  to  in- 
crease the  internal  prosperity  of  their  States,  and  to 
awaken  those  sentiments  of  religion  and  morality, 
whose  influence  has  been  but  too  much  enfeebled 

by  the  misfortune  of  the  times. 
Aix-la-Chapell£,  15th  November,  1818. 


APPENDIX   B 

DANUBE    REGULATIONS 

Regulations  fixing  the  Order  of  Procedure  of  the 
European  Commission  of  the  Danube,  November 
10, 1879* 

I.— GENERAL  PROVISIONS 

Article  1.  Each  regular  full  session  is  presided 
over  by  a  delegate,  chosen  by  rotation,  in  the  alpha- 
betic order  of  the  powers  represented.  Each  dele- 
gate fills  the  oflEice  of  president  for  one  session.  The 
special  sessions  are  presided  over  by  the  president 
of  the  last  regular  session.  When  the  delegate 
whose  turn  it  is  to  be  president  is  absent  at  the 
opening  of  the  session,  the  office  passes  to  the  dele- 
gate next  in  line  according  to  the  alphabetic  order, 
which  cannot  be  changed. 

Article  2.  The  president  receives  the  credentials 
of  new  delegates.  He  calls  the  meetings  and  de- 
clares their  opening  and  closure.  He  directs  the 
discussions  and  establishes  during  the  meeting  the 
text  of  decisions  and  the  result  of  the  votes. 

If  one  of  the  delegates  requests,  the  roll  is  called 

*  Sturdza,  Recueil  des  Documents  relatifs  d  la  LibertS  de  Naviga- 
tion  du  Danube,  p.  127. 

182 


APPENDIX  B 

in  alphabetic  order  of  the  powers,  except  that  the 
president,  who  takes  the  vote,  casts  his  vote  last. 

Article  3.  During  a  regular  full  session  the  presi- 
dent supervises  the  drafting  of  the  protocols,  directs 
the  secretariat,  and  signs  the  correspondence  with 
the  authorities. 

Article  4.  The  commission  holds  two  regular  ses- 
sions every  year  and  assembles  for  this  purpose  in 
full  session  in  the  first  weeks  of  the  months  of  May 
and  November. 

Article  5.  The  executive  committee  addresses  to 
the  delegates  on  the  first  of  March  and  the  first  of 
September  of  each  year  a  resume  of  the  questions 
which  are  to  be  discussed  in  common  at  the  next 
session.  Every  proposal  submitted  after  that  date 
is  also  brought  promptly  to  the  notice  of  all  the 
delegates. 

A  proposal  made  in  the  course  of  a  session  can- 
not, as  a  rule,  be  discussed  in  the  session  in  which 
it  is  made. 

Propositions  for  an  increase  of  toll  on  sea-going 
vessels  can  only  be  voted  in  the  regular  session  fol- 
lowing that  in  the  course  of  which  they  have  been 
made. 

Article  6.  Delegates  who  do  not  attend  a  periodi- 
cal session  may  vote  in  writing. 

Article  7.  Article  5  only  applies  to  regular 
sessions. 

Article  8.  Regular  sessions  can  only  proceed  if 
there  are  at  least  five  delegates  present. 

There  may  be  extraordinary  sessions  on  a  request 

supported  by  five  delegates. 

183 


INTERNATIONAL  ADMINISTRATION 

Article  9.  When  the  annual  budget  of  receipts 
and  expenses  of  the  commission  is  not  voted  on  in 
time,  the  budget  of  the  preceding  year  remains  in 
force  till  the  next  full  meeting. 

Article  10.  A  session  is  not  considered  as  closed 
until  the  protocols  of  all  the  meetings  have  been 
approved  by  the  delegates  who  have  taken  part  in 
them. 

A  member  of  the  commission  may  confide  to  one 
of  his  colleagues  or  to  the  general  secretary  the 
power  of  approving  for  him  the  protocols  as  drafted. 

Article  11.  The  proces  verbaux  state  the  decisions 
of  the  commission  and  the  deliberations  that  have 
preceded  them. 

Each  delegate  is  entitled  to  have  inserted  in  the 
protocol  his  vote  by  writing. 

If  the  written  vote  is  not  formulated  till  after 
the  meeting,  delegates  of  a  different  opinion  may 
have  inserted  their  reserves  on  the  points  which,  in 
their  opinion,  would  not  have  been  developed  ver- 
bally by  the  delegate  who  has  given  his  vote  in 
writing. 

In  the  deliberations  relating  to  the  service  of  the 
personnel  and  the  administration,  the  protocols  of 
the  full  sessions  state  simply  the  decisions  taken 
without  mentioning  the  votes  given  for  or  against. 

The  discussion  relating  to  such  subjects  is  repro- 
duced in  detail  in  a  separate  report  which  is  men- 
tioned in  the  protocol  and  of  which  a  manuscript 
copy  is  given  to  each  delegate,  for  the  information 
of  his  government,  the  minute  remaining  in  the 
archives  of  the  commission. 

184 


APPENDIX  B 

When  a  person  other  than  a  delegate  gives  verbal 
explanations  during  a  full  session,  a  resume  of  his 
communication  is  communicated  to  him  for  revision 
before  being  finally  inserted  in  the  protocol. 

Article  12.  Decisions  are  by  a  majority  of  votes: 

(a)  When  it  is  a  question  of  form,  in  particular 
if  it  concerns  the  interior  service  of  the  commission, 
the  relations  of  the  commission  with  its  employees, 
details  of  execution  of  measures  decided  upon  in 
commission; 

(6)  When  it  is  a  question  of  modifying  the  tolls 
of  navigation  established  by  virtue  of  Article  16  of 
the  Treaty  of  Paris  of  March  30,  1856. 

On  important  questions  [questions  de  fond]  for 
which  unanimity  is  required,  decisions  made  unani- 
mously by  the  delegates  present  become  final  two 
months  after  having  been  communicated  to  the 
absent  delegates,  unless  a  formal  contrary  vote  is 
sent  by  one  or  several  of  these  delegates,  before  the 
expiration  of  the  said  period  of  two  months. 

II.— EXECUTIVE  COMMITTEE 

Article  13.  The  executive  committee  is  composed 
of  all  the  members  present  at  the  seat  of  the  com- 
mission, whatever  their  number  and  whatever  the 
length  of  their  stay. 

If  there  is  only  one  member  present  he  has  by 
right  full  power  to  dispose  of  urgent  matters. 

Article  14.  The  delegates  present  at  the  seat  of 
the  commission,  in  a  minimum  of  three,  as  a  court 
of  the  second  and  last  instance,  decide  appeals  to 
the  commission  from  condemnations  pronounced  in 

185 


INTERNATIONAL  ADMINISTRATION 

police  matters  by  the  inspector  of  navigation  and 
by  the  captain  of  the  port  of  Soulina. 

The  appeal  court  is  presided  over  by  the  delegate 
charged  with  the  direction  of  financial  affairs,  or  if 
he  be  not  present,  by  the  delegate  charged  with 
the  general  direction  of  the  administration. 

Article  15.  The  delegates  present  at  the  seat  of 
the  commission  are  charged  by  rotation  for  the 
period  of  one  month,  one  with  the  general  direction  of 
the  administration  of  the  commission,  and  another 
with  the  general  direction  of  its  financial  afiFairs; 
the  first  acts  with  the  title  of  administrative  delegate 
[Delegue  a  Tadministration] ;  the  second,  under  that 
of  financial  delegate  [Delegue  aux  Finances]. 

When  one  of  the  two  offices  becomes  vacant  it 
devolves  on  that  one  of  the  delegates  present  who 
has  been  the  longest  time  without  office. 

The  acceptance  of  an  office  does  not  imply  the 
obligation  to  remain  at  the  seat  of  the  conmiission 
during  the  whole  month. 

Article  16.  The  executive  committee,  when  it 
thinks  proper,  draws  up  a  proces-verbal  of  the  de- 
liberations. These  proces-verbaux  are  entitled: 
"  Proces-verbaux  of  the  Meeting  of  the  Executive 
Committee  of  the  European  Commission  at  the  date 
of  *  *  *  .'*  They  are  given  a  regular  number  under 
which  they  are  carried  on  the  journal  of  the  central 
bureau. 

Article  17.  All  directions,  all  orders  [for  supplies, 
work,  etc.]  instructions,  and  in  general  all  disposi- 
tions, originating  in  the  executive  committee  are 

put  in  writing. 

186 


APPENDIX  B 

The  minutes  are  signed  by  all  the  members  pres- 
ent, but  for  current  matters  the  signature  of  the 
two  delegates  in  oflBce  is  sufficient.  All  notes,  let- 
ters and  instructions  sent  in  relation  to  the  general 
service,  are  signed  by  the  administrative  delegate, 
and  all  relative  to  the  operation  of  the  treasury  by 
the  financial  delegate;  they  are  countersigned  by 
the  respective  chiefs  of  service. 

When  a  member  of  the  committee,  by  whom  a 
document  should  be  signed,  is  absent,  it  may  be 
signed  by  one  of  his  colleagues. 

Every  signature  by  a  delegate  on  any  document, 
including  pay  orders,  from  the  commission,  is  pre- 
ceded by  the  words  "For  the  European  Commission 
of  the  Danube." 

Article  18.  The  executive  committee  consults  the 
absent  delegates  on  important  questions. 

If  it  makes  decisions,  in  cases  of  emergency  which 
exceed  its  executive  capacity,  it  notifies  without 
delay  the  absent  delegates.  Decisions  of  the  com- 
mittee are  by  a  majority,  in  every  case  in  which,  for 
decisions  of  the  same  character  in  the  full  meetings, 
a  majority  would  suffice. 

But  if,  on  the  contrary,  questions  are  raised  for 
which  the  unanimity  would  be  necessary  in  a  full 
meeting,  the  committee  in  case  of  urgency  refers 
the  question  by  telegram  to  the  absent  delegates, 
whose  answer  is  awaited  for  ten  days.  If  there  be 
no  answer  within  this  time  the  committee  is  au- 
thorized to  put  its  decision  into  execution. 

Article    19.   The   administrative  delegate  super- 
vises especially  the  work  of  the  secretariat. 
187 


INTERNATIONAL  ADMINISTRATION 

Article  20.  Letters,  acts  and  documents  addressed 
to  the  commission  or  to  the  executive  committee 
are  opened  by  the  delegate  present  in  the  office;  if 
no  delegate  be  present  the  general  secretary  opens 
papers  received  and  has  them  entered  in  the  journal 
or  register. 

Important  papers  are  circulated  among  the  dele- 
gates present. 

At  the  end  of  each  month  the  general  secretary 
sends  to  the  delegates  who  do  not  reside  at  the  seat 
of  the  commission,  in  a  circular,  a  copy  of  the  record 
with  the  documents  entered  and  with  a  summary 
mention  of  the  decisions  arrived  at;  but  this  extract 
does  not  include  documents  concerning  current  mat- 
ters or  those  whose  communication  would  not  inter- 
est the  absent  delegates. 

Article  21.  When  a  delegate  who  is  alone  at  the 
seat  of  the  commission  has  the  intention  of  leaving, 
he  notifies  his  colleagues  by  telegraph,  as  soon  as 
his  intention  is  fiixed,  and  if  no  one  of  them  is  able 
to  take  his  place,  he  turns  over  the  direction  of  af- 
fairs to  one  of  the  chiefs  of  service  at  Galatz,  who 
directs  current  affairs  and  supervises  the  carrying 
out  of  the  decisions  of  the  fuU  commission  under  his 
own  responsibility;  he  signs  all  documents,  includ- 
ing pay  orders.* 

*  Arts.  22  to  28  deal  with  Accounts  and  Financial  Matters. 


APPENDIX  C 

THE    INTERNATIONAL   SUGAR 
CONVENTION 

I.— THE  CONVENTION  OF  MARCH  5.  1902 

Convention  between  Great  Britain,  Germany,  Austria, 
Hungary,  Belgium,  Spain,  France,  Italy,  Nether- 
lands, and  Sweden,  relative  to  Bounties  on  Sugar, 
signed  at  Brussels,  March  6,  1902.* 

Translation 

Article  1.  The  High  Contracting  Parties  engage 
to  suppress,  from  the  date  of  the  coming  into  force 
of  the  present  Convention,  the  direct  and  indirect 
bounties  by  which  the  production  or  exportation  of 
sugar  may  profit,  and  not  to  establish  bounties  of 
such  a  kind  during  the  whole  continuance  of  the 
said  Convention.  For  the  application  of  this  pro- 
vision, sugar-sweetened  products,  such  as  preserves, 
chocolates,  biscuits,  condensed  milk,  and  all  other 
analogous  products  containing,  in  a  notable  pro- 
portion, artificially  incorporated  sugar,  are  assimi- 
lated to  sugar. 

The  preceding  paragraph  applies  to  all  advan- 

*  Hertslet's  Commercial  Treaties,  Vol.  XXHI,  p.  679. 
189 


INTERNATIONAL  ADMINISTRATION 

tages  derived  directly  or  indirectly,  by  the  several 
categories  of  producers,  from  State  fiscal  legislation, 
and  in  particular  to — 

(a)  Direct  bonuses  granted  on  exportation; 

(b)  Direct  bonuses  granted  to  production; 

(c)  Total  or  partial  exemptions  from  taxation 
which  profit  a  part  of  the  products  of  manufacture; 

(d)  Profits  derived  from  excess  of  yield; 

(e)  Profits  derived  from  too  high  a  drawback; 
(/)  Advantages  derived  from  any  surtax  in  excess 

of  the  rate  fixed  by  Article  3. 

Article  2.  The  High  Contracting  Parties  engage 
to  place  in  bond,  under  the  continuous  supervision, 
both  by  day  and  by  night,  of  Revenue  officers,  sugar 
factories  and  sugar  refineries,  as  well  as  factories 
for  the  extraction  of  sugar  from  molasses. 

For  this  purpose  the  factories  shall  be  so  arranged 
as  to  afford  every  guarantee  against  the  surreptitious 
removal  of  sugar,  and  the  officers  shall  have  the 
right  of  entry  into  all  parts  of  the  factories. 

Check  registers  shall  be  kept  respecting  one  or 
more  of  the  processes  of  manufacture,  and  finished 
sugar  shall  be  placed  in  special  warehouses  affording 
every  requisite  guarantee  of  security. 

Article  3.  The  High  Contracting  Parties  engage 
to  limit  the  surtax — that  is  to  say  the  difference  be- 
tween the  rate  of  duty  or  taxation  to  which  foreign 
sugar  is  liable,  and  the  rate  of  duty  or  taxation  to 
which  home-produced  sugar  is  subject — to  a  maxi- 
mum of  6  fr.  per  100  kilog.  on  refined  sugar  and  on 
sugar  which  may  be  classed  as  refined,  and  to  5 

fr.  50  c.  on  other  sugar. 

'  190 


APPENDIX  C 

This  provision  is  not  intended  to  apply  to  the 
rate  of  import  duty  in  countries  which  produce  no 
sugar;  neither  is  it  applicable  to  the  by-products 
of  sugar  manufacture  and  of  sugar  refining. 

Article  4.  The  High  Contracting  Parties  engage 
to  impose  a  special  duty  on  the  importation  into 
their  territories  of  sugar  from  those  countries  which 
may  grant  bounties  either  on  production  or  on  ex- 
portation. 

This  duty  shall  not  be  less  than  the  amount  of 
the  bounties,  direct  or  indirect,  granted  in  the 
country  of  origin.  The  High  Contracting  Parties 
reserve  to  themselves,  each  so  far  as  concerns  itself, 
the  right  to  prohibit  the  importation  of  bounty-fed 
sugar. 

In  order  to  calculate  the  amount  of  the  advan- 
tages eventually  derived  from  the  surtax  specified 
under  letter  (f)  of  Article  1,  the  figure  fixed  by 
Article  3  is  deducted  from  the  amount  of  this  sur- 
tax; half  of  this  difference  is  considered  to  represent 
the  bounty,  the  Permanent  Commission  instituted 
by  Article  7  having  the  right,  at  the  request  of  a 
Contracting  State,  to  revise  the  figure  thus  obtained. 

Article  5.  The  High  Contracting  Parties  engage 
reciprocally  to  admit  at  the  lowest  rates  of  their 
tariffs  of  import  duties  sugar  the  produce  either  of 
the  Contracting  States  or  of  those  Colonies  or  Pos- 
sessions of  the  said  States  which  do  not  grant 
bounties,  and  to  which  the  obUgations  of  Article 
8  are  applicable. 

Cane  sugar  and  beet  sugar  may  not  be  subjected 
to  different  duties. 

13  191 


INTERNATION.VL  ADMINISTRATION 

Article  6.  Spain,  Italy,  and  Sweden  shall  be 
exempted  from  the  engagements  which  form  the 
subject  of  Articles  1,  2,  and  3  so  long  as  they  do 
not  export  sugar. 

Those  States  engage  to  adapt  their  sugar  legisla- 
tion to  the  provisions  of  the  Convention  within  one 
year — or  earher  if  possible — from  the  time  at  which 
the  Permanent  Commission  shall  have  found  that 
the  above-mentioned  condition  has  ceased  to  exist. 

Article  7.  The  High  Contracting  Parties  agree  to 
establish  a  Permanent  Commission  charged  with 
supervising  the  execution  of  the  provisions  of  the 
present  Convention. 

This  Commission  shall  be  composed  of  delegates 
of  the  several  Contracting  States,  and  a  Permanent 
Bureau  shall  be  attached  to  it.  The  Commission 
elects  its  President;  it  will  sit  at  Brussels  and  will 
assemble  at  the  summons  of  the  President. 

The  duties  of  the  delegates  will  be: — 

(a)  To  pronounce  whether  in  the  Contracting 
States  no  direct  or  indirect  bounty  is  granted  on 
the  production  or  on  the  exportation  of  sugar. 

(6)  To  pronounce  whether  the  States  referred  to 
in  Article  6  continue  to  fulfil  the  special  condition 
foreseen  by  that  Article. 

(c)  To  pronounce  whether  bounties  exist  in  the 
Non-Signatory  States,  and  to  estimate  the  amount 
thereof  for  the  purposes  of  Article  4. 

(d)  To  deliver  an  opinion  on  contested  questions. 

(e)  To  prepare  for  consideration  requests  for  ad- 
mission to  the  Union  made  by  States  which  have 
not  taken  part  in  the  present  Convention. 

192 


APPENDIX  C 

It  will  be  the  duty  of  the  Permanent  Bureau  to 
collect,  translate,  arrange,  and  publish  information 
of  all  kinds  respecting  legislation  on  and  statistics 
of  sugar,  not  only  in  the  Contracting  States,  but  in 
other  States  as  well. 

In  order  to  insure  the  execution  of  the  preceding 
provisions,  the  High  Contracting  Parties  shall  com- 
municate, through  the  diplomatic  channel,  to  the 
Belgian  Government,  which  shall  forward  them  to 
the  Commission,  the  Laws,  Orders,  and  Regulations 
on  the  taxation  of  sugar  which  are  or  may  in  the 
future  be  in  force  in  their  respective  countries,  as 
well  as  statistical  information  relative  to  the  ob- 
ject of  the  present  Convention. 

Each  of  the  High  Contracting  Parties  may  be 
represented  on  the  Commission  by  a  Delegate,  or 
by  a  Delegate  and  Assistant  Delegates. 

Austria  and  Hungary  shall  be  considered  as  sepa- 
rate Contracting  Parties. 

The  first  meeting  of  the  Commission  shall  be 
held  in  Brussels,  imder  arrangements  to  be  made  by 
the  Belgian  Government,  at  least  three  months  be- 
fore the  coming  into  force  of  the  present  Convention. 

The  duty  of  the  Commission  shall  be  limited  to 

findings  and  investigations.     It  shall  draw  up  a 

report  on  all  questions  submitted  to  it,  and  forward 

the  same  to  the  Belgian  Government,  which  shall 

communicate  it  to  the  States  interested,  and,  at 

the  request  of  one  of  the  High  Contracting  Parties, 

shall  convoke  a  Conference,  which  shall  take  such 

decisions  or  measures  as  circumstances  demand. 

The  findings  and  calculations  referred  to  under 
199 


INTERNATIONAL  ADMINISTRATION 

letters  (6)  and  (c)  must,  however,  be  acted  on  by 
the  Contracting  States;  they  will  be  passed  by  a 
vote  of  the  majority — each  Contracting  State  having 
one  vote — and  they  will  take  eflFect  in  two  months* 
time  at  the  latest.  Should  one  of  the  Contracting 
States  consider  it  necessary  to  appeal  against  a 
decision  of  the  Commission,  the  said  State  must, 
within  eight  days  of  notification  to  it  of  the  said 
decision,  require  a  fresh  discussion  by  the  Com- 
mission; the  Commission  will  immediately  hold 
a  meeting,  and  will  pronounce  its  final  decision 
within  one  month  of  the  date  of  the  appeal.  The 
new  decision  shall  take  effect,  at  latest,  within  two 
months  of  its  delivery.  The  same  procedure  will 
be  followed  with  regard  to  the  preparation  for  con- 
sideration of  demands  for  admission  provided  for 
under  letter  (e). 

The  expenses  incurred  on  account  of  the  organi- 
zation and  working  of  the  Permanent  Bureau  and 
of  the  Commission — excepting  the  salaries  or  allow- 
ances of  the  Delegates,  who  shall  be  paid  by  their 
respective  countries — shall  be  borne  by  all  the 
Contracting  States,  and  shall  be  divided  among 
them  in  a  manner  to  be  determined  by  the  Com- 
mission. 

Article  8.  The  High  Contracting  Parties  engage, 
for  themselves  and  for  their  Colonies  or  possessions, 
exception  being  made  in  the  case  of  the  self-govern- 
ing Colonies  of  Great  Britain  and  the  British  East 
Indies,  to  take  the  necessary  measures  to  prevent 
bounty-fed  sugar  which  has  passed  in  transit 
through  the  territory  of  a  Contracting  State  from 

194 


APPENDIX  C 

enjoying  the  benefits  of  the  Convention  in  the 
market  to  which  it  is  being  sent.  The  Permanent 
Commission  shall  make  the  necessary  proposals 
with  regard  to  this  matter. 

Article  9.  States  which  have  not  taken  part  in 
the  present  Convention  shall  be  admitted  to  adhere 
to  it  at  their  request,  and  after  concm'rence  has 
been  expressed  by  the  Permanent  Commission. 

The  request  shall  be  addressed  through  the  diplo- 
matic channel  to  the  Belgian  Government,  which 
shall  undertake,  when  occasion  arises,  to  notify 
the  adhesion  to  all  the  other  Governments.  The 
adhesion  shall  entail,  as  of  right,  acceptance  of  all 
the  obligations  and  admission  to  all  the  advantages 
stipulated  by  the  present  Convention,  and  will  take 
effect  as  from  the  1st  September  following  the  de- 
spatch of  the  notification  by  the  Belgian  Govern- 
ment to  the  other  Contracting  States. 

Article  10.  The  present  Convention  shall  come 
into  force  from  the  1st  September,  1903. 

It  shall  remain  in  force  for  five  years  from  that 
date,  and  in  the  case  of  none  of  the  High  Contract- 
ing Parties  having  notified  to  the  Belgian  Govern- 
ment, twelve  months  before  the  expiration  of  the 
said  period  of  five  years,  its  intention  of  termina- 
ting the  effects  thereof,  it  shall  continue  to  remain 
in  force  for  one  year,  and  so  on  from  year  to  year. 

In  the  event  of  one  of  the  Contracting  States 

denouncing  the  Convention,  such  denunciation  shall 

have  effect  only  in  respect  to  such  State;  the  other 

States  shall  retain,  until  the  31st  October  of  the 

year  in  which  the  denunciation  takes  place,  the  right 

195 


.  INTERNATIONAL  ADMINISTRATION 

of  notifying  their  intention  of  withdrawing  as  from 
the  1st  September  of  the  following  year.  If  one  of 
these  latter  States  desires  to  exercise  this  right,  the 
Belgian  Government  shall  summon  a  conference  at 
Brussels  within  three  months  to  consider  the  meas- 
ures to  be  taken. 

Article  11.  The  provisions  of  the  present  Con- 
vention shall  apply  to  the  oversea  Provinces, 
Colonies  and  foreign  Possessions  of  the  High  Con- 
tra,cting  Parties.  The  British  and  Netherland 
Colonies  and  Possessions  are  excepted,  save  as  re- 
gards the  provisions  forming  the  object  of  Articles 
5  and  8. 

The  position  of  the  British  and  Netherland  Colo- 
nies and  Possessions  is,  furthermore,  regulated  by 
the  Declarations  inserted  in  the  Final  Protocol. 

Article  li^.  The  fulfilment  of  the  mutual  engage- 
ments contained  in  the  present  Convention  is 
subject,  as  far  as  necessary,  to  the  completion 
of  the  formalities  and  requirements  established  by 
the  Con^itutional  laws  of  each  of  the  Contracting 
States. 

The  present  Convention  shall  be  ratified,  and  the 
ratifications  shall  be  deposited  at  the  Ministry  for 
Foreign  Affairs  at  Brussels,  on  the  1st  February, 
1903,  or  earlier  if  possible. 

It  is  understood  that  the  present  Convention 
shall  become  binding,  as  of  right,  only  if  it  is  ratified 
by  those  at  least  of  the  Contracting  States  who  are 
not  the  subject  of  the  exceptional  provision  of  Arti- 
cle 6.     Should  one  or  more  of  the  said  States  not 

have  deposited  their  ratifications  within  the  period 

196 


APPENDIX  C 

stipulated,  the  Belgian  Government  shall  immedi- 
ately take  steps  to  obtain  a  decision  by  the  other 
Signatory  Powers  as  to  whether  the  present  Con- 
vention shall  come  into  force  among  them  alone. 

FINAL  PROTOCOL 

On  proceeding  to  the  signature  of  the  Sugar  Con- 
vention concluded  this  day  between  the  Govern- 
ments of  Germany,  of  Austria,  and  of  Hungary, 
of  Belgium,  of  Spain,  of  France,  of  Great  Britain, 
of  Italy,  of  the  Netheriands,  and  of  Sweden,  the 
undersigned  Plenipotentiaries  have  agreed  as  follows: 

AS  REGARDS   ARTICLE  III 

Considering  that  the  object  of  the  surtax  is  the 
eflfectual  protection  of  the  home  markets  of  the  pro- 
ducing countries,  the  High  Contracting  Parties  re- 
serve to  themselves  the  right,  each  as  concerns  itself, 
to  propose  an  increase  of  the  surtax,  should  con- 
siderable quantities  of  sugar  produced  by  one  of 
the  Contracting  States  enter  their  territories;  this 
increase  would  only  apply  to  sugar  produced  by 
that  State. 

The  proposal  must  be  addressed  to  the  Permanent 

Commission,  which  will  decide,  at  an  early  date, 

by  a  vote  of  the  majority,  whether  there  is  good 

ground  for  the  proposed  measure,  as  to  the  period 

for  which  it  shall  be  enforced,  and  as  to  the  rate 

of  the  increase;    the  latter  shall  not  exceed  1  fr. 

per  100  kilog. 

The  assent  of  the  Commission  shall  be  given  only 
197 


INTERNATIONAL  ADMINISTRATION 

when  the  invasion  of  the  market  concerned  is  the 
consequence  of  real  economic  inferiority,  and  not 
the  result  of  a  factitious  increase  in  price  brought 
about  by  an  agreement  among  producers. 

AS   REGARDS   ARTICLE   XI 

(A)  1.  The  Government  of  Great  Britain  declares 
that  no  bounty,  direct  or  indirect,  shall  be  granted 
to  the  sugar  of  the  Crown  Colonies  during  the  con- 
tinuance of  the  Convention. 

2.  It  also  declares,  as  an  exceptional  measure, 
and  reserving  in  principle  entire  liberty  of  action 
as  regards  the  fiscal  relations  between  the  United 
Kingdom  and  its  Colonies  and  Possessions,  that, 
during  the  continuance  of  the  Convention,  no  pref- 
erence will  be  granted  in  the  United  Kingdom  to 
Colonial  sugar  as  against  sugar  from  the  Con- 
tracting States. 

3.  Lastly,  it  declares  that  the  Convention  will  be 
submitted  by  it  to  the  self-governing  Colonies  and 
to  the  East  Indies,  so  that  they  may  have  an  op- 
portunity of  giving  their  adhesion  to  it. 

It  is  understood  that  the  Government  of  His 
Britannic  Majesty  has  power  to  adhere  to  the 
Convention  on  behalf  of  the  Crown  Colonies. 

{B)  The  Government  of  the  Netherlands  declares 
that  during  the  continuance  of  the  Convention  no 
bounty,  direct  or  indirect,  shall  be  granted  to  sugar 
from  the  Netherland  Colonies,  and  that  such  sugar 
shall  not  be  admitted  into  the  Netherlands  at  a 
lower  tarijff  than  that  applied  to  sugar  from  the 
Contracting   States. 

198 


APPENDIX  C 

The  present  Final  Protocol,  which  shall  be  rati- 
fied at  the  same  time  as  the  Convention  concluded 
this  day,  shall  be  regarded  as  forming  an  integral 
part  of  the  Convention,  and  shall  have  the  same 
force,  value  and  duration. 

II.— THE  ADDITIONAL  ACT  OF  AUGUST  28,  1907 

Additional  Act  between  Great  Britain,  Austria  and 
Hungary,  Belgium,  France,  Germany,  Italy, 
Luxemburg,  Netherlands,  Peru,  Sweden,  and 
Switzerland,  to  the  International  Sugar  Conven- 
tion of  March  5,  1902.  Signed  at  Brussels  on 
August  28,  1907,* 

Translation 

Article  1.  The  Contracting  States  engage  to 
maintain  the  Convention  of  March  5,  1902,  in 
force,  during  a  new  period  of  five  years,  to  date  from 
September  1,  1908. 

However,  it  will  be  lawful  for  any  of  them  to 
withdraw  from  the  Convention  after  September, 
1,  1911,  after  one  year's  notice  if,  in  the  last  meeting 
held  before  September  1,  1910,  the  Permanent  Com- 
mission has,  by  a  majority  vote,  decided  that  the 
circumstances  justify  allowing  this  privilege  to  the 
Contracting  States. 

Otherwise,  the  provisions  of  Article  10  of  the 
said  Convention  of  March  5,  1902,  in  regard  to  its 
denunciation  and  its  tacit  renewal,  will  remain 
applicable. 

•See  Hertslet's  Commercial  Treaties,  Vol.  XXV,  p.  547. 
199 


'     INTERNATIONAL  ADMINISTRATION 

Article  2.  In  derogation  of  Article  1,  Great  Bri- 
tain will  be  freed,  from  September  1,  1908,  from  the 
obligation  created  by  Article  4  of  the  Convention. 

From  the  same  date,  the  Contracting  States  may 
exact  that,  in  order  to  enjoy  the  benefits  of  the 
Convention,  sugar  refined  in  the  United  Kingdom 
and  exported  to  these  states,  must  be  accom- 
panied by  a  certificate  showing  that  no  part  of  this 
sugar  previously  came  from  a  country  recognized 
by  the  Permanent  Commission  as  according  boun- 
ties for  the  production  or  exportation  of  sugar. 

Article  3.  The  present  Additional  Act  will  be 
ratified  and  the  ratifications  will  be  deposited  at 
Brussels  with  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  at 
the  earliest  possible  date,  and  in  any  case  before 
February  1,  1908. 

It  will  not  become  lawfully  binding  until  it  is 
ratified  by  all  those  of  the  Contracting  States  which 
are  not  covered  by  the  exceptional  provisions  of 
Article  6  of  the  Convention.  In  the  event  that  one 
or  more  of  the  said  States  shall  not  have  deposited 
their  ratifications  within  the  time  allowed,  the  Bel- 
gian Government  will  ask  for  a  decision,  within  a 
month  from  February  1,  1908,  on  the  part  of  those 
States  which  have  ratified,  as  to  their  willingness 
to  put  the  Additional  Act  into  effect  among  them- 
selves alone. 

The  States  which  shall  not  have  ratified  it  before 
its  expiration  on  February  1,  1908,  will  be  consid- 
ered as  having  denounced  the  Convention  in  suffi- 
cient time  so  that  it  ceases  to  apply  to  them  from 

September  1st  following,  unless  a  contrary  decision 
800 


APPENDIX  C 

is  taken,  at  the  request  of  those  interested,  by  a 
majority  of  States  called  to  decide  as  provided  for 
in  the  preceding  paragraph. 

In  testimony  of  which  the  respective  plenipoten- 
tiaries have  signed  the  present  Additional  Act. 


THE  END 


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